

## ABSTRACT

### POLITICAL SCIENCE

DRAMMEH SR., SHEIKH TIJAN B.A. UNIVERSITY OF WEST GEORGIA, 2001

M.P.A. UNIVERSITY OF WEST GEORGIA, 2003

M.B.A. UNIVERSITY OF WEST GEORGIA, 2008

THE *DEMOCARASSIE* MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON POLITICAL  
STABILITY IN SENEGAL

Committee Chair: F. S. J. Ledgister, Ph.D.

Dissertation dated May 2015

A democratic system of government has become analogous with peace, economic prosperity, and political stability (no coup d'état). This observation generally holds true for advanced liberal democracies, but not for those democracies and emerging democracies in West Africa. Given the dismal condition of both economic prosperity and political stability, it seems as if the liberal democratic model is unable to uphold prosperity and stability in West Africa.

However, despite similarities in experience of the sixteen countries in the sub-region, since attaining independence, only Senegal and Cape Verde remain relatively prosperous, and more significantly, coup-less (no successful coups) and relatively stable. Within this background the inquiry therefore becomes, despite similar experiences, what explains the different outcome: the outcome of high level of political instability coupling

with low level of democratic consolidation indicative of the sub-region, against considerable democratization and political stability in Senegal and Cape Verde? This trajectory becomes perplexing enough to warrant further study, thus, the central purpose of this dissertation.

In explaining this conundrum, the dissertation focuses on Senegal. It is this study's position that the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal. Therefore, the study suggests that what explains political stability in Senegal is referred to in this study as the *Democarassie* model (the Senegalese model of democracy). Despite the *Democarassie* model's grounding in the liberal democratic tradition, the model acknowledges and accommodates Senegal's unique reality. In the case of Senegal, this unique reality is referred to in this study as "Establishments", all headed by "Customary Authorities." Together these establishments and their customary authorities play an intricate role in maintaining democracy and political stability. Considering the far reaching powers and influence of the customary authorities over the *demos*, the *Democarassie* model seems to exhibit the hallmarks of a flawed or pseudo-democracy. Nonetheless, the *Democarassie* model promotes self-rule and self-determination, allowing citizens the luxury to genuinely participate in choosing and holding their leaders accountable.

With an exploratory qualitative case study analysis, the study examines the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal. This examination reveals the indispensable role of customary authorities in upholding a unique democratic system that in turn upholds political stability in Senegal.

THE *DEMOCARASSIE* MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON POLITICAL  
STABILITY IN SENEGAL

A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY  
SHEIKH TIJAN DRAMMEH SR.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

MAY 2015

© 2015

SHEIKH TIJAN DRAMMEH SR.

All Rights Reserved



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Through this humbling experience, I honor and extend my sincere and heartfelt accolades to Mr. K. O. Jobarteh who sowed the germ of higher education and believed in me before anyone else did. Thanks KO, rest in eternal peace. Brother Mbye, thank you for the air ticket and making the trip possible. Mr. Mo, my brother, best friend, thank for your genuine love and support all these years. Mr. Al thank you for seeing us through high school. Most importantly, thank you Mambouy. All glory goes back to you, and I am honored to be your child. My sincere gratitude to Auntie Amie, Mamie, Sai, Adu and all my siblings, especially Ebou Sainey for all your support and love through the years. Thank you Mr. Jim for the early years in the United States. My sincere gratitude also goes to I.B.K. Sinyan and Ya Mamie and all my Serre-Kunda Boys (*Sune Boys Ye*) at Westfield. I would also like to thank all those who helped me through this daunting process: my committee chair Dr. F.S.J. Ledgister, and my mentor and brother, Dr. George Klay Kieh. Honestly, this dissertation would have finished without Dr. Kieh's unwavering support. Kudos to all my UWG colleagues for their encouragement, particularly Drs. Schaefer, Peralta, and Howe. Keeping the best for last, I would like to thank my wife, Sanou and our beautiful blessings; Alieu, FatuYamu Jama, Amy, Sophie and Sheikh Tijan Jr. and our Auntie Sophie. Thank you all for your support, sacrifice, and encouragement. Sanou dearest, I am ready for all those missed dates. Here is a promise, no more sharing your husband with a dissertation (second wife).

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	viii
LIST OF TABLES .....	ix
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .....	1
Senegal on Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy: A Brief Introduction to the Case Study .....	12
Research Question .....	20
Significance of the Study .....	20
Organization of the Study .....	21
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....	23
Political Stability in the General Literature .....	24
Political Stability in Africa with a West Africa Focus .....	26
Democracy and the Democratization Process.....	30
Analysis of the Literature.....	44
General Consensus: Spirit and Values of the Democratic Model.....	44
Beyond the General Consensus .....	48
The Democratic Model: A Chameleon.....	51
True Color of the Chameleon: Debate between the Believers and Doubters/Critics of the Democratic Model .....	53
Is the Liberal Democratic Model a One-Size-Fits-All Model, or a Misfit for Some Nation? .....	55
Is <i>the Democarassie</i> Model A Customized Refit?.....	57

Gap in the Literature .....	60
Conclusion .....	62
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE <i>DEMOCARASSIE</i> MODEL.....	65
The Nature: Decentralize Despotism within the Backdrop of Political Sociology, Democratic Pluralism, and Consociation Theory.....	68
The Values .....	71
The Elements .....	73
The Operations of the Model .....	74
Outcomes .....	76
How Democratic is The <i>Democarassie</i> Model? .....	76
Conclusion .....	78
IV. METHODOLOGY .....	81
Conceptual Issues: Political Stability.....	81
The Coup D'état.....	87
Democracy and the Democratization Process.....	90
The <i>Democarassie</i> Model: A Conceptualization.....	95
Data, Data Sources, and Data Collection Method .....	101
The Theoretical Underpinnings and Justifications for a Qualitative Explanatory Case Study Analysis as a Research Method for Exploring the Implications of the <i>Democarassie</i> Model on Political Stability in Senegal.....	102
The Case Study Approach .....	103
The Qualitative Method .....	106
Conclusion .....	108

V. THE CASE STUDY: THE <i>DEMOCARASSIE</i> MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN SENEGAL.....	110
A Comparative Prelude.....	115
West Africa: Challenges and Solutions to Democracy and Political Stability ....	116
Senegal: Challenges and Solutions to Democracy and Political Stability .....	127
The State of Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy in West Africa .....	132
Plausible Explanations to Political Stability in Senegal as a Democracy.....	134
The State of Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy in Senegal ...	135
Democratization & Democracy in Senegal.....	142
The <i>Democarassie</i> Model: Democracy the Senegalese Way .....	146
The Values .....	149
The Elements .....	150
The Institutions: The <i>Democarassie</i> Model-Decentralize Despotism and the Role of Establishments and Customary Authority and its Implications on Political Stability in Senegal .....	151
Political Establishment: Political System, Government Apparatus (National, Regional Local), Political Parties, Party Machine, and the Body Politic.....	158
Civic Establishment: Religious, Socio-cultural and Economic Dimension.....	163
Muslim Brotherhood and the Religious Dimension .....	164
The Socio-Cultural Dimension .....	170
The Economic Dimension.....	173
Military Establishment: Armed Forces.....	174

VI.	FINDINGS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.....	181
	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	186

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Exchanges between the Political Regime Headed by the President and the Establishments Headed by Customary Authorities and its Implications on Political Stability.....	75
Figure 5.1. Political Stability in Senegal 1960-2004 (Center for Systemic Peace) .....	139

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Successful Coups d'état in West Africa from 1963 to 2013 (The First 50 Years).....	7
Table 4.1. Sources of Political Instability .....	87
Table 5.1. Center for Systemic Peace Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility .....	138
Table 5.2. WGI: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism .....	141
Table 5.3. African Elections Database Political Designation for Senegal 1960-2014.....	144
Table 5.4. Senegal Presidential Elections since Independence-1960 to 2011 .....	144
Table 5.5. Freedom House: Senegal Freedom Score 2002-2013.....	145

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Although the genesis of democracy traces back to the Athenian Greeks and the Romans more than 2500 years ago, by the Enlightenment epoch spanning the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, democratic systems began to flourish in earnest in modern Western European countries. Even though Europeans fought wars amongst themselves, with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, amongst other arrangements, Europeans decided to explore peace and other engagements. As a result, part of the intra-European exchanges and conflict resolutions included collaboration and the exploration of other means of solving differences rather than making war against and amongst each other. This peaceful resolution posture was also in line with the European Enlightenment ideals. Arguably, the Enlightenment ideals and the Westphalia Treaty promoted peace and collaboration underpins the liberal democratic tradition in Europe today. These democratic ideals were further solidified in the West (Europe and the United States) by the American and French Revolutions, both in the last quarter of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, that liberal democratic framework has by and large helped foster both in-country and cross-border political stability in Europe.

In the spirit of the “Peace of Westphalia” and the guarantees of liberal democracy, Europe ushered in an unprecedented era of peace, prosperity, and political



stability. Even though Europeans engaged in two total wars (World War I and World War II) in the twentieth century, European liberal democracies generally avoided collapsing; most particularly, by avoiding the coup d'état experience over at-least a century, they remain generally stable and prosperous. Such stability and prosperity indicative of developed liberal democracies can be explained from different levels of analyses, including but not limited to the international system, the global north/global south dynamic, political and economic systems, level of development, and degree of dependency; however, the fact remains that these developed liberal democracies remain generally prosperous, politically stable, and coup-less.

Within this background and moving forward to the end of the last century (twentieth), one observes a similar effect. Paralleling the surge of democracy following the Enlightenment in Europe and following the fall of the Soviet Union and Marxism-Leninism ideology, the 1990s also witnessed a surge in democracy resulting in the triumph of the liberal democratic framework. This surge ushered in what Samuel Huntington popularized as the “third wave” of democracy to many parts of the world including developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. According to Huntington, this third wave started on April 25, 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal with a coup that unwittingly triggered a global democratic movement.<sup>1</sup> The “third wave” of democracy has come to be characterized with a global embrace of the liberal democratic model, especially in the developing countries including countries in Africa. However, regardless of this surge of democracy, given the state of economic stagnation and political instability

---

<sup>1</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1991), 3-4.

manifested with the high frequency of coups d'état and other forms of political instability, one observes a major disconnect of the liberal democratic model from the upholding and fostering of political stability and prosperity. As it is now evident, following the "third wave," many African countries from Algeria to Zimbabwe consider themselves democracies of sorts, and as a result, adopt the liberal democratic framework or at minimum, operate under the liberal democratic tradition of holding elections. However, besides a few bright spots and the promising few, these "third wave" democracies, especially in Africa, unlike their developed democracy counterparts, are by and large, unable to prosper economically, maintain political stability, and keep the threat of the coup at bay.

Within this backdrop, with the liberal democratic model, prosperity, and political instability in the West African sub region as the focus, an exception to the rule of the lack of democratic consolidation and political instability is the country of Senegal. With the absence of the coup as the main indicator of political stability in the West-African sub-region, only Senegal and Cape Verde have been able to avoid the coup to so far remain relatively prosperous, politically stable, and democratic. However, it is interesting to point out that a second glance reveals that, even though Senegal is considered a democracy, as already mentioned, the Western liberal democratic model, cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal. Despite the fact that the Senegalese model of democracy is grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, the Senegalese model of democracy veers from the liberal democratic model by taking into consideration Senegal's unique realities. As a result, the Senegalese model of democracy is arguably

not in total compliance with the liberal democratic model. However, albeit the liberal democratic model and developed democracies, Senegal's unique model helps maintain political stability in Senegal for over sixty years, despite the dismal political stability record of this sub-region.

Even though one agrees that the “values” and “spirit” of democracy yields to universality, it is argued that the uniqueness in realities, situations, and challenges faced by individual nations must not only be considered but also accommodated within the framework of the liberal democratic model; however, the current Western liberal democratic model fails to do so. With Senegal as a case in point, it is suggested in this study that the version of the liberal democratic model that helps maintain prosperity and political stability in advanced democracies does not quite fit as neatly with unique realities and exceptional situation(s) of developing democracies, therefore falling short in upholding prosperity and political stability. Consequently, it is observed here that the current Western liberal democratic model falls short in taking unique realities into account. As a result, it is reiterated that the liberal democratic model falls short of explaining political stability in Senegal and the few emerging democratic “bright spots” in Africa. This is the dilemma the study seeks to address.

Given the current challenges to democracy and the political instability that closely trails, governments around the world are waking up to a new reality. This reality partially informs events such the Arab Spring, the proliferation of illiberal democracies, and dictators ascending to power through democratic mechanisms. The logic of the democratic model in the creation of economic prosperity is also currently being

challenged by the performing Chinese “undemocratic” model. Countries around the world from Egypt to Zimbabwe, Syria to Iraq, Ukraine and around Europe to Russia, Thailand to Indonesia, and Argentina to Venezuela, countries around the world are grappling with this reality. These currents of democratic challenges and political instability (particularly political instability) are also very strong in West Africa. In this milieu, the relationship between the liberal democratic model and political stability must be revisited and further explored. This is worth further exploration especially at a time when many countries in the sub-region including Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Nigeria are facing mounting political stability challenges. In Mali, for example, the current situation in 2014 is still fluid and unfolding, but remains daunting. Nigeria, another example, is currently dealing with problems posed by *Boko Haram* in the context of terrorism and the wider global war on terror that is escalating instability and show no signs of abating. Considering the recent actions of groups such as *Ansar Dine*, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), *Al Nusra*, *Al Shabaab* and many other terrorist groups, these groups are posing significant challenges to stability in West Africa and around the world. Also alarming is the stagnation, or even a general trend of democracy in retreat in the sub-region. Given this catalogue of political stability challenges, if two countries in a sub region of sixteen counties are able to beat the odds so far, to remain both democratic and politically stable, these countries are worth studying.

In the backdrop of these events and in the interest of more profound understanding of the relationship between democracy and political stability, the study chooses to examine Senegal, one of the two countries that so far avoided the coup. One of

the main reasons for choosing Senegal and not Cape Verde is that, as an independent country, Senegal is older. Given significant similarities, if one could understand the relationship between the democratization process and democracy in Senegal and its implications on political stability, this deepens the understanding of the current state of lackluster democratic consolidation and political instability manifested in the high frequency of coups in the sub-region.

In earnest, the winds of independence started blowing over West Africa in the late 1950s. With the exception of Liberia (independent in 1847), starting with Ghana in 1957, the circle of political independence for West Africa's sixteen states became complete with Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau's attainment of independence from Portugal in 1975. High hopes, bright future, high expectations, even "irrational exuberance"<sup>2</sup>, from commoners and the elite alike, characterized the mood in West Africa during the wave of independence in the early 1960s.

However, this era of hope was short-lived; by the mid-1960s, the reality of political instability became clearly evident. Like a set of dominoes, starting with Togo in 1963, one after the other, all the West African countries with the exception of Senegal and Cape Verde, eventually succumbed to political instability as manifested in the frequent coups d'état and other sources of instability prevalent in the sub-region. Such sources of instability include but are not limited to secessions, irredentism, civil wars, revolutions, riots, rebellions, strikes, religious conflicts, ethnic conflicts, uprisings, demonstrations, liberation and wars of liberation, genocide, and politicides. Issaka K.

---

<sup>2</sup> An emphasis on the exaggerated optimism that the attainment of independence and self-rule will solve all problems and usher in a new era of peace, prosperity and self-determination.

Souaré painted this picture well. According to Souaré, “Since independence, the West African sub-region has experienced numerous armed conflicts, including five full scale civil wars, thirty-nine successful coups d’état (and counting), three protracted separatist rebellions, and numerous attempted coups.”<sup>3</sup> Even though, the sources of instability abound (as mentioned above), because of its devastating effects on regime stability, particularly when the coup is successful, this study considers the coup d’état (also known as *pronunciamento*, and *putsch*, in some parts of the world) as the main indicator of political instability. Even though, since the 1990s, the coup is abating across the globe including West Africa however, the coup challenge is still menacing in West Africa. Compared to the frequency of successful coups d’état in both developed and developing countries in Latin America and Asia, in a fifty year period between 1963 and 2013, Table 1.1 captures a high frequency of successful coups d’état in West Africa.

Table 1.1 Successful Coups d’état in West Africa from 1963 to 2013 (The First 50 Years)

Country	Indepen- -dence Date							TO TA L
Mauritania	11/28/1960	1978	1979	1980	1984	2005	2008	6
Nigeria	10/01/1960	1966	1966	1975	1983	1985	1993	6
Benin	08/01/1960	1963	1965	1967	1969	1972		5
Ghana	03/06/1957	1966	1972	1978	1979	1981		5
Burkina Faso	08/05/1960	1966	1980	1982	1983	1987		5
Sierra Leone	04/27/1960	1967	1968	1992	1997			4

---

<sup>3</sup> Issaka Souaré, *Civil Wars and Coup d’état in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America Inc., 2006), 1.

Guinea Bissau	10/12/1968	1980	1999	2003	2012			4
Mali	06/20/1960	1968	1991	2012				3
Niger	8/03/1960	1974	1996	2010				3
Togo	04/27/1960	1963	1967	2005				2
Guinea	10/02/1958	1984	2008					2
Ivory Coast	08/07/1960	1999						1
Liberia	06/26/1847	1980						1
Gambia	02/18/1965	1994						1
Cape Verde	06/05/1975							0
Senegal	04/04/1960							0

Compiled by author

Because of the active currents of the coup activity in this sub-region, during the course of this study, Table 1.1 had to be updated several times. This captures the stubbornness of the coup problem in this sub-region. As noted in Table 1.1, led by Benin, Mauritania and Nigeria registering six coups each (the highest number of coups by country), the vast majority of West African states fell into what Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler refer to as the “coup trap.”<sup>4</sup> Collier and Hoeffler conceptualize a coup trap with the argument that once a coup or civil war has occurred, further such events are much more likely. “Since a coup legitimizes further coups, if legitimacy is the key barrier, then

---

<sup>4</sup> Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Coup Traps: Why does Africa have so many Coups d’état?,” *Center for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford* (2005), accessed May 20, 2012, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/Coup-traps.pdf>.

we should observe ‘coup traps’.”<sup>5</sup> In other words, once that innocence of a coup-less state is lost, such innocence is most likely irretrievable.

Even though the sources and types of political instability abound as already pointed out, considering a successful coup as literally the final frontier, the point of no return, the coup is considered in this study as the main indicator of political instability. In his classic definition of the coup d’état in 1969, Edward Luttwak posits that “a coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.”<sup>6</sup> Some forty years later, the coup exhibit similar characteristics. In 2006, Issaka K. Souaré defined the coup d’état “as an illegal seizure of the highest level of power by a limited number of military officers in a more or less violent or peaceful covert operation that does not exceed a few days.”<sup>7</sup> The 2014 publication by Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall defines the coup d’état as follows:

[a] forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that result in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance.<sup>8</sup>

These three definitions reveal the general characteristics of the coup: At the least three characteristics of the coup d’état become evident: the nature of the takeover, the

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>6</sup> Edward Luttwak, *Coup D’état: A Practical Handbook* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 12.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>8</sup> Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, “Coup d’état Events, 1946-2013 CODEBOOK,” *Center for Systemic Peace* (March 2014): 1, accessed May 21, 2014, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/CSPCoupsCodebook2013.pdf>



target, and the mode of operation. First, Luttwak refers to the takeover as an infiltration; Souaré calls the takeover an illegal seizure, and the Marshalls call the takeover a forceful seizure. This indicates that the takeover in a coup is always extra-constitutional; it is obviously outside the parameters of the law and aimed at displacing and replacing the highest level of the regime. This brings us to the second characteristic of the coup d'état: the target. Luttwak refers to the target as the highest level of the regime: the critical segment of the state apparatus, which Souaré refers to as the president or prime minister, and the Marshalls refer to as the executive authority. The question now becomes who orchestrates such a takeover of the highest level of the regime. Answering this question brings us to the third shared characteristic of the coup d'état: the mode of operation. The mode of operation tends to be swift, covert, and limited to few operatives (not initially including the masses). Luttwak, Souaré, and the Marshalls all highlight the importance of the compact number of orchestrators and covertness of the coup operations. In other words, unlike other types of political instability (secession, revolutions, civil war, etc.), the collaborators of coups initially exclude the masses and keep plans, tactics, strategies, and entire operations as covert as possible; mass support is only welcomed after the coup unfolds.

With the high frequency of the coup and the authoritarian dictators that operated within a framework of a one party state, in the early years into the first couple of decades following independence, one could call into question the seriousness and genuineness of democracy as a major part of the post-independence agenda. Some even contend that democracy was never part of the post-independence agenda. Therefore, one can rightly

argue that it has only been shy of a quarter century (1990s) since the liberal democratic model became part of the African political affair calculus in earnest, as compared to centuries of experience in developed liberal democracies; however, the fact remains that liberal democracies reasonably expect prosperity, political stability and putting a tight lid on the coup. This is by and large failing to hold true in many of today's emerging democracies in West Africa. This trajectory of high frequency of the coup in the West African region informs the fact that, by and large, the liberal democratic model falls short of promoting political stability in the region. This trajectory is still manifest, especially at a time when Mali has imploded and Senegal is showing signs of tilting towards the malaise of instability that could have resulted in a coup, as manifested in the political crises that almost eclipsed Senegal's February 26, 2012 presidential election. However, like an oasis in the middle of the Sahara, the outcome of the 2012 election once again reinforced Senegal's position as a democracy that is politically stable. Even though, the pre-election crisis added to the ongoing challenges presented to Senegal as part the West African sub-region reality, the 2012 election outcome adds to the impressive record of election outcomes since 2000. Since 2000, the Senegalese people have been able to navigate through three significant peaceful and democratic transitions of power from one president to another. As a result, even though the issues of political stability, democratization, and democracy in Senegal are the foci of the case study, Senegal in relation to these issues must be introduced early on.

### **Senegal on Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy: A Brief Introduction to the Case Study**

Chapter five exclusively deals with the case study. However, considering the importance of the case study, a brief introduction is in order. This introduction starts with a recapitulation as follows: 1) The case is made that despite similar challenges and solution between Senegal and other West African countries, Senegal is the only country in West Africa (besides Cape Verde) that has thus far avoided a successful coup d'état, maintaining political stability. Based on this observation, it seems that Senegal managed to beat the odds despite similar experiences. Therefore, the study finds it prudent to explore the driver behind or the explanation for political stability in Senegal since the study suggests that the liberal democratic model falls short of doing so. 2) With this suggestion that the liberal democratic model cannot explain political stability in Senegal, the study suggests that what explains the political stability in Senegal is the Senegalese model of democracy-the *Democarassie* model. This proposition and the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability becomes the main focus of the case study. More precisely, the case study explores the *Democarassie* model and its implication on political stability in Senegal.

In this perspective, the case study opens with an introduction followed with a comparative analysis, which is seen as necessary in placing Senegal within its context in West Africa on the democracy and political stability continuum. This comparative analysis is followed with an introduction and an extensive discussion of the state of political stability, the democratization process, and the state and model of democracy in Senegal. With the research question in mind, the case study enters the realm of the

*Democarassie* model. First, one examines the *Democarassie* model in the context of West Africa's reality. Within this examination, the role and exchanges of establishments and customary authority is examined to help determine the implications of *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal. The crux of the contribution of the case study is to examine and indicate the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability.

Building upon the concept of the *Democarassie* model and the important role of various establishments and customary authorities, the study shows how the various establishments all headed by a customary authority work in concert to uphold democratic institutions and how such democracy in turn promotes political stability. One is not blind to the fact that the first twenty years of independence witnessed a less-than democratic Senegal, a one party regime led by the charismatic and generally appealing President Senghor. However one can argue that democracy began to flourish and set deep roots beginning in the early 1980s and in earnest following the 2000 elections. Over half a century of relative political stability is worth noticing, especially given the history of political volatility the West Africa region. This statement partly underscores the significance of the study.

Even though the issues of political stability, democratization, and democracy in Senegal will be dealt with in great detail in the case study (Chapter Five), a brief introduction of Senegal is necessary early in the study. Senegal is one of the sixteen countries that make up the West Africa sub-region. The history of Senegal spans millennia; however, for the purpose of examining the Western concept of liberal democracy and its implications on political stability in Senegal today, it makes sense to

focus on the political history of Senegal after 1445. According to Michael Crowder, the year 1445 witnessed the first European penetration into Senegal through the River Senegal. After the founding of St. Louis by Caullier in 1659, the seventeenth and most part of the eighteenth century witnessed the building of numerous forts that over time blossomed into prosperous towns.<sup>9</sup> By 1854, Senegal was under the rule of France, and as a result of its assimilation policy was well on its way to becoming part of the French Republic. By 1865, citizens of St. Louis and Gorée-Dakar became French citizens,<sup>10</sup> and by 1914, Blaise Diagne had become the first black Senegalese French Chamber of Deputies representative.<sup>11</sup> Senegal remained a colony of France until independence in 1960.

Given Senegal's unique location, favorable climate, and privileged position in French colonial assimilation policy, Senegalese especially from the *Quartre Commun* were allowed to participate in the French political system decades before independence, as early as the late nineteenth century. Alongside French assimilation policy, Senegal's national and local politics was known to be (and is still) dominated by democratic pluralism with both a local flavor, including a decentralization mechanism. This assertion is in accordance with W. A. E. Skurnic's observation that "Senegal's domestic

---

<sup>9</sup> Michael Crowder, *Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy* (London: Methuen and Co Ltd., 1967), 9.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Crowder, *Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy*, 17.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

political history has followed a pluralistic pattern, which probably reinforced the present leadership's taste for conciliation as a method of settling conflict."<sup>12</sup>

Citing Senegal's privileged position in the French colonial system, her long track record and experience with democracy, and political participation based on pluralism, one can argue that Senegal has more experience with democracy than majority of the countries sharing the West African sub-region. This, in and by itself, partly explains political stability in Senegal. With this observation in mind, it could be concluded that, even though Senegal's challenges and solutions mirror those of other West African states, Senegal is better able to maintain democratic institutions and political stability. These challenges include political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural challenges. However, citing its privileged colonial position, the overwhelming support of the French republic, the long experience with the exercise of democracy and pluralism, the decentralization of power, and the empowerment of local governments during both the pre and post-independence eras, Senegal is able to respond to these challenges more favorably than most West-African states. Consequently, Senegal has become a symbol of stability in a very unstable region. This warrants the case study. By prompting the inquiry into what Senegal did right, one can discover what most if not all the other countries in the sub-region were unable to achieve. The above statement does not insinuate that Senegal is a perfect democracy with a spotless record and no challenges of political stability at all, but rather, challenges one to see democracy in a continuum and political stability as relative.

---

<sup>12</sup> W. A. E. Skurnic, *The Foreign Policy of Senegal* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 19.

As stated earlier, Senegal is not an exception when it comes to challenges, agitations, and political agitations including frequent strikes, high unemployment rates, one dominant party rule (between 1960-1980), border skirmishes with neighbors (Mali, Mauritania, Gambia and Guinea Bissau), and the most challenging so far, the secessionist aspiration of the Casamance region. Mirroring the rest of the sub-region, Senegal also struggles with cleavages within its society including but not limited to ethnic, linguistic, regional, and social classes. However, together with Cape Verde, Senegal is the exception when it comes to democracy, political stability, and the lack of the coup, especially following the elections of March 2000. One can argue that since 2000, Senegal has managed to uphold a model of democracy beyond the electoral minimal threshold. Since 2000, Senegal elections by many standards are considered participatory. Despite the above-mentioned challenges and fragmenting predispositions within Senegalese society, Senegal still manages to remain democratic with considerable political stability. These challenges and predispositions are further exacerbated and complicated with brewing political upheavals that occasionally ebb and overflow resulting from economic challenges ranging from higher prices and inflation to issues of governance. As many Senegalese have lamented, a good example of mismanagement and displaced priorities is the Monument of the African Renaissance.

As far as the democratization process and democracy in Senegal is concerned, the power transition between Senghor and his handpicked successor, Abdou Diouf in 1981 was a less democratically significant election than the elections that follow after 2000. The more democratically significant elections were the elections of 2000 and beyond.

The 2000 presidential election marks the first of many transitions of power from and incumbent president to the opposition. In 2000 power transitioned from Diouf to the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, Wade's fifth contest since 1978. Again in 2012, power transferred to an incumbent president to the opposition candidate in an election reported by many pundits and media outlets including the *New York Times* as free, fair and peaceful. The *New York Times* referred to this election as "a rare example of prompt and peaceful political turnover in a region tormented by coups and leaders who refuse to give up power."<sup>13</sup> After twelve years in office and seeking a third term, Wade lost the election to opposition leader Macky Sall, after a second round in a hotly contested election. Even though Senegal is challenged by other forms of instability, one could argue that these peaceful transfers of power at the ballot box by the citizens since 2000 further solidified democracy and political stability and particularly kept the coups d'état at bay. It is safe to state that, the only major political stability challenge Senegal has encountered in the last few decades has been the secessionist aspirations of the geographically isolated Casamance region in the south.

Even though Senegal is referred to in this study as generally democratic and politically stable as highlighted above, it goes without saying that there are critics and observers that question the cost, genuineness, and the sustainability of Senegalese democracy. As a matter of fact, some critics go as far as characterizing Senegal's

---

<sup>13</sup> Adam Nossiter, "A Turbulent-Free Elections in Senegal," *New York Times*, March 25, 2012, accessed on May 11, 2012, accessed May 21, 2014, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/president-concedes-race-in-senegal.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/president-concedes-race-in-senegal.html?_r=0)



democracy as being on what is considered to be the “thin” side, rendering the Senegalese model of democracy and the political stability that results as relative and open to interpretation. However, the fact cannot be denied that Senegal is the only other West African nation that is yet to experience the coup d’état, therefore rendering her politically stable. Keeping in mind the shared developmental challenges, such could not be said for all the other nations that share the West Africa sub-region.

Within the background of the research question, the political stability-democracy dynamics remains important, rendering the story of Senegal on the subject matter abundantly relevant. Senegal is viewed as an oasis of political stability in a desert of political instability in West Africa. As a result, Senegal presents itself as a bastion of political stability and a vanguard of democracy. By many measures, Senegal proves to be a beacon of democracy and political stability in West Africa. However, it is suggested in this study that even though the Senegalese model of democracy is grounded in the liberal democratic model, there are variations between the two models. With the Senegalese model taking Senegal’s unique realities into account, this model is able to explain political stability in Senegal. To be more precise, the study makes the observation that the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal, but the *Democarassie* model can. As a matter of fact, the *Democarassie* model is the driver behind political stability in Senegal. In making the case that the *Democarassie* model explains political stability in Senegal, the case study delves into the intricate nuances in the relationship between political stability and the *Democarassie* model to illustrate how the *Democarassie* model reinforces political stability in Senegal.

In the interest of streamlining the unique position of Senegal, this introduction closes with few observations that will be revisited later in the study: 1) Of the sixteen West African countries in the exception of Cape Verde, Senegal has been the only country that since independence is spared the coup d'état followed by military rule (with exception of Prime Minister Mamadou Dia's 1962 alleged coup plot), 2) In addition to this "coup-less" credential, Senegal is recognized globally as a formidable democracy (by many standards including the respectable current Freedom House standards), 3) Senegal is also considered highly tolerant (religious, ethnic, and cultural) and in frontlines of human rights, diplomacy, and peacekeeping, including past operations in Lebanon, East Timor, and Liberia, in naming a few. Around the world Senegal is a renowned champion of international peace-keeping operations. 4) Senegal also maintains a political culture track record that entertains political dissent and encourages political participation. 5) Despite challenges in this area, Senegal is considered a country with relatively free media as indicated with the 2.02 overall score (near sustainability) on the 2012 Media Sustainability Index.<sup>14</sup> 6) Senegal also has a vibrant economy and informed citizenry. 7) With Nigeria Ghana and Ivory Coast, Senegal is among the hegemonic powers in the sub-region in economic and political terms. 8) While Senegal's population is ninety-four percent Muslim, Senegal is a secular country. The above observations culminate in suggesting that democratization in Senegal is close to maturity and politically stability has taken root. In the interest to a more balanced approach the introduction comes to a conclusion with an acknowledgement of the critics of democracy in Senegal.

---

<sup>14</sup> "Senegal Media Sustainability Index (MSI)," IREX, last modified April 24, 2014, accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u128/Senegal%200618b.pdf>.

Within the context of the above observations, the main inquiry of the study goes beyond the question of whether Senegal is a democracy and politically stable: Senegal is already considered democratic and politically stable. The inquiry is, despite similarities in challenges and solutions, between Senegal and the rest of the West African sub-region, how and why is Senegal able to maintain both democratic institutions and political stability in a region that is generally challenged by both. Is there a relationship between political stability and democracy in Senegal? It is an illusion to consider Senegal a perfect democracy, with no political stability challenges, but by and large, Senegal is considered politically stable, relatively democratic, and far along on the democratization path, especially considering elections and elections outcomes since 2000. Therefore, democratization, democracy, and political stability in Senegal are all seen in a continuum. These are the issues the case study addresses in more detail.

### **Research Question**

This dissertation seeks to examine what explains political stability in Senegal? Within this backdrop, the study examines the implications of Senegal's *Democarassie* model and its implications on political stability.

### **Significance of the Study**

The significance of the study is captured in four major points of significance: 1) Considering the challenges of political instability, if one can explain why similar challenges gave birth to the same outcome (political instability-the coup) everywhere else except Senegal and Cape Verde, this would help improve our understanding of the political instability that plagues the sub-region. 2) If advanced democracies seldom

experience the coup, but the West African emerging democracies are coup-prone, revisiting and better understanding democracy and its implications on political stability, especially in a region challenged with both is significant. This discussion, contributes to the discourse on the democratization process and democracy as a concept and a system of governing. 3) Considering the frequency of the coup exacerbated by similar development challenges, only Senegal and Cape Verde make the “coup-less” list in West Africa, and both remain politically stable. Discovering what Senegal did right proves to be very significant. 4) The *Democarassie* model is considered a significant contribution towards theory building.

### **Organization of the Study**

Chapter opens with an introduction, followed with the research question. This chapter also offers the significance of the study, before finally closing with a summary and roadmap outlining the organization of chapter two to chapter six. Following the introductory chapter; the rest of the study is organized as follows.

Chapter 2, the literature review, surveys the literature on the two main concerns of the study-political stability and democratization /democracy. The review of political stability approach is two pronged: political stability in general in the general literature, and political stability in Africa with a West Africa focus. The democratization process and democracy is also reviewed here. The discussion of political stability and democracy in Senegal fits better in the case study and, therefore, delayed for chapter five. Following an analysis of the literature, the literature review comes to completion with a presentation of the gap(s) and a general conclusion.

Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical framework. The *Democarassie* model is introduced here as the theoretical framework that better explains political stability in Senegal. The *Democarassie* model is presented within the theoretical backdrop of political sociology, democratic pluralism, consociation theory, and Mahmoud Mamdani's decentralized despotism theory.

Chapter 4, the methodology chapter, opens with a conceptualization of political stability and the coup, democratization/democracy, and the *Democarassie* model. This is followed with the presentation of the data and data sources and the data collection method. In exploring the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal, the method of analysis as pointed out in this chapter is an exploratory case study. The case study follows in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 presents the case study. The implications of the *Democarassie* model on Political stability in Senegal. The chapter begins with a comparative prelude. This prelude is followed with an examination of the state of political stability, democratization and democracy in Senegal. The crux of the chapter focuses on political stability and the *Democarassie* model in Senegal vis-a-vis the function and role "establishments and customary authority." The chapter closes with a presentation of the how and why of the *Democarassie* model and its implications on political stability in Senegal.

Chapter 6 chronicles the findings of the study on the workings and processes of the *Democarassie* model and its implications on political stability. This chapter also concludes the study with a presentation of the key finding of the study, prior to offering general conclusions, and suggestions for future study.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

It is evident that the discussion of the democratization process, democracy as a concept and system of governing, and political stability is still an unfolding topic and far from over, therefore revisiting the general enduring debate on the subjects matter, particularly the relationship between democratic model and political stability, is timely. As a passageway to the core of the research question, the existing literature on the subject matter is thoroughly reviewed. Within this backdrop, the literature review unfolds by first surveying the scholarly literature. This survey spans the classics, the mainstream, and emerging arguments, explanations, positions taken, and theoretical and conceptual frameworks surrounding the two concerns of the study-political stability and democratization/ democracy. Second, following this in-depth survey is an analysis of the literature review. This analysis is expected to reveal the gap(s) in the literature.

The literature review chapter is divided in three sections as follows. Following the introduction is section one. Section one reviews the general literature on political stability, followed with a review of political stability in Africa with a West Africa focus. This is followed with a review of the literature on democratization and democracy. The review on political stability, democratization, and democracy in Senegal is set aside for the case study. Section two presents an analysis of the literature review. Section two, in

detail, analyzes the literature review revealing a discrepancy between the liberal democratic model and the explanation of political stability in Senegal. Section three outlines and discusses the gap in the literature, and offers a better explanation of political stability in Senegal. Finally, suggesting that exploration with a nation-centric model of democracy is deemed tenable.

### **Political Stability in the General Literature**

Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier discover in their paper *Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America* four key points of reference on democracy and political stability: 1) Democratic countries on average experience less political instability. 2) Low income and ethnic fractionalization are discovered to be among the major causes of instability. 3) Demographic trends and the rural and urban relationship are also found to be important indicators of political stability; the more integrate the rural and urban relationship is, the more politically stable the nation is. 4) Contrary to conventional wisdom, the usual economic indicators such as inflation, and budget overruns, but with the exception of trade liberalization, do not increase instability.<sup>1</sup> These four reference points were the conclusions of the Blanco-Grier collaboration on the study of eighteen Latin American countries between 1971 and 2000. As the Blanco-Grier study indicated, Latin America is the third most politically unstable region, where only three countries qualify as democracies in an unstable region that

---

<sup>1</sup> Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier, "Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Instability in Latin America," *Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy Working Papers* 33(2009), accessed February 15, 2011, <http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers/33>.

experienced 20 coups, 451 political assassinations, and 113 regime threatening crises.<sup>2</sup>

Even though the Blanco-Grier duo painted a grim picture of democracy and political stability in Latin America, by all counts the West Africa region is worse. Therefore, the Blanco-Grier study resonates and serves as an important point of reference for this study.

Richard Jong-A-Pin studies the measurements, causes, and consequences in his dissertation entitled “Essay on Political Instability: Measurements, Causes, and Consequences.” After reminding readers that since the degree of political stability is not directly observable, it is a challenge for many scholars to readily define the concept.<sup>3</sup> Within this background, Jong-A Pin went on to tackle the major concerns of the study; measuring political instability, the causes of political instability, and the consequences of political instability. In measuring political instability, Jong-A-Pin also looked at political instability and its effect on economic growth, political instability and its effect on democracy, globalization and ethnic violence, political instability and its effect on terrorism and cabinet instability. As a measurement for political instability Jong-A-Pin utilized an exploratory factor analysis on 25 indicators of political instability. On the causes and consequences of political instability, Jong-A Pin teased out what is called the “Chua thesis-that the current globalization and democratization waves are increasing violence in much of the developing world.”<sup>4</sup> Most likely in the developing world market-dominated minorities MDM dominate markets and this in and by itself result of

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Jong-A-Pin, “Essay on Political Instability: Measurements, Causes, and Consequences” (PhD diss., Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008), 1.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 73.



resentment for the majority, this in turn results in instability. As a cause and consequence of political instability, Jong-A-Pin also looks into the consequence of terrorism and cabinet instability and concluded that terrorism increases the probability of cabinet failure and this could exacerbate political instability.

### **Political Stability in Africa with a West Africa Focus**

George Klay Kieh first reckoned with the endemic nature and the various explanations of political instability in Africa before taking a position on the root cause. As a passageway towards offering an alternative theoretical framework in explaining instability, Kieh revisited the archetypical theories in the explanation of political instability in Africa-the usual, the Cold War theory, the ethnic theory, and the rent-seeking theory- all found to be lacking. The alternative theory Kieh offered is the peripheral capitalist state theory. Within the backdrop of this theory, Kieh also discussed the Berlinist state; a product of Western imperial capitalism. “Second, the domestic political economies based on the peripheral capitalist mode of production in which the major means of production (especially capital and technology) are owned and controlled by various members of metropolitan-based ruling classes in the United States and Europe.”<sup>5</sup> In conclusion, according to Kieh, “the best way to address political instability and its events is to democratically reconstitute the peripheral capitalist state. This is a multidimensional process that entails deconstruction, rethinking, and reconstitution. The

---

<sup>5</sup> George Klay Kieh, “The State of Political Instability in Africa,” *Journal of Developing Societies* (March 2009): 1, accessed December 6, 2013, <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1177/169796X09028500101>.

end product is to establish substantive or deep democracy with human development and well-being as the fulcrums.”<sup>6</sup>

Anirudha Gupta asked whether African leaders can engage in meaningful nation-building and simultaneously legitimize their hold on political power.<sup>7</sup> Gupta acknowledged the fact that these two endeavors are practically incompatible. As a matter of fact, nation-building could alienate supporters (the elite class-*evolués*); this in turn hinders holding on to power. Therefore, African leaders have their work cut out for them. In order to succeed in both nation-building and legitimately holding on to power, they will have to walk a fine line and delicately balance priorities. Gupta points out that African leaders strategized by pandering toward a favored social class. However, this strategy proved to be a temporary fix. In short order regimes started imploding resulting in numerous coups. Even though this piece was published in 1967 (barely a decade since Ghana started the independence revolution in 1957), Gupta was able to count seven coups between 1965 and 1967. Among these countries are Algeria and Congo in 1965, Central Africa Republic, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Nigeria (twice), and Ghana; all in 1966, and Sierra Leone in 1967. As a result, Gupta concluded by suggested a further study of the African elite class he refers to as the *evolués* because of the important role they play within their communities. Notwithstanding the fact that these *evolués* are very influential in their societies, and they always spark tensions amongst themselves as they jockey for

---

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>7</sup> Anirudha Gupta, “Roots of Political Instability in Africa,” *Economic and Political Weekly* (June 1967): 1041-1046, accessed December 8, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4358039>.

more resources for themselves and their societies. As the leader panders to various elite groups, the leader tries to be everything for everyone, and if everything fails they turn to what Gupta refers to their “Africanness.”

Antony Otieno Ong’ayo endeavors to examine and not only explain were the problem of political instability in Africa lies, but to also offer alternative perspectives. In his piece, “Political Instability in Africa,” Ong’ayo admits that internal factors including leadership problems and Africa’s colonial heritage that handed down the current weak and ineffective institutions could be to blame for political instability in Africa today. However, the biggest culprit, according to Ong’ayo, is the international community operating in the international system. Ong’ayo posits that “the international community constantly plays a significant role in undermining the very processes and institutions that are expected to nurture democracy and instill a sense of stability for societal development in Africa.”<sup>8</sup> Ong’ayo goes on to point out that Africa is endowed with enough resources for all its citizens; however, these resources are rapidly leaving the shores of Africa into the hands of the major players in the international community. In this backdrop, Ong’ayo looks at Africa’s leadership problem and political instability, economy and political stability, and political violence in African political stability. Ong’ayo also shines light on the international community’s solution for Africa’s political instability problems and form of power-sharing, which he refers to as “electoral thieving” (another vice of the

---

<sup>8</sup> Antony Otieno Ong’ayo 2008, “Political Instability in Africa: Where the Problem Lies and Alternative Perspectives” (paper presented at the Symposium 2008: Afrika: een continent op drift.” Stichting Nationaal Erfgoed Hotel De Wereld, Wageningen, September 19, 2008).

international community to rip off African resources). Ong'ayo looks at migration policies, conflict resolution, and even peace building initiatives as tools in the international community's toolbox for the extraction of resources.

As an alternative perspective to Africa's instability debacle, Ong'ayo offers the following: first, solutions should go beyond the dynamics of resources and exploitation and military or humanitarian intervention and assistance; second, a new type of leadership for both Africa and Western countries who see themselves as equal partners; third, a relationship between the African and developed based (the Western partners) on equal footing and the recognition of the symbiotic nature of the relation; fourth, the recognition that Western countries should help bolster African institutions and processes rather than weaken them for a more exploitative relation.

Leonardo Arriola presents the sobering assessment that "the appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers the leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth."<sup>9</sup> With this assessment, Arriola shines light on a pervasive patronage strategy that allows African leaders not only to maintain power, but also to remain in office for an extended period. Arriola posits, well aware of cleavages, fractionalization, and scarce resources, African leaders are building patronage coalitions. With these coalitions, leaders build extensive and effective networks of cabinet members (ordinarily, cronies) that effectively deliver spoils and resources to keep the majority of the people. According to Arriola, one of the most

---

<sup>9</sup> Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* Volume 2 Number 10 (2009): 1339-1362, accessed May 24, 2014, [http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3618/Arriola\\_2009.pdf](http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3618/Arriola_2009.pdf)1339.

effective ways of building these coalitions is through ministerial and cabinet appointments and the expansion of the cabinet. Arriola utilized a time-series cross-section data of 40 African countries to come to this conclusion. From that conclusion, one of the most important findings of Arriola's study is, contrary to the Africanist literature, the most effective way for African leaders to keep themselves in power is to take advantage of cabinet appointments to expand patronage, not the intra-elite explanation, popular with Africanist.<sup>10</sup> Arriola's conclusion makes a lot of sense because these cabinet appointees have their own constituents and serve at the pleasure of the president; the larger the cabinet, the larger the "patronage base," and the stronger the president. In effect, the cabinet appointees work tirelessly to keep their constituency vested, that in turn keeps the president in power.

### **Democracy and the Democratization Process**

In this study, democratization is viewed as a path toward democracy, and democracy is viewed in a spectrum with the outermost point, the ultimate destination, being "pure" democracy. It must be pointed out that there is a general consensus that reaching the outermost point and becoming a "pure" democracy is more utopian than real. In other words, democracy is messy and imperfect and all democracies face challenges. Nonetheless, all democracies strive to get as close to the outermost point as possible. It is also worth mentioning that the movement along the spectrum could take a reversal path, away from democracy. Within this conception, democratization is viewed as the movement along the democracy spectrum toward the outermost point, "pure"

---

<sup>10</sup> Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies*, 1358.

democracy. Because “pure” democracy is more utopian than real, this study views all democracies as a point on the democratization path, within the democracy spectrum, either progressing toward or reversing away from the final destination of “pure” democracy. For this reason, the study does not make separating the two concepts a priority. In this study, the two terms are seen as very closely related because democratization leads to the democracy, and all democracies are still democratizing toward to ultimate destination of “pure” democracy. In this milieu, some democratic systems are closer to the final destination than others.

Democracy is hereby defined as a constitution limiting, self-governing form of government that seeks the autonomous consent of the people while guaranteeing civil liberties, political rights, political participation, and the rule of law. In the context of this definition, the literature review on democracy and democratization unfolds, starting with Larry Diamond.

Larry Diamond offers a normative perspective to posit that “democratization is generally a good thing and democracy is the best form of government.”<sup>11</sup> Diamond further points out that even though various forms, models, and concepts of democracy exist, there is what he sees as the best form of democracy. This form must include 1) a constraining constitution, 2) rule of law, 3) popular sovereignty, and 4) institutional authority in check. Diamond goes on to write that:

Thus, as Locke, and Montesquieu, and the American Federalist asserted, only a constitutional government, restraining and dividing the temporary power of the majority, can protect individual

---

<sup>11</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 2.

freedom. This fundamental insight (and value) gave birth to a tradition of political though-liberalism-and to a concept-liberal democracy.<sup>12</sup>

Diamond defines democracy within a framework based on “thin” and “thick” conceptions.<sup>13</sup> According to Diamond the “thin” side is Schumpeterian and minimalist: reducing democracy down to voting characterized with regular free and fair elections. This Diamond refers to as electoral democracy. However, on the “thick” side, democracy becomes more complex, demanding, and harder to achieve. On the “thick” side reasonable expectations of democracy are expected. Diamond’s reasonable expectations are summarized as follows: 1) meaningful individual freedom (speech, press, assembly, and petition); 2) all adult citizens retain the right to vote and run for office; 3) genuine rule of law and equality in the eyes of the law; 4) an independent and neutral judiciary; 5) due process of the law; 6) “institutional” checks and balances; 7) meaningful pluralism; 8) civilian control of military.<sup>14</sup>

Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler write along the lines of Diamond’s proposition that democracy carries different meanings depending on the individual, the society, or even time in history; however, the spirit of democracy is unquestionable. This “spirit” is formed along the lines of what Dye and Ziegler refer to as “democratic values.” Dye and Ziegler sums up democracy and democratic values as self-governing values that promote

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>13</sup> Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 22.

“individual dignity, equality of opportunity, the right to dissent, freedom of speech and press, religious toleration, [and] rule of law.”<sup>15</sup> Dye and Zeigler go on to state that, democracy is ideally mean individual participation in the decisions that affects one’s life. Dye and Zeigler also state that democracy leads to individual self-development because democracy promotes responsibility; develops character; promotes self-reliance, intelligence, and moral judgment- in short human dignity.<sup>16</sup> According to Dye and Zeigler, procedurally, in a liberal democracy the majority rule while respecting the minority’s rights. In a democracy, self-development means self-government where “all” eligible individuals take part in the decision making process. In avoiding tyranny from the majority or the minority in self-governing, both sides (majority and minority) should be able to counter each other’s passions and interests. Free and fair elections and freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition, and dissent is expected.

Robert Dahl conceptualizes democracy as a political system conceived with the idea that members of society regard each other as political equals: political equals as in, equality to participate; equality in self-governance, ruling and association. Dahl refers to this idea as “the Strong Principle of Equality.”<sup>17</sup> For a more profound understanding of the bloated “democracy” concept, Dahl posits that even though democracy has its genesis with the Greeks (particularly the Athenians) approximately 2500 years ago, democracy

---

<sup>15</sup> Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, *The Irony of democracy: An Uncommon introduction to American Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1972), 4.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, *The Irony of democracy: An Uncommon introduction to American Politics*, 8.

<sup>17</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 31.



transitioned from various sources. Dahl offers four sources: “classic Greeks; a republican tradition...; the institutions of representative governments; and the logic of political equality.”<sup>18</sup> This confirms that democracy has gone through many transformations and Dahl’s observation captured substantiates the transformation:

Whatever it takes, the democracy of our successors will not and cannot be the democracy of our predecessors. Nor should it be. For the limits and the possibilities of democracy in a world we can already dimly foresee are certain to be radically unlike the limits and possibilities of democracy in any previous time or place.<sup>19</sup>

As far as Dahl is concern, in order to keep up with ever changing world realities, democratic transformations are not only expected but inevitable. Dahl goes on to warn that the transformations democracy undergoes can yield dissimilar democratic systems however, the basic safeguards of the democratic ideals including self-governance, political equality, and self-determination never changes. Dahl captures that:

We can be confident that in the future as in the past the exacting requirements of the democratic process will not be met and many of the theoretical and practical problems in the democratic process explored here will not be completely resolved. Yet the vision of people governing themselves as political equals, and possessing all the resources and institutions necessary to do so, will I believe remain a compelling if always a demanding guide in the search for a society in which people may live together in peace, respect each other’s intrinsic equality, and jointly seek the best possible life.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, 13.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 340.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 341.

The above statement goes beyond Dahl's conceptualization of democracy. The statement also makes the point-what democracy mean today is not necessarily what democracy meant in the time of Periclean Athens.

David Held sought to follow the trajectory of a transforming and transitioning democracy and takes various forms and subjected different models. Such transformations and transitions are heavily influenced by a changing global world order. Consequently, the literature reveals Held's steadfast focus on the effects of a changing landscape of democracy given the transitioning and the transformation to the current international system and the new global order. As succinctly presented in his book *Models of Democracy*, Held captures the transitions and transformation of variants of democracy from; the Classical Athenian Model, to Republicanism, to a Liberal Model of democracy that forms the bases of elitist democracy, legal democracy, pluralism, and deliberative and participatory democracy, with participatory democracy having the overtones of what Held refers to as the Marxian Direct democracy. Compartmentalized in variants based on epoch (classic, twentieth century, today), Held is able to capture the evolution of democracy in what he refers to in the book as Models. Starting with *Model I* that dealt with Classical (Athenian) Democracy, Held subsequently presented *Models II – X*. Together the ten models highlight the various transformations democracy experienced over the last 2500 years.<sup>21</sup> As Held posits, democracy has its genesis in the highly exclusive city-state in the Athenian (classic) model of democracy. However, as societies

---

<sup>21</sup> David Held, *Models of Democracy* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 5.

increase in number and complexity, democracy transformed. This transformation assumes a republican nature where participation, liberty and self-government extend beyond the city-state and the affluent. Held presents another transformation following the French and American revolutions. This time democracy transforms from republicanism to liberal democracy. In liberal democracy government is limited by a constitution. In summation, democracy has been transformed from its Athenian (Classic) form to a Republican form to Liberal democracy.

As Held points out, twentieth century democracy was further complicated by yet new variants including competitive elitism, pluralism, and corporate capitalism, amongst others. By the time Held presents *Model X*, he is looking at the present state of democracy and rethinking democracy in a global age, thus looking into what he terms as the cosmopolitan model of democracy.

David Held and Christopher Politt edited the book *New Forms of Democracy*. In the introduction authored by Held, he highlighted the many challenges and controversies of democracy in its current form, before making a case for new forms of democracy. By new forms of democracy, Held meant “all those new initiatives as well as new developments on formal political and policy agendas which seek to alter systematically the dominant form of contemporary democracy...either by increasing the *scope* or transforming the *methods* of democratic decision-making.”<sup>22</sup> Held’s position is in line with other observers such as Dahl. Held concurs that today’s model of democracy is far from the original Athenian Democracy. Therefore, the idea of incorporating current

---

<sup>22</sup> David Held, *New Forms of Democracy*, ed. David Held and Christopher Politt (London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1986), 7.

realities of the international system and globalization makes sense. As a result, advocating for new forms and models for democracy as part of the democracy discourse is hardly new for Held.

Alexis de Tocqueville, in the 1830s, made the observations that democracy (American democracy) is based on pluralism of politically equal citizens forming associations for self-governance as captured:

The most natural Privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow-creatures and acting in common with them. The right of association therefore appears to be almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty.... In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or applied to a greater multitude of objects, than in America. Besides the permanent associations which are established by law, under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals.<sup>23</sup>

Arend Lijphart also acknowledges the lack of social homogeneity and political consensus in plural society, meaning deep political and social cleavages. As a solution to such deep cleavages Lijphart offers a consociation form of democracy: a model of democracy where the elites cooperate, and such cooperative attitude counteracts what Lijphart refers to as the “negative plurality” in plural society. In other words, cooperative attitudes serve as an antidote to deep cleavages in a plural society. For Lijphart this model of democracy (consociational democracy) explains political stability in smaller

---

<sup>23</sup> *Democracy in America: Alexis De Tocqueville*, ed. Richard D. Heffner. (Mentor Books. New York, 1984), 95.

multinational, multicultural European democracies such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.<sup>24</sup>

Arend Lijphart, some twenty-two years later, concludes that even though majoritarian democracy proves better at governing, consensus democracy is better at representation especially for minority groups and their interests. For this simple reason, Lijphart views consensus democracy as a “kinder, gentler” form of democracy.<sup>25</sup> To arrive at this conclusion that consensus democracy is “kinder and gentler,” Lijphart applied the following eight benchmarks: 1) democratic quality, 2) women’s representation, 3) political equality, 4) electoral participation, 5) satisfaction with democracy, 6) government-voter proximity, 7) accountability and corruption, and 8) John Stuart Mill’s hypothesis.<sup>26</sup>

Adam Przeworski conceptualizes democracy through a development lens. Puzzled by the empirical evidence grounded in the fact that the 1990s witnessed a proliferation of political democracy especially in Eastern Europe and the “Third World” (Africa and Latin America); however, ironically, in response economic stagnation also increased exponential. Przeworski in collaboration with other experts in the field investigated this puzzlement further. In collaboration with other scholars Przeworski edited the book *Sustainable Democracy*.<sup>27</sup> With this book, Przeworski et al. engaged in rethinking what

---

<sup>24</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (Binghamton: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>25</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 275.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 276-293.

<sup>27</sup> Adam Przeworski et al., *Sustainable Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

constitutes a sustainable democracy. Przeworski and his team narrowed down sustainable democracy to two variables: 1) institutions and 2) performance. Under institutions, they examined issues which individually or together foster sustainable democracy. Under institutions, the issues the Przeworski team reviewed include the following: freedom from state violence, material security, equality and justice, states capability of handling crises, and most importantly, the state capability of maintaining normalcy. After examining institutions variable, Przeworski, et al engaged the performance variable. According to the Przeworski team, the lack of performance perpetuates the vicious cycle of un-sustainability of democracy. Consequently, if nations' institutions are not up to the challenges, the issue of lack of performance sets in, thus throwing the nation into a political and economic tailspin. Such result in political instability and un-sustainable democracy becomes the end product.

Michael Parenti posits that the only way we can understand liberal democracy in general and American government in particular is to incorporate the relationship between economic and political power in a democracy. In his book, *Democracy of the Few*, Parenti examines the relation between what he refers to as “corporate capitalism” and political power in a democracy (American democracy). In this work, Parenti comes across as a skeptic and a doubter and critic of liberal democracy, especially democracy in the United States. With a structural approach, Parenti views American democracy cynically with heavy a dose of skepticism. With power and special interest in mind, Parenti, from a Marxist standpoint, makes the case that in the U.S., political and economic powers go hand-in-hand. His analysis spans the formal political institutions,

the foundation and historical developments of American democracy and the political and economic policies that “public policy” results from. According to Parenti, public policy is nothing more than the administration’s agenda. Where is the public in public policy, he asked. With this mode of questioning, Parenti could pass as a cynic to many observers who tend to see a positive relationship between democracy and free market capitalism. As argued elsewhere, Parenti’s argument is generally driven by the fact that when it comes to democracy we all agree on the basic facts and pretend that political equality and equal opportunity exist. However, power, wealth, class, and institutions play a major role in not only setting the political organizations, but also in the economic system, and the rules within society. For Parenti, even in the U.S. (the so-called champions of democracy), power and influence determines “who gets what, when, and how,” making the case that contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy in the United States is not democracy for “we the people” but democracy for the few: the powerful, privileged, and the influential.<sup>28</sup>

Thomas Carothers succinctly captures the promotion of liberal democracy abroad as an important U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s in his book, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*.<sup>29</sup> In this book, Carothers contends that since President Woodrow Wilson called for concerted effort “to make the world safe for democracy,” the United States made the promotion of democracy a major foreign policy goal. The “tools

---

<sup>28</sup> Michael Parenti, *Democracy of the Few* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011).

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

of the trade” for aiding democracy according to Carothers includes military, diplomatic, and economic (including “democracy promoting” assistance and aid, the most sought after tool since the 1960s). Carothers however, argues that despite half a century of promoting democracy abroad the mission and the method is still unclear. For Carothers the most basic questions concerning aiding democracy abroad are still unanswered. Questions still linger around accomplishments, failures (where and how), and improvement strategies. Carothers’s main point of argument maintains that even though in the 1990s the United States alone spends over 700 million yearly in aiding democracy abroad, democracy in developing countries is yet to consolidate.<sup>30</sup>

However, according to Carothers the good news is a steady progression along the learning curve. The main reason of what Carothers calls a “lack of learning” has a lot to do with what he refers to as a “democracy template” that is mechanical, “United States specific” and does not take into consideration the realities elsewhere. The democracy template, a one size fit all is based on three sectors: 1) electoral process (free and fair elections and strong national political parties); 2) state institutions (constitution, rule-of-law, legislative, local government, civil-military relations); and 3) civil society (NGO advocacy, civic education, media strengthening, union building).<sup>31</sup> Even though the said “democracy template” yield haphazard positive results in promoting democracy abroad, by and large the template proves to be inadequate. As a result, Carothers recommends;

...going beyond the simplistic use of United States models;  
moving from the reproduction of institutional forms to the

---

<sup>30</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, 89.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.



nurturing of core political processes and values, such as representation, accountability, tolerance, and openness; coming to terms with the multiplicity of political trajectories that follow democratic openings; understanding the limits of electoralism; confronting the inadequate will to reform that hampers the reform of most state Establishments; giving up the simple advocacy of NGOs with civil society; embracing more hands on training of journalist as a solution to media reform; taking seriously the need to synthesize top-down and bottom-up approaches rather than merely pursuing them side by side; finding a workable middle ground on evaluation between over-elaborate, mock-scientific schemes and cursory, in-house reviews; and so forth across all the areas of concern.<sup>32</sup>

Carothers's recommendation captured above seems to suggest the United States democracy template is inadequate and lacking many ways. As a result, Carothers suggests adjustments. In the case of West Africa, one contends that Carothers has a valid point. As Carothers shows, "in sub-Saharan Africa fewer than ten of the more than forty countries that experienced political opening at the start of the 1990s have managed to achieve even plausibly democratic systems. Civil wars, coup d'état, strongman leaders, and failing states are still common on the continent."<sup>33</sup>

Fareed Zakaria points out that we are currently living in a "democratic age" where even the worst of dictators and authoritarians, including Islamic theocracies, are claiming to be democratic by holding elections. As Zakaria laconically puts it, in most parts of the world democracy has managed to become "the standard form of government for humankind...the sole surviving source of political legitimacy."<sup>34</sup> However, Zakaria

---

<sup>32</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, 342.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 350.

<sup>34</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The future of Freedom; Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 13.

discovers a disturbing trend, a trend he characterizes and refers to as “Illiberal democracy.” In such democracies, relatively free and fair elections produce a cadre of less-than democratic leaders including separatist, racists, and fascists. From Peru to Palestine, Ghana to Venezuela, such democratically elected leaders routinely ignore constitutional limitation and deprive their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.<sup>35</sup> Zakaria sees this as a major problem for the future of freedom and the future of democracy.

Jim Schultz takes the idea of “illiberal” democracies further by including enquiries in the state of the polity. These enquiries are captured in his book *The Democracy Owners’ Manual: a Practical Guide to Changing the World*. Schultz presents five key debate points that liberal democracies must address as follows: 1) the role of government; 2) the rules of politics; 3) tax and spending; 4) public rules for business and the market place, and 5) civil rights and criminal wrongs. Focusing on the very first debate point; the role of government in a liberal democracy (United States), Shultz presents six fundamental and familiar public policy questions: 1) foreign interest and foreign policy; 2) domestic crime and punishment; 3) liberty and freedom 4) tax and spending and-public service; 5) economic policy-business and the market place; 6) quest for genuine democracy.<sup>36</sup> Shultz’s questions captured above enshrine the main discussions surrounding contemporary liberal democracy.

---

<sup>35</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The future of Freedom; Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, 17.

<sup>36</sup> Jim Shultz, *The Democracy Owners’ Manual: A Practical Guide to Changing the World* (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 2002), 7-16.

## Analysis of the Literature

### General Consensus: Spirit and Values of the Democratic Model

Even though the debate on the democratic model and the processes towards democratization still rages, there is a general consensus: what Larry Diamond refers to as “the spirit of democracy.”<sup>37</sup> Diamond’s conceptualization of the spirit of democracy captures the general ideals of democracy. According to Diamond, the general ideals include choosing one’s leader-self-governing (voting), limiting government and protecting citizens’ (liberty), and freedom to choose and belong (freedom). Diamond’s conceptualization further insinuates that the debate on democracy is not about the general ideals of democracy but about the nuances of democracy and the democratization process. Consequently the general ideals of democracy prove to be simplistic, appealing, and universal considering Diamond’s spirit of democracy theory. However, the major disagreement on democracy and the democracy processes centers on the means to achieving the general ideals of democracy.

The above observation serves as testimony that the most basic ideal of democracy the “spirit of democracy” and what Dye and Ziegler refers to as “democratic values”<sup>38</sup> are pure and universal, therefore could be applied anywhere. However, the question remains, should the Western model be the chosen model? This question precipitates the questioning of the wisdom in the internationalizing of the Western model of democracy.

---

<sup>37</sup> Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World*.

<sup>38</sup> Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, *The Irony of democracy: An Uncommon introduction to American Politics*.

More precisely, the question enquires if democracy is more relevant in Western societies and developed countries with a liberal democratic heritage or is Western democracy relevant everywhere regardless to experiences and history?

To answer the above questions, it is worth going back to the base, the genesis to remind ourselves that the idea of democracy has its genesis in the Greek city-state and the Roman republic. However, democracy is subject to various transitions, from the Enlightenment period, to the American and the French revolutions, and to the subsequent waves, (see Huntington and Held). As a result there is little doubt the idea of democracy is a Western concept and eventually laid deep roots in Western societies. However, the ideals of democracy were eventually promoted the world over. Even though results vary democracy consolidated well in some parts of the world and on the same token fail to consolidate in others.

The transformation of democracy that is evident throughout the literature reviewed seems to enable democracy to transform into almost anything anyone wants to call it as long as the spirit and values of democracy are incorporated. However, to be truly democratic, the concern goes beyond the simple spirit and values of a democratic system. For instance, the spirit of democracy includes inclusion and participation. Nonetheless, in advanced democratic systems, the concern of who is considered a member of society, and therefore allowed to politically participate, (vote, run for office, petition government and so on) is constitutionally protected and well-articulated. In a similar vein, the democratic values also go beyond lip service and something only written on paper. These values are the constitutional limits on government and mechanisms that effectively limit

government. Equality is also considered a value of democracy. The concerns on equality include equal before the law, equal opportunity, equal protection of the law, and rule of law. All these should be coherently incorporated in a true democratic system. These enduring concerns of democracy can be easily violated, even with advanced democratic systems.

Consequently, enduring concern on democracy is not the question of the spirit and values of democracy, but how to create a democratic society around the spirit and values. As an illustration, consider the question of inclusion and participation as a democratic spirit and value. For example, inclusion and participation in the classic context of Greek city state democracy is not necessarily the same as inclusion and participation in the enlightened period and sure enough, not the same today, but the spirit and democratic values remain unchanged. Inclusion and participation were limited to certain privileged classed of Athenian citizens and were not extended to women, foreigners, and slaves. Since then, the franchise has been significantly extended and today most nations boast of attaining universal suffrage; however, participation and inclusion are still stymied in many ways both de-jure and de-facto. A good example of limiting participation and inclusion is during the Jim Crow era in the United States. Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, by most measures, the Jim Crow system has been consigned to the dustbin of history; however, there are still observers who believe that, even though de jure segregation is no longer a concern, de facto segregation still exists in the United States

Despite the above captured argument that the democratic value and the spirit of democracy- self-governing, self, development, dignity, freedom, liberty, limited government, and equal opportunity- remain constant and appealing and despite the many transformations of democracy in the last 2500 years, one could argue that the “value” and “spirit” will never change because it appeals directly to the most innate part of the human spirit: John Locke is still relevant; the idea of individuals surrendering some of their inalienable natural rights and entering into a social contract to protect their welfare and well-being is still true today. Not mentioning that if such government fails its citizens, the citizens still retain the right to replace such government, as argued by Thomas Jefferson in the thirteen colonies’ Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1776.

As discussed above, the literature confirms an existence of a general consensus on the principles, attributes, and characteristics referred to as the spirit and values of democracy. However, beyond the basic principles, attributes, and characteristics - spirit and values- there exists a substantial lack of consensus on the nuances of democracy. Therefore democracy comes across in the literature as a “chameleon”: a reptile (a concept) whose color is substantially determined by its environment. As the transitions in model of democracy mimics the change of color that predispose the chameleon as they respond to their personal environment, the enduring question remains, what is the true color of the chameleon? Such dilemma precipitates the enduring debate between the “believers” and “doubters” of democracy and the democratization process. Despite the enduring debate in the last two centuries the liberal democracy model has managed to remain the current consequential model with offshoot. However, the debate between

believers and doubters perpetuate and this question remains: what is the future of democracy, now that liberal democracy has become the “gold standard?” The analysis of the literature is based on the above observations. Starting with the general consensus observation, each point of observation is dealt with at length.

### **Beyond the General Consensus**

Even though the literature review confirms a general consensus on the basic logic, principles, and attributes (spirit and values) of democracy, it is prudent to balance the argument by highlighting the general lack of consensus on the central arguments, concepts, and theories of democracy and democratization. This general lack of consensus abounds, including definition, application, process, and even the justification of democracy. Such lack of consensus reveals that besides the spirit and values of democracy, scholars and observers alike are not in total agreement of the nuances of democracy.

Evident throughout the literature reviewed is that the spirit and values of democracy means different things to different people. Larry Diamond succinctly echoed this lack of consensus with this statement: “There cannot be any one ‘right’ answer to the question of what democracy is; we can only be transparent, and logical and consistent, in whatever standard we adopt.”<sup>39</sup> Actually, Arend Lijphart went further and flat out posits that democracy is a concept that “virtually defies definitions.”<sup>40</sup> It goes without saying that beyond the basic consensus discussed above the literature confirms that there exists

---

<sup>39</sup> Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World*, 22.

<sup>40</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 4.

diversity in the views on democracy. Such diverse views on democracy manifest in the whole host of different terms scholars invoke in their quest to define, contextualize, understand and explain democracy. Arend Lijphart sees democracy in patterns; David Held sees democracy in models; Samuel Huntington and John Markoff see democracy in waves; Francis Fukuyama views democracy as reaching its final destination in liberal democracy; Seymour Martin Lipset sees democracy through the eyes of society and societal conditions; Joseph Schumpeter sees democracy in terms of participation limited to free and fair elections-minimal requirement. Thomas Dye views democracy (especially in the United States) through elite theory (the primacy of the elite). Robert Michels views democracy through the primacy of the few - the oligarchy. Michael Parenti also views democracy in the United States as democracy for the few - the special interest of the wealthy and the powerful. Quoting Collier and Levitsky, Diamond reports that 550 subtypes of democracy were identified.<sup>41</sup> Diamond drives this point home by stating that:

[D]efining democracy is a bit like interpreting the Talmud (or any religious text): ask a room of ten rabbis (or political scientist) for the meaning, and you will have at least eleven different answers. In the case of democracy these answer tend to group into “thin” and “thick” conceptions.<sup>42</sup>

This lack of general consensus beyond the “spirit and values” of democracy is hardly new. From Aristotle to contemporary scholars, scholars have argued and written

---

<sup>41</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 7.

<sup>42</sup> Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World*, 21.



extensively on the ideals of democracy. Renowned contemporary scholars including but not limited to, Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond, Harold Lasswell, Adam Przeworski, Juan Linz, David Held, John Markoff, Arend Lijphart, Thomas Dye and many others. Departing from various conceptualizations, meanings, and models these scholars made inroads in defining, understanding, and explaining democracy despite the general lack of consensus

This lack of consensus also challenges the perpetuation of democracy in its current general form. The perpetuation of democracy is also in the mind of many scholars. Echoing Huntington's dilemma, Larry Diamond and Marc Platter also ask if democracy (the third wave) will be perpetuated into the future, or if this third wave (1974-1990) will reverse and succumb to democratic breakdown as experienced in the previous two waves.<sup>43</sup> Even Robert Dahl, a staunch proponent of democracy, airs his concerns on the limits and possibilities of democracy in his book *Democracy and Its Critics*. Knowing that such limitations could serve as a solid point of argument for critics and skeptics, Dahl reckons with what he refers to as the "desirability" (or lack thereof) of democracy. As a result, it is prudent to question the passing liberal democracy as a universal template, because it seems democracy takes the nature of a chameleon: a reptile that is known to be capable of changing its color to match its environment for protection. The next section discusses the chameleonic nature of democracy in greater detail.

---

<sup>43</sup>Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, x.

### **The Democratic Model: A Chameleon**

From the above survey of the literature two things are now evident: 1) there is consensus, with little doubt on the ideal of democracy, the universality of the spirit of democracy, and the democratic values; however, 2) there is a general lack of consensus on the nuances of an “ideal democracy.” Consequently, it is clear that democracy has undergone many transitions and transformations in the last 2500 years. Accompanying these transitions and transformations are changes in the conceptualization, definition, applications, and even the justification of democracy. The most significant of these transitions and transformations is from direct democracy (Athenian) to representative democracy (in the modern electoral republic) and its various forms: electoral democracy, participatory democracy, Madisonian democracy, deliberative democracy, pluralistic democracy, and polyarchical democracy among others. Two and a half millennia prove to be a solid test of time for many things including democracy. All these transformations and models confirm the chameleonic nature of democracy. A basic definition and a quick journey in history will further confirm the chameleonic nature of democracy.

For a basic definition, Robert Dahl reminded us that “a useful starting point is the etymological origins of the term: *demos* (the people) *kratia* (rule).”<sup>44</sup> Nonetheless, the question, what constitutes “the people,” remains. The question on what constitutes “the people” has prompted heated debate throughout the history of democracy, thus creating believers and doubters. These supporters and opponents, in turn, construct theories and explanations to solidify their respective positions. In explaining democracy and “the

---

<sup>44</sup> Dahl, *On Political Equality*, 8.

people” question, the theories offered tend to gravitate towards two general poles: 1) Normative Democratic Theory (moral foundation of democracy and democratic institutions) and 2) Descriptive and Explanatory Democratic Theory (interdisciplinary). However, it is worth keeping Dahl’s advice in mind: “There is no democracy theory—there are only democratic theories.”<sup>45</sup> This means that no one democracy theory is capable of explaining democracy single handedly. Not to mention that all democracy theories have at least an element of validity. In other words, one should refrain from the temptation of holding one democracy theory superior while discounting others.

Keeping in mind the transitions and transformations that democracy underwent in response to changing times, changing political climate, and adaptation to new realities, the author metaphorically refers to democracy as “the Chameleon.” It seems that its perpetuation over the last 2500 years is made possible partly because of the “chameleonic” nature of democracy. In other words, even though the ideals of democracy are universally appealing, the ways of achieving such ideals depends on time in history, society and societal values, political and socio-economic values, and society’s world view.

The argument boils down to “democracy is desirable.” However, if democracy is to yield positive results for individual societies just like a chameleon changing its color to adapt to its environment mainly for survival purposes, such a model of democracy should also adapt to its environment. Athenian democracy extended participation to some Athenians, not all, not to mention the rest of Greece. Conversely, the Roman republic

---

<sup>45</sup> Robert Dahl., *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956), 1.

extended participation to some Romans, not all, but at its best democracy generally delivers in these governments. On the same token, one can argue that liberal democracy generally works for Western countries. However, it is fair to state that all these models of democracy worked in these respective policies because the model takes into consideration the realities of that particular society. Because of these various models and templates, the debate on democracy is ending, as evident throughout the literature: a debate between the believers and doubters (skeptics), even cynics. The next section focuses on this debate. As we transition to the next section, keep in mind that the final destination in this review is the enquiry of liberal democracy a universal fit, particularly for West Africa and Senegal.

### **True Color of the Chameleon: Debate between the Believers and Doubters/Critics of the Democratic Model**

True Color of the Chameleon: Debate between believers” and doubters/critics

The debate opens by revisiting Dahl as he highlights the confusing nature of democracy, suggesting a source of lack of consensus of what democracy really is:

An important cause of the confusion over what democracy means in our present world is that it has developed over several thousand years and stems from a variety of sources. What we understand by democracy is not what an Athenian in the time of Pericles would have understood by it. Greek, Roman, medieval, and Renaissance notion intermingle with those of later centuries to produce a jumble of theory and practices that are deeply inconsistent.<sup>46</sup>

Referring to Dahl’s observation, the focus now turns to the debate between the believers and the doubters of democracy.

---

<sup>46</sup> Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, 2.

In democracy's 2500 year history, there is a long line of "believers" (differing degrees) including democracy in the classic sense (Socrates), democracy in the Enlightenment period and thereafter (John Locke, Montesquieu, J. J Rousseau, de Tocqueville), and contemporary "believers" (Robert Dahl, Arend Lijphart, Harold Lasswell and many others).

As expected, there are also "doubters" of democracy from classic to contemporary times. Classic "doubters" include Aristotle and Plato; Enlightenment doubters include Hobbes; contemporary doubters include Robert Michels, Michael Parenti, and Thomas Dye in naming a few.

Considering human nature and the perpetual struggle for basic survival, even greed, and human's propensity towards evil as Hobbes and Machiavelli might contend, it is almost common sense to note that this basic idea of democracy is pure and desirable, given the fact that democracy in its perfect form uplifts the human in both being and spirit. However, noting the fact that the world is yet to see a perfect democracy, the question becomes how desirable is democracy. What are the justifications of democracy in an imperfect world? Who actually rules? Who is included and allowed to participate? Who is protected from government? Is there equality in access and equality in opportunity? These questions lead to the examination of democracy beyond the surface. With the question of justification and desirability (or lack of) of democracy, democracy becomes questionable. Questioning democracy in an imperfect world is hardly new. Aristotle asked these questions 2300 years ago. J. S. Mill, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and many others asked these questions in the Enlightenment period and the same is true

today. Today scholars such as Dahl, Parenti, Dye, and many more are still asking the same questions about the justifiability and the value of democracy.

Consequently these questions are still relevant today and the author finds it prudent to revisit them. To answer such questions, the author further reviews the literature on the proponents and opponents of democracy. Considering the fact that both proponents and opponents find themselves somewhere in the democracy spectrum (various degrees of support/opposition), proponents are herein referred to as “believers” and opponents as “doubters.” Stemming from the literature review, some of “the believers” and “the doubters” positions of the democracy debate are captured in the next section.

### **Is the Liberal Democratic Model a One-Size-Fits-All Model, or a Misfit for Some Nations?**

Up to this point, like a slow moving river the literature review meandered through the many transitions and transformations of democracy. Upon reaching our current destination we now turn attention to liberal democracy, the current consequential model. But is our current destination (illiberal democracy) the final frontier? From this point on the focus is on liberal democracy.

Borrowing from Diamond, liberal democracy is defined here as “political systems in which individual and group liberties are well protected and in which there exists autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from state control.”<sup>47</sup> As extrapolated from Dahl’s definition, the discussion now focuses on the core of the concept of liberal democracy: 1) individual liberties and freedom, 2) political equality, 3) majority rule and minority rights, 4) individual worth, and 5) the need for compromise.

---

<sup>47</sup> Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 3.

The focus is on liberal democracy, not because the author is in complete agreement with Francis Fukuyama's assertion that we have witnessed the "end of history" and liberal democracy prevailed, but for the simple fact that liberal democracy is the model of democracy promoted by the West particularly France, England, and the United States since independence in the area of focus: West Africa in general and Senegal in particular.

As the literature review suggests, the current consequential model is the liberal democracy model, but the question still lingers, is liberal democracy a model that fits all? There is considerable evidence that the Senegalese model of democracy is the driving force behind political stability in Senegal. The argument then becomes what model of democracy fits Senegal more perfectly? It is believed that the Senegalese model of democracy (the *Democarassie* model) is not only effective and responsive to the post-independence challenges Senegal is facing, but also proves to be sensitive to Senegal's realities, social mores, and cultural ideals, and therefore fits Senegal better. Stemming from the findings in the literature review, the following observations are made, and therefore follow-up questions on the issue of democracy and political stability in Senegal become necessary. As captured in the next section, the follow-up questions are as follows. In the case of Senegal, 1) Is the *Democarassie* model a customized refit of liberal democracy that reflects the realities in Senegal and thus help maintain political stability since independence in 1960? 2) Does the *Democarassie* model and political stability share a natural symbiotic relationship (reinforcing each other)? 3) What is the future of democracy especially in the West Africa sub-region and Senegal in particular? Should liberal democracy still be the "standard" model or should each state pursue a

model of liberal democracy that reflect realities on the ground and hopefully discover a model that fosters political stability? In more detail, these questions are now investigated.

### **Is the *Democarassie* Model a Customized Refit?**

Prior to exploring if liberal democracy as a model fits realities everywhere, revisiting Dahl is in order. In his book *On Democracy*, Robert Dahl makes a case for democracy stating reasons “why democracy” as follows: 1) Democracy protects against tyranny, 2) promotes essential rights, 3) fosters general freedom, 4) promotes self-determination, 5) supports moral authority, 6) promotes human development, 7) protect essential personal interests, 8) promotes political equality, and 9) in modern democracies seeks peace and prosperity.<sup>48</sup> If this is the case, there is something terribly wrong with democracy in the context of West Africa, because a good number of West African countries are deficient in many of these variables. Within “Dahl’s democratic environment,” democracy is nurtured and stable. Full participation and a higher quality of political and social life becomes the norm. Arguably, this is not the case in most West African countries. This establishes the fact that democracy does not deliver the same everywhere. The question then becomes why does democracy work for some nations and not for others?

In answering the enquiry why democracy works for some nations and not for others, revisiting Lijphart becomes necessary. Echoing and concurring with Sir Arthur Lewis and the Lewis Model, Lijphart states that it is a fact that just because certain

---

<sup>48</sup> Dahl, *On Democracy*, 45.



models of democracy “work” in “class societies” such as Britain and France does not necessarily mean that such models will also produce positive results in “plural” West African societies where cleavages abound ranging from tribal, to religious, linguistic cultural, economic and regional.<sup>49</sup> If the Lewis Model recommends a consociation model over a majoritarian model in plural societies, the question remains why Senegal (or other West African countries for that matter) should adopt liberal democracy in the majoritarian sense. Should the model of democracy reflect the realities and unique societal challenges? The answer to the enquiry then becomes democracy should be based on the type of society, “class,” pluralistic and beyond. With the reasons stated above, the question that is begging to be asked is whether countries or regions have to follow the blue prints of Western concocted models of democracy or come up with their own hybrid models of democracy that fit its environment and realities better. This question leads us back to Senegal’s model of democracy: the *Democarassie* model.

In the methodology section (chapter 4), the dissertation further explores the *Democarassie* model to investigate why the *Democarassie* model produces better results than liberal democracy in Senegal. This section will highlight the similarities and differences between liberal democracy and *the Democarassie model*, prior to building a case that the *Democarassie* model works more effectively and produces better results in Senegal. At this point the focus turns to the relationship between the *Democarassie* model and political stability which is considered to be symbiotic and further explored in the next section. Following the case study in chapter five, the ultimate question in the

---

<sup>49</sup> Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 144.

final chapter will be, does the *Democarassie* model and political stability share a natural symbiotic relationship? If yes, the recommendation for future study will be if Senegal discovers a model of democracy embedded in liberal democracy, however, customized to “fit” its unique needs, why not prescribe the same rationale for other countries in the sub-region and beyond?

However, few “presidents for life” are still hanging on to power and “illiberal democracies” still flourish. Consequently, many African countries in the sub-region still experience governments that blatantly disregard the rule of law, and curtail liberties. Patrimonialism, the stymie and manipulation of political participation and the political process, considerable dissent intolerance, amongst others, all culminates to, not only allowing un-democratic leaders to benefit from the democratic process (gaining and retaining office through election), but holding on to power by undemocratic means.

Even though examples abound, captured here are three examples on how un-democratic leaders take advantage of the democratic process (gaining and retaining office through election), by holding on to power by undemocratic means. The first example is what is referred to here as “constitutional manipulation”. A case in point, both presidents, Wade of Senegal and Obasanjo of Nigeria unsuccessfully maneuvered to manipulate their constitutions to allow a third term bid. Both finally only abandoned this constitutional manipulation after staunch opposition. Second, is what is referred to as the trading of “military camouflage outfit with the suit and tie or *grand boubou*.” Again, using the democratic process, successful military coup leaders transform to civilians for solely legitimizing and keeping the presidency. Cases in point include but are not limited to

Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, A. Toumani Touré of Mali (ex-presidents) and President Jammeh of the Gambia. Thirdly, and equally disturbing is the case of a populist opposition leader “gone wild.” A great example is president of Wade of Senegal. In its waning days, Wade’s regime became increasingly corrupt- A president who had been an opposition leader for over a quarter of a century; an opposition candidate who had campaigned strongly against corruption sought to hold power by underhanded means. If this trend continues the illiberal democracy Zakaria has been warning us about will lay deep roots in West Africa’s near future.

### **Gap in the Literature**

The following archetypal authorities on democracy offer the following as the basic elements of democracy. These authorities include Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond, Arend Lijphart, and Fareed Zaria amongst others. For Robert Dahl the basic democracy elements may be summarized as:

1. Effective participation
2. Voting equality
3. Enlightened understanding
4. Citizen’s control of the agenda

In multiple works, Larry Diamond summarizes and offers the thin and thick of democracy as follows:

1. Meaningful Individual Freedom
2. Religious and ethnic freedom
3. Right to vote and run for office/(free and fair election)
4. Rule of law and genuine equality
5. Independent and neutral judiciary
6. Due Process
7. Checks and balances
8. Meaningful Pluralism
9. Civilian control of the military

10. Openness and competition
11. Popular Sovereignty
12. Accountability of Rulers
13. Constraining constitution

Arend Lijphart presents prerequisites and factors conducive to stable democracy as:

1. Social Homogeneity
2. Political Consensus

Fareed Zakaria summarizes the basic democracy elements as follows:

1. Free and Fair elections
2. Rule of law
3. Separation of powers
4. Protection of basic liberties

As highlighted above, for; Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond, Fareed Zakaria, Arend Lijphart, and many other scholars and throughout the literature, the elements of the liberal democratic model generally summarize as follows: 1) Elections (frequent, free, and fair) 2) Individual liberties guarantees, 3) Political Rights protected and 4) Political participation guarantees. Even though Larry Diamond extended these elements to the “thick side” of democracy, these four elements generally form the basic elements of the democratic model. Under the umbrella of political rights and civil liberties, these basic elements of democracy also accentuate the Freedom House methodology as follows:

#### Political Rights

Electoral Process  
Political Pluralism and Participation  
Functioning of Government

#### Civil Liberties

Freedom of Expression and Belief  
Associational and Organizational Rights  
Rule of Law  
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

As captured above, the foremost democracy authorities narrow democracy down to, and generally concur that the elements of democracy are guarantees of frequent, free, and fair elections; individual liberties protected; political rights, and political participation guaranteed. However, Senegal is considered democratic and remains politically stable, despite deficiencies in many of these general guarantees, especially when one considers the “thick” side of democracy-independence of the judiciary, and checks and balances, for instance. This suggests that the liberal democratic model cannot fully account for, and explain the political stability Senegal has enjoyed since independence in 1960. This is in conjunction with the revelation from the analysis of the literature review revealing that the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal. This is seen as the main gap in the literature; the inability of the liberal democratic model to account for, and explain democracy and political stability in Senegal. In filling the gap in the literature, the study offers the *Democarassie* model as a model of democracy that explains democracy and political stability in Senegal more completely.

### **Conclusion**

Beyond the general consensus, there lies a wide-ranging lack of consensus on what qualifies as a democracy: a broad spectrum of disagreement ranging from the question of simply holding elections, to the “thin” and “thick” conceptions of democracy. In effect, what becomes evident as a result of the analysis is that beyond the general consensus democratization and democracy carry different meanings across time, culture, and space. Consequently, the democratic model comes across, as illustrated in the

analysis as a chameleon; a reptilian character capable of changing color as necessary to adapt to its environment strictly for survival purposes. This ever changing adaptive nature of democracy is what drives the enduring debate between what is referred in this study as believers and doubters/critics. Within the backdrop of this lack of consensus and the enduring debate that ensued, it seems that since the eighteenth century and in earnest after the 1990s, considering third world countries, most of the world's nations that identify as democracies have settled with the liberal democratic model. However, even with this model, the lack of consensus on democracy still exists, and the debate still rages.

Therefore, as part of the of the analysis of the literature review the “big question” is, considering vast differences between the developed democratic countries and developing and emerging democracies on the issues of culture, social exchanges, ethics, morals, economic development in naming a few, does the liberal democratic model in its Western version fit all nations? As part of the analysis, it is this study's position that the liberal democratic model in its Western version does not fit all nations. As a result, considering the value in the “spirit and value” of democracy as universal and desirable to many, the study suggests a version of the liberal democratic model that takes into consideration and therefore accommodates nations' unique realities. This suggestion stems from the findings of studying Senegal on democratization, democracy, and political stability. The finding reveals that the liberal democratic model falls short of fully explaining political stability in Senegal, but the customized version; the *Democarassie* model is able to. As a result, one challenges the universality of the liberal democratic

model, which the study generally sees as a misfit for many nations, and therefore suggests a refit. This refit in the case of Senegal is the liberal democratic model version: the *Democarassie* model. It is further suggested that other nations can discover their own versions of the liberal democratic model that suit their individual nation's unique realities. And as a result, fit the nation better than the liberal democratic model in its current form. As evident the literature review followed by an analysis reveals the fact that the liberal democratic model is unable to explain political stability in Senegal, but the *Democarassie* model can. As a result, the *Democarassie* model, viewed as a derivative of the liberal democratic model in this study is presented as the vanguard of political stability in Senegal. The notion that the liberal democratic model is not capable of explaining political stability in Senegal as the main gap in the literature.

## CHAPTER 3

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE *DEMOCARASSIE*<sup>1</sup> MODEL

It is the study's position that the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal. As a result, the study proposes a version of the liberal democratic model: the *Democarassie* model. This is the study's main contribution towards the theory and the general discourse on democracy and political stability. Compared to the liberal democratic model, the *Democarassie* model is hereby introduced as a theoretical framework that better explains political stability in Senegal. In the interest of avoiding misconceptions and fostering deeper understanding, it is prudent to extensively deal with the *Democarassie* model in this chapter beyond the scope of the introductory chapter. Consequently, the theoretical framework chapter succinctly conceptualizes, defines in detail, and operationalizes where appropriate, the core theoretical concept of the study-the *Democarassie* model. The conceptualization and definition of the accompanying main concepts in the study (democratization/democracy and political stability) will be dealt with in chapter four.

---

<sup>1</sup> The term *Democarrassie* is coined by the author from the Senegalese Wolof pronunciation of term democracy. By definition the *Democarrassie* Model is an offshoot (an offspring, a derivative, a localized version) of the liberal democratic model sharing guarantees including frequent, free, and fair election, political participation, civil liberties, political rights, and rule of law, however, considers and accommodates the unique realities of individual nations, in this case, Senegal.



Since the *Democarassie* model is the study's main contribution to the existing body of knowledge on democracy and political stability; since this concept is the debut of a nation-centric model of democracy; since the *Democarassie* model is expected to be a trailblazer, significant volume of enquiry is expected. Just like all virgin concepts, further questioning, probing, challenging, and even criticism is expected from peers, critics skeptics, supporters and the "just curious" alike. These inevitable questions are anticipated. Questions could include but are not limited to 1) what is the *Democarassie* model? 2) What are the basic essentials (taproot, building block(s), and cornerstone(s) of the *Democarassie* model? 3) What are the similarities or differences between the liberal democratic model and the *Democarassie* model, and how can the *Democarassie* model deliver where the liberal democratic model falls short? 4) Why the *Democarassie* model? What makes the *Democarassie* model so unique? How does the *Democarassie* model promote political stability? These questions and many more will be dealt with in this chapter and in greater detail throughout the study, especially in the case study.

To begin to unpack the *Democarassie* model, one must start with an examination of the values, elements, operations, and outcomes of the model. Within the context of these values, elements, operations and outcomes, it is found important to remind readers what exactly is the *Democarassie* model. The *Democarassie* model is a version of the liberal democratic model that the study suggests upholds political stability in Senegal. The *Democarassie* model is grounded within the parameters of the liberal democratic model. Therefore, the *Democarassie* model is seen as a derivative/a localized version/an offshoot/an offspring of the liberal democratic model. Why is the *Democarassie* model

considered as an offshoot of the liberal democratic model? The *Democarassie* model is considered rooted in the liberal democratic model in the sense that: 1) the *Democarassie* model among other guarantees allows and promote frequent, free, and fair elections with mass citizen's participation in the excess of seventy percent voter turn-out.<sup>1</sup> These voting citizens prove to be capable of not only significantly affecting election outcomes, but also capable of voting an incumbent president out of office as evident in the elections of 2000 and 2012. 2) To a great extent, the *Democarassie* model extensively exhibits most, if not all, the other hallmarks of the liberal democratic model including: civil liberties, political rights, and the rule of law (as highlighted with the above elements). Together these guarantees are referred to as "shared guarantees" between the two models. These shared guarantees include the guarantee of frequent, free, and fair elections with mass citizen's participation, civil liberties, political rights, and rule of law. Both the liberal democratic model and the *Democarassie* model champion these shared guarantees.

To recap, the *Democarassie* model is 1) considered a version of the liberal democratic model with shared characteristics including political participation, civil liberties, political rights, rule of law and popular sovereignty. 2) Akin to the liberal democratic model, the *Democarassie* model draws power from the people. 3) Unlike the liberal democratic model, the establishments and establishment heads also referred to in this study as the decentralized despots, or customary authorities, and also seen in the image of power elites, play the important role of servicing the basic needs of the people in terms of jobs, business opportunities, spirituality, guidance and leadership, and so on.

---

<sup>1</sup> This is especially true starting with the 2000 Presidential Election

These customary authorities also intervene as needed in influencing the people's political decision, especially if such decision threatens the political stability of the nation as a coherent unit.

**The Nature: Decentralized Despotism within the Backdrop of Political Sociology, Democratic Pluralism, and Consociation Theory**

In this study the *Democarassie* model is theorized within the wider context of supporting existing theories including political sociology, democratic pluralism and consociation. Evidently, one can choose to stay on course and follow norms and status quo by invoking mainstream political and economic theoretical frameworks including but not limited to: feminist, dependency, development theory; realism; idealism; structural functionalism; constructivism, all capable of explaining democracy and democratization in Senegal to some extent. Also as a level of analysis, one can choose to adopt the “gold standards”; the international system, the state system, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions; as these prove to be the preferred analytical tool in terms of explaining issues of democratization, democracy and political stability. However, considering the importance of 1) society and societal norms, 2) the reality of “establishments” and “customary authority” in Senegal, and 3) patronage and clientelism in Senegalese political exchanges and issues of governance, the study looks within and beyond theories grounded in political science. As a result, in theorizing the *Democarassie* model, the study utilizes decentralized despotism theory as the ultimate theoretical framework, however, within the wider context of political sociology, polyarchy democratic pluralism, and consociation theory.

Consequently, decentralized despotism theory within the context of democratic pluralism, polyarchy democratic pluralism and consociation, all with the wider context of political sociology proves to be an effective theoretical framework. Hence, as a passageway to the task of fleshing out the decentralized despotism theory, it is necessary to revisit political sociology and democratic pluralism and consociation theory.

In Lewis A. Coser's definition, political sociology:

Is that branch of sociology which is concerned with the social causes and consequences of given power distributions within or between societies, and with the social and political conflicts that lead to changes in the allocation of power....Whereas traditional political science tends to be mainly concerned with the machinery of government and the mechanism of public administration, the sociological analysis of political phenomena is concerned with the wider interplay between politics and the social structure, between political and societal processes.<sup>2</sup>

Anthony M. Orum and John G. Dale argue that democracy does not spring full blown, but depends on a set of historical and social circumstances to emerge.<sup>3</sup>

Consequently, Coser characterizes political science as focusing on “the machinery of government and the mechanisms of public administration and not the wider interplay between politics and the social structure, between political and societal processes.” Also, Orum and Dale argue that in order for democracy to emerge, it must depend on a specific set of historical and social circumstances. Given the role of customary authority, it is

---

<sup>2</sup> Lewis A. Coser, *Political Sociology* (New York: Harper Torch books, 1966), 1.

<sup>3</sup> Anthony Orum and John G. Dale, *Introduction to Political Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.

evident that if one seeks to understand political stability in Senegal and its relation with the Senegalese model of democracy more intimately, one should not only go beyond the “machinery of government and the mechanism of public administration,” but also include the wider interplay between politics and the social structure and societal processes. One must also seek to understand historical and social circumstances that bear heavily on Senegalese society.

Within the backdrop of the greater political sociology theoretical framework one realizes that decentralized despotism theory also shares values with polyarchic democratic pluralism theory. Democratic pluralism according to Dahl’s 1961 seminal work, *Who Governs* is defined as democracy in the populist or pluralist/polyarchic sense.<sup>4</sup> Dahl contends that contrary to renowned scholars such as C. Wright Mills, within democratic pluralism there exists multiple elite bases, and such elite bases contend and compromise. Democratic pluralism or populist democracy also resonates with Lijphart’s consensus and consociation model of democracy, where power is shared. This sharing of power is a very important aspect of the *Democarassie* model.

In view of the above, the study utilizes decentralized despotism as the perennial theoretic framework within the context of political sociology, democratic pluralism, and consociation democracy theory. But what exactly is decentralized despotism? Mahmoud Mamdani describes decentralized despotism as, “A hallmark of the colonial state, modeled as monarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian with a king in the center, a chief

---

<sup>4</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

as the head of the administrative ground and a patriarchy in every homestead or kraal.”<sup>5</sup>

Such decentralized despotism political arrangement takes place in a political setting where significant political participation (democratic pluralism) exists. However, citizens’ political behavior is heavily influenced by what is referred to in this study as “establishments” and what Mamdani refers to as “customary authority.” Bearing in mind the importance of “establishments” and “customary authority” within the Senegalese political and social exchanges, Mahmoud Mamdani’s theoretical framework of decentralized despotism serves as the central theoretical framework of reference supported by the wider framework of consociation and democratic pluralism theory, both within the framework of political sociology theory. One now takes a closer look at the *Democarassie* model vis-à-vis the decentralized despotism theoretical framework. For a better understanding of the model, one must first understand its values, elements, operation, and outcomes.

### **The Values**

To set the stage towards a more profound understanding of the *Democarassie* model, the values of the model must be considered here. The *Democarassie* model’s values can be summarized as, “kinder and gentler,” sensitive to local realities, accommodating to religious and socio-cultural exchanges, and adaptive to existing systems, political, economic, cultural etc. All the other values help make the *Democarassie* model “kinder and gentler.”

---

<sup>5</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 39.

Akin to Lijphart's position on consociationalism, the *Democarassie* model is believed to be "kinder and gentler" considering the following values: The *Democarassie* model incorporates a high degree of liberty; a high level of political participation; a high degree of tolerance (religious, ideological, and associational). The *Democarassie* model also incorporates a high level of inclusion and acceptance. Instead of taking advantage of existing cleavages, the *Democarassie* model makes inclusion a major priority. As a result, the model recognizes cleavages, however, instead of excluding groups based on ethnicity, location, social status, and gender, in naming a few, the *Democarassie* model uses religion, culture, language, nationalism, patronage, age and gender roles to include all, thus, converging instead of diverging existing cleavages.

All these values help make the *Democarassie* model "kinder and gentler." This "kinder and gentler" characteristic of the *Democarassie* model is believed to promote a system where citizens not only "buy into" but "claim ownership" of their political destiny. As a result, all citizens regardless of social status (elites, peasants, and all in between) display considerable confidence with the political exchanges in the system. This sentiment is captured with these well-known Senegalese maxims, *Senegal sunu gal* (Senegal, our boat/vessel-Senegal our country) and "*boule yengal galgi*"; a literal translation of this might read "do not rock the boat," with Senegal being the proverbial boat. As owners of their political destiny, citizens generally refrain from exchanges that upset the political harmonic balance. Arguably, these nationalistic tendencies, in and of itself, can lead to political stability. Adding to the "kinder and gentler" nature of the *Democarassie* model, the model also proves to be sensitive and accommodating to

Senegalese culture, social mores, religion, and political and economic realities. This is what makes the *Democarassie* model unique. The importance of such accommodation cannot be understated in upholding democracy and political stability in Senegal, because Senegal is not only a class society, but also ethnically diverse with multiple languages. Therefore, it is believed that a model of democracy, not only consociational in nature, but accommodating and adaptive to Senegal's unique realities seems to serve Senegal better than the traditional Western liberal democratic model. This is why the *Democarassie* model is seen as a more perfect fit for Senegal. With these values in mind, the question that is begged to be asked is what exactly are the elements the *Democarassie* model.

### **The Elements**

To understand the *Democarassie* model, one must examine the elements of the model. Since the *Democarassie* model is grounded the liberal democratic tradition, besides accommodating a country's unique realities, the elements of the *Democarassie* model are very similar to those of the liberal democratic model as listed.

1. Political freedoms and civil liberties.
2. Religious and Ethnic Freedom
3. Political Participation and Elections (frequent and relatively free and fair)
4. Rule of Law
5. Due Process
6. Pluralism and Collective bargaining

There is a general consensus within Senegal observers and critics alike, that under Senegalese system of government, what is referred to in this study as the *Democarassie* model, all the above element are significantly present. The only concern from observers and critics is how deeply entrenched are these elements. This is a genuine concern



because in Senegal some of these elements, for instance the rule of law, and due process could use improvements and more oversight. There are also issues of checks and balances and separation of power, considering the influence the president. The independence of the judiciary is also called into question.

### **The Operations of the Model**

Mahmoud Mamdani, decentralized despotism theory is conceptualized in the vein of a political regime with multiple “customary authorities” all working in concert for the perpetuation of the political unit. From their perch as establishment heads, these “customary authorities” play their important unifying and stabilizing roles. The questions that is begged to be asked is what are “establishments”, who are these customary authorities, and why are they are so important in decentralized despotism theory? Utilizing the electric grid analogy, in short, the establishments are the various “power houses,” and the “customary authorities” as heads are the power brokers/distributors. These customary authorities serve multiple functions and most importantly diffuse populist tensions, serve as opinion leaders, provide leadership, services, and dole out “goodies” and spoils. With these privileges, these opinion leaders command significant influence over the people, and therefore, are capable of influencing behavior significantly. The other part of the customary authority dynamic is the customary authority’s relationship with the political regime. In their relationship with the regime, the main function of these customary authorities is to keep the regime, the status quo and the central authority (the president) in place and into perpetuity. It is this study’s position that the “Senegalese model of democracy (the *Democarassie* model) that has upheld political

stability for over half a century can be explained through these theoretic frameworks, particularly decentralized despotism. Figure 3.1 captures the operations and the exchanges of the model.




Figure 3.1 Exchanges between the Political Regime Headed by the President and the Establishments Headed by Customary Authorities and its Implications on Political Stability.

<u>President and Political System (provides)</u>	<u>Establishment (provides)</u>
1. Jobs and job security	1. Legitimacy and Recognition
2. Perks and Privileges	2. Votes, Support, and Advocacy
3. Material benefit and Access	3. Security and regime longevity
4. Financial and other Resources	4. Grassroots Support and Volunteering
5. Autonomy	5. Guidance and Advice

### **Outcomes**

1. Sense of normalcy
2. Expectation and hope for the future
3. Sense of ownership and belonging
4. Conformity and patriotism
5. Accountability and responsibility
6. Opportunity and resource access through the patronage system
7. Inclusion and tolerance through the religious and social exchanges

The outcomes of the *Democarassie* model will be revisited and discussed in great detail in the case study. At this juncture, it is found important to draw attention to these generally positive outcomes. Arguably, these outcomes and the fear of the unknown keep the people vested in a system of government that operates under the *Democarassie* model. Looking across the West African sub-region could also be a motivation for staying under the *Democarassie* model, at least the model has a lot to offer, compared to others.

### **How Democratic is the *Democarassie* Model?**

The case is already made that the *Democarassie* model not only takes into consideration, but even accommodates a nation's unique realities; therefore, it is less than democratic in the pure Western liberal democratic model sense. In the case of Senegal, this unique reality is the reality of "establishments" headed by "customary authorities," as introduced above. Especially, important in the exchange between customary authority and the people is the unique reality of customary authority influence. This influence carries a heavy bearing on people's political decision-making and political behavior; both having a direct impact on political stability. Even though, the activities of customary authority renders this model less-than-democratic, the study argues that these same

accommodating attributes of the *Democarassie* model have perpetuated political stability in Senegal over half of a century.

Evidently, akin to the liberal democratic model, the *Democarassie* model assures self-determination and guarantees “the people” effective political participation influencing the decision of choosing their leaders. However, it is of paramount importance to highlight a major departure; a departure of popular sovereignty. Even though the *Democarassie* model is grounded in and considered an offshoot of and therefore shares many characteristics with, the liberal democratic model, there is a major difference between the two models. The *Democarassie* model not only considers, but also recognizes, and accommodates, Senegal’s unique reality: the permanence of what is referred to in this dissertation as the “establishments.” Arguably, any model of democracy that accommodates any reality including the reality of “establishments” and “customary authorities” or any unique reality could be considered by critics as less-than democratic. In consideration of the accommodation of unique realities, one could further argue that less-than democratic tendencies are woven into the very core fabric of the *Democarassie* model. These less-than democratic tendencies include the general acceptance of the role of an elite class (not necessarily a ruling class) that fulfills the role of power brokers and serve as intermediaries between the state and the citizens.

Evidently, the *Democarassie* model is less than perfect. Without asking if the liberal democratic model is perfect, (and even it is, perfect for whom?), an important distinction is to be made here: Unlike the Western liberal democratic model, the *Democarassie* model is not only responsive to unique realities in Senegal, but the model

considers cultural exchanges, mores, ethics and societal norms in Senegal. For instance, within Senegalese society, society's elders enjoy a substantial degree of reverence and respect. The *Democarassie* model considers that. The religious leaders are divinely respected; the *Democarassie* model considers that, also. Heads of industry, government, and the economic apparatus are not treated with contempt, but generally seen as divinely ordained leaders; the *Democarassie* model considers that too. The military establishment and its leaders enjoy considerable amounts of trust and respect, the *Democarassie* model also takes that into consideration. Furthermore the *Democarassie* model considers ethnicity, age, gender, and occupational roles set in the Senegalese society.

### **Conclusion**

Consequently, what unfolds is a version of the liberal democratic model that takes into consideration society's realities. As already mentioned, Senegal's reality happens to be the reality of establishments and customary authority and the important role they play in Senegalese sociocultural, political, and economic life. Considering the degree of political stability in Senegal one could argue that so far the *Democarassie* model within the framework of decentralized despotism theory has been working well for Senegal up to this point. Even though a detailed explanation as to why the *Democarassie* model is working well for Senegal will be hashed out in the case study, to conclude this chapter it is important to offer a brief explanation

The explanation departs from this observation. Considering the vast differences between the developed, developing and emerging democracies, would it be an illusion to expect the authentic Western liberal democratic model to produce the same positive

results as the model produced for Western nations, given the multitude of differences between the West and developing nations? The follow-up question becomes, is there a nation-centric model of democracy? As far as this study is concerned, the answer is in the affirmative; the time is ripe to explore nation-centric models of democracy. To bolster this position, the study presents the *Democarassie* model as a nation-centric model of democracy, producing positive results simply because, unlike the liberal democratic model, the *Democarassie* model goes beyond considering local realities, this model incorporates and places Senegal's realities front and center.

A plausible explanation as to why the *Democarassie* model is working well for Senegal is that even though Western democracy as a concept is foreign to Senegal, Senegal is able to forge a local version of the concept that accommodates its realities. In other words democracy as a concept has adapted well in its new and foreign environment. This idea of adapting a foreign idea is hardly new, and could be envisaged in the milieu of a donated organ. Just like any donated organ, if a foreign organ, idea, or concept is to fully adapt as part of a system/society such organ/idea/concept must "become one" with its new local environment, or otherwise risk rejection. This means that such organ/idea/concept must yield to adaptation to form or become compatible with the new environment. Within this background, it is further observed that foreign ideas/concepts are hardly adopted in their original/authentic form; the foreign idea or concept must transform in varying degrees to its new host. The same holds true for Senegal or any other nation for that matter. In the case of democracy and Senegal, the liberal democratic model transforms into a nation-centric "Senegalese version" of democracy in the form of

the *Democarassie* model. In accommodating the unique realities in Senegal, the *Democarassie* model serves Senegal well. As a result, it seems “hybrid concepts/ideas” (an amalgamation of the origin/the authentic mixed with the local version) work well for individual nations. Therefore, given the success of Senegal and the *Democarassie* model, in the case of democracy and West Africa, a region-centric “West African version” model of democracy should be considered.

## CHAPTER 4

### METHODOLOGY

This chapter is divided into three major sections. Since chapter three introduced, conceptualized, defined and extensively discussed the *Democarassie* model as the theoretical framework in this study, it is found judicious to start section one of the methodology chapter with the conceptualization and definition of political stability and democratization and democracy in the context of this study. Within the wider discussion of political stability, the coup d'état (as the main indicator of political stability) is also contextualized as implemented in this study. Part two of the chapter follows the conceptualization issue with a presentation of an overview of the data, data collection, and data analysis method. Even though the actual case study in chapter five goes in great detail showing the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal, part three of this chapter jump starts the discussion by presenting the theoretical underpinnings and the justifications of an explanatory qualitative case study analysis.

#### **Conceptual Issues: Political Stability**

In this study political stability is viewed as the product of a legitimate political unit where non-coercive civil order exist, as a result of habitual multidimensional and multifaceted political exchanges that allows for perpetuation and longevity, however, provides for transition of power as necessary. Such a transition of power should be



guided by these three conventions. The transition must be: 1) legal, 2) within the boundary of set rules, and 3) orderly, accepted and agreed upon, not coercive, manipulated, or violent. Within this milieu, political stability is hereby conceptualized.

A study that proves to be very instrumental in the conceptualization of political stability is Leon Hurwitz's *Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability*.<sup>1</sup> After reminding readers that the task of conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing political stability proves to be a Herculean task, Hurwitz proceeds to survey the contemporary views and approaches of political stability. Such views and approaches of political stability includes what Hurwitz refers to as "isolated monomeasures:" a) absence of violence; b) governmental longevity/duration; c) legitimate constitutional regime; d) absence of structural change; and e) a multifaceted/system stability approach.<sup>2</sup> Considering all the approaches and views, Hurwitz contends that even though all monomeasures are legitimate political stability approaches, Hurwitz recommends avoiding isolated monomeasures and therefore recommends approaching political stability through a multifaceted/system stability approach, because "stability cannot be reduced to an isolated variable." According to Hurwitz, this approach (multifaceted/system stability approach) is an attempt to integrate and synthesize the various other approaches."<sup>3</sup> With the recommendation of a multifaceted/system stability

---

<sup>1</sup> Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, *Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change* (April, 1973): 449-463, accessed, May 10, 2011, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421273>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 449-463.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 458.

approach, Hurwitz finds allies in Arend Lijphart and Harry Eckstein, especially Eckstein. Harry Eckstein also reached similar conclusions to Hurwitz, that the most comprehensive approach to political stability should include multifaceted societal attributes, because such an approach tends to encompass all monomeasures, therefore offering a more comprehensive conclusion. Eckstein's conceptualization of democratic political stability in the context of the several attributes includes: 1) persistence of patterns, 2) legitimacy, 3) effective decision making, and 4) authenticity.<sup>4</sup> With these attributes in mind, Hurwitz believes Harry Eckstein presumably presented the most comprehensive theoretical study of the problem of a one dimension explanation of political stability. This means that both Hurwitz and Eckstein advocate for "multi-measures" as the legitimate approach to political stability.

Also in concordance with the multifaceted nature of political stability is Arend Lijphart. Lijphart conceptualizes political stability as multidimensional, meaning that political stability is affected by and could be explained from more than one dimension. Most important among the many dimensions according Lijphart include: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness.<sup>5</sup>

In a similar vein Claude Ake echoes the multifaceted/multidimensional nature of political stability. Ake conceptualizes political stability in the context of political exchange, highlighting the regularity of such exchange. Again, one notices the

---

<sup>4</sup>Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," 459.

<sup>5</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (Binghamton: Yale University Press, 1977), 4.

multifaceted and multidimensional nature of political exchanges. As a result, Ake is considered to be in good company with Hurwitz, Eckstein, and Lijphart. Ake's agreement with the other scholars mentioned is captured in his definition of political stability as follows, political stability is:

The regularity of the flow of political exchanges. The more regular the political exchanges, the more stability. Alternately, we might say that there is political stability to the extent that members of a society restrict themselves to the behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed by political role expectations. Any act that deviates from these is an instance of political instability.<sup>6</sup>

Concurring with the above-cited scholars (Hurwitz, Eckstein, Lijphart, and Ake ), this study takes the position that if political stability is to be conceptualized and defined comprehensively, one must do so in a multifaceted/multi-dimensional fashion. Conversely, avoid using single monomeasures because no one single monomeasure has the capacity to completely explain political stability. For illustration purposes consider Lijphart's monomeasures, for example. The first two monomeasures (system maintenance and civil order) share a symbiotic relationship. Conceptually, civil order helps perpetuate system maintenance, and system maintenance promotes civil order. The other two monomeasures (legitimacy and effectiveness) are also closely related. The more legitimate the political system, the more effective the system is in serving its citizens. The more effective the system is in allowing participation and guaranteeing civil rights and liberties the more legitimate the system. As evident, each monomeasure can

---

<sup>6</sup> Claude Ake, "A Definition of Political Stability" (Jan. 1975): 278, accessed June 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421552>.

partially, but not entirely explain political stability. As a result the study conceptualizes political stability in a spirit that is multi-dimensional and multifaceted in nature.

How does this multi-dimensional/multifaceted framework of political stability fit with this study? Studying political stability in Senegal is no different from studying political stability elsewhere. Just like anywhere else, a comprehensive understanding of political stability in Senegal calls for a multidimensional/multifaceted approach.

Arguably, however, when it comes to setting a benchmark for political stability, a monomeasure could be set. As already mentioned, in this study that benchmark is crossing the coup threshold; therefore, the main monomeasure of political stability in this study is the coup d'état. Even though political stability in Senegal could be explained by many of the monomeasures offered by Hurwitz, Lijphart and the rest, the coup d'état is considered the final frontier and the ultimate threshold especially when the coup is successful: A successful coup puts the last nail in a regime's coffin.

Considering the various political exchanges between the president and the people, and the role of "establishments and customary authority," as expected, political stability in Senegal is multidimensional and multifaceted in nature. It is a fact that a nation could experience various forms of political instability stemming from various sources; however, the ultimate threshold, the benchmark for political stability in Senegal and West Africa, proves to be the coup d'état. Grounded in a conceptualization multifaceted and multidimensional in spirit, political stability in the context of this study is hereby defined.

As a result, political stability could be defined within a wide spectrum ranging from Marta Reynal-Querol's simplistic definition that political stability is the ability of a political systems to prevent conflict,<sup>7</sup> to the more nuanced definitions offered by the likes of Edward Luttwak, Issaka Souaré, Samuel Huntington, Monty and Donna Marshall, Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), and Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier in naming a few. With this in mind, a concise definition of political stability in the context of this study must be offered here.

A fusion of the Hurwitz, Lijphart, and Ake conceptualizations lends context to the definition of political stability in this study. Within the context of the multidimensional, multifaceted nature of political exchange and extrapolating from these authors' conceptualization, political stability is defined as:

A legitimate political unit where non-coercive civil order as a result of habitual multidimensional and multifaceted political exchanges allows perpetuation and longevity, however, providing for transition of power as necessary. Such transition of power should be guided by these three conventions, the transition must be: 1) legal and within the boundary of set rules, and 2) orderly, accepted and agreed upon, not coercive, manipulated, or violent.

For a more balanced approach, it is recognized that the coup is not the only source of political instability. As a result it is found prudent to reflect on other sources

---

<sup>7</sup> Marta Reynal-Querol, "Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars," *Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmic* (April 2002), accessed May 10, 2010, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/politicalsystems\\_stability\\_and\\_civilwars.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/politicalsystems_stability_and_civilwars.pdf)

of political instability to help make the case that the coup is the benchmark for political instability for the West Africa sub-region.

Even though the main measure of political instability in this study is the coup, as mentioned above, there are various other sources of political instability. These sources of instability other than the coup, also known as a *putsch* and a *pronunciamento* are captured as follows. Table 4.1 identifies fourteen sources of political instability that are grouped into two source groups, extra-judicial and judicial/quasi-judicial.

Table 4.1: Sources of Political Instability

Extra-Judicial	Judicial/Quasi-Judicial
Secessions	Riots
Irredentism	Strikes
Civil Wars	Uprising
Revolutions	Demonstrations
Genocide/Politicide	Protests
Cross-Border Conflict	Ethnic and Religious Conflicts
Terrorism	Liberation and Wars of liberation

### **Coup D'état**

According to Patrick J. McGowan, "A coup d'état involves the sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group-in contrast to 'revolutions'

achieved by large number working for basic social, economic and political change.”<sup>8</sup>

Even though the literature confirms that coups could be peaceful and bloodless, the following characterize the coup d'état: sudden, violent, surprising, expeditious, and deadly. In great secrecy a small band of conspirators conspire to topple and replace the regime and its leaders, especially the most senior leaders. As Edward Luttwak pointed out, the coup could involve some of the elements of revolutions, civil wars, *pronunciamientos*, putsches, liberations, and wars of national liberation). However the coup is unique in two ways: unlike the others, the coup does not necessarily require the intervention of the masses or-a significant military-type force.<sup>9</sup>

Citing the authors (Luttwak, the PITF, Blanco and Grier) and their views on other types of political instability in the previous paragraph, it is evident that the most notorious types of political instability include, but are not limited to: assassinations, *putsche*, demonstrations, guerilla action, purges, revolutions, riots, strikes, civil wars, *pronunciamientos*, liberations, and wars of national liberation, genocides, politicides, ethic wars, among others. As evident, other types of political instability run the gamut. Despite the other types of political instability, the regime is likely to perpetuate while fending off instability; however, when it comes to the coup-a successful coup, the regime does not only cease to exist, but it is replaced. This is why the coup is considered here,

---

<sup>8</sup> Patrick J. McGowan, “African military Coup d'états 1956-200: Frequency, Trend, and Distribution,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 3 (2003): 342 accessed September 30, 2010, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0300435X>.

<sup>9</sup> Edward Luttwak. *Coup D'état: A practical Handbook* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 11-12.

the final frontier, the point of no return. This explains why the study considers the coup as the main indicator of political instability, even though there are other political instability drivers. The focus now turns to the frequency of coups and the challenges it poses in the West Africa sub-region.

The facts captured with the above chart highlighting the frequency and the stubborn nature of coups in the sub-region, partially explains why the study considers the coup d'état as the main indicator of political stability, and its frequency as the measure of political stability. Beyond the chart, two great studies that deserve to serve as a doorway to the literature review on political stability in Sub-Saharan and West Africa is Patrick J. McGovern's 2003 study, "Africa Military Coup d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," published in the *Journal of African Studies* and Issaka Souaré's, "Civil Wars and Coup d'état in West Africa."

Patrick J. McGovern succinctly characterizes the frequency of the coup d'état in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as endemic and astounding. According to McGovern's summary, (between 1956 and 2001) statistics from the forty eight SSA states reveal the following: 80 successful coups, 108 failed coup attempts, and 139 reported coup plots.<sup>10</sup> As if the high frequency of coups is not disturbing enough, McGovern's study also reported that although all African regions have experienced coups, West Africa is the center of coup activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. McGovern cited 85 failed and successful

---

<sup>10</sup> McGowan, "African military Coup d'états 1956-200: Frequency, Trend, and Distribution," 339.



coups, totaling to one-third of all coups in SSA, even though West Africa only represents 16 of the 48 countries that make up SSA.<sup>11</sup>

In a similar vein Issaka K. Souaré sums up the coup activity in West Africa this way:

It clearly showed that military coups have been by far the most common form of political change in the region. Since independence of the West African countries in or around the 1960s, there have been 38 successful military coups. Divided on a five-year-period scheme, most of the coups occurred in the five-year-period between 1966 and 1970 followed by the period between 1976 and 1980 where five coups took place.<sup>12</sup>

Souaré also shows that when it comes to coups Nigeria and Benin lead the pack with six successful coups each followed by Ghana with five, while countries such as Liberia, Gambia, Ivory Coast and Guinea only experienced one coup.<sup>13</sup> For the causes of coups in West Africa, Souaré also offers a three-pronged explanation outlined as: 1) the politicization of the army, 2) ideological motives, and 3) foreign roles.<sup>14</sup>

### **Democracy and the Democratization Process**

The analysis of literature reviewed makes it abundantly clear that beyond the basics (the “values and spirit”) of the democratic model there exists a general lack of

---

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 355.

<sup>12</sup> Issaka Souaré, *Civil Wars and Coup d'état in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America Inc., 2006), 113.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 99-113.

consensus on democracy as a concept, notwithstanding the fact that repressive countries including African countries from Algeria to Zimbabwe refer to their systems of government as democratic. This conundrum precipitates the enduring debate between the believers and doubters of the democratic model as captured in the analysis section of the literature review. This debate and the “rock bottom qualification” of democracy confirm a lack of general consensus on what constitutes a democracy. This is evident throughout the general literature and is highlighted in the literature reviewed in this study. In other words, the canons of the democratic model are somewhat clear (free and fair election, political participation, civil liberties, civil rights, etc.); however capturing what constitutes a democracy becomes very complicated, even illusive. This explains why many scholars conceptualize democracy in a wide spectrum; from the Schumpeterian minimalist definition to Robert Dahl’s and Larry Diamond’s more demanding definition of democracy. From Larry Diamond’s thin to Diamond’s thick definition of democracy. As a result, it is obvious that beyond the “spirit” and basic values, the advanced values, justifications, even the definition of democracy proves to be ambiguous. As a consequence of such ambiguity, a succinct conceptualization and definition of democracy must be considered here. The next paragraphs start the conceptualization process.

For the purpose of this study democracy is conceptualized in terms of the ruler/ruling class and the ruled, with emphasis and focus on the ruling class. As a result, in this study, democracy is defined as an attitude of self-governing that requires autonomous consent and yields to transformations reflecting society and society’s

experiences. In this conceptualization attitude is very important because such attitude should not be imposed or coerced neither vertically nor externally (from ruler to the ruled). Such attitude should go beyond simple consent to what Simone Chambers refers to as “autonomous consent”.<sup>15</sup> Autonomous consent means that informed citizens are convinced and therefore consent to ownership of the decision making process. This means that informed citizens consciously and whole-heartedly accept the self-imposed limits set for the betterment of all within that society. In such an environment democracy becomes a system Chambers refers to as possessing a deontological value. In such a society citizens become bound to what Chambers refers to as “duty for the sake of duty.”<sup>16</sup> With this definition, attitude (autonomous consent) is very important as captured with Chambers’s central politics thesis in her book, *Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse*. Chambers writes that, “The more we employ noncoercive public debate to resolve our deepest collective moral, political, and social disputes, the better.”<sup>17</sup> Chambers goes on to state that, “Dialogue and persuasion are constitutive of peaceful cooperation, and peaceful cooperation creates a secure and stable environment in which to pursue our life plans.”<sup>18</sup> Chambers’s overarching argument is

---

<sup>15</sup> Simone Chambers, *Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 9.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 2.

that in a democracy dialogue and persuasion should take precedence over force and coercion, thus the tenets of deliberative democracy.

As Larry Diamond puts it, liberal democracy extends beyond the formal and intermediate conceptions of democracy. The “formal” being “electoral democracy” following a minimalist conception (a system constrained by a constitution, where regular, competitive multiparty elections are held with the parameters of universal suffrage). Borrowing from Collier and Levitsky, Diamond refers the “intermediate” as the “expanded procedural” conception, where the conceptions are not clearly related to one another. Therefore liberal democracy can be conceptualized in a continuum. As Diamond puts it, liberal democracy extends beyond the formal and the intermediate conceptions. Beyond the formal and the intermediate conceptions, the liberal democracy model (according to Diamond) can be conceptualized with the following characteristics: 1) absence of military or other actors not directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate, 2) yields to both vertical (rulers to the ruled) and horizontal accountability (officeholder to the order), 3) high degree of political and civic pluralism coexisting with individuals and group freedoms, 4) fair and consistent application of the “rule of law” that promotes political and legal equality.<sup>19</sup>

Considering the ambiguous nature of democracy, a concise working definition of democracy is necessary; however, defining democracy proves challenging without a precise conceptualization of the concept. Therefore, as a passage way leading to a

---

<sup>19</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 10-11.

definition, democracy is hereby conceptualized in the context of this study. Against this backdrop a clear definition of democracy in the context of this dissertation becomes necessary. To assist in this Herculean task (defining democracy), one is tempted to revisit and reflect on democracy's most famous definition, today: Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address defines democracy as; "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." It is argued here that even this well adopted definition is not without ambiguity, considering the fact that this speech was given in 1863 when most African Americans in the United States were slaves with no civil liberties and political rights to be respected and observed. The ambiguity in this definition zeroes in on "the people" question. As the question of who is considered "the people" resurfaces to haunt us once again. Even though the Emancipation Proclamation started the inclusion process in 1863, by 1870 slavery was totally abolished in the U.S., with the Thirteenth Amendment, and ex-slaves were extended citizenship courtesy of the Fourteenth Amendment. The newly freed male slaves were extended suffrage courtesy of Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However by 1877, the Hayes-Tilden compromise followed by the "separate but equal" system wiped out most if not all the political gains African Americans achieved until then. Once again the question remains, who are "the people"? Evidently, Lincoln's definition of democracy is great when one finds oneself qualified as a member of the community of equals; qualifying as one of "the people." Consequently, democracy does not mean much to the excluded. What if the majority is excluded?

With such ambiguity in mind, it is important to highlight the multi-dimensional nature of the definition of democracy. As mentioned in the literature review, democracy could be defined in both normative and empirical terms; ideal and procedural terms; however, for the purpose of this study, democracy is conceptualized in terms of the relationship between the ruled “the people” and the ruler and ruling class. Therefore in this study democracy is defined within the context of the attitude of self-governing that requires autonomous consent and yields to processes and exchanges reflecting society and society’s experiences.

### **The *Democarassie* Model: A Conceptualization**

As a point of departure on the conceptualization process, one finds it necessary to depart from the etymology of the word *Democarassie*. *Democarassie* is coined and originated from the Wolof<sup>20</sup> pronunciation of the term democracy. In this study *Democarassie* is conceptualized as a model of democracy grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, thus the *Democarassie* version of liberal democracy. Since the model was very briefly introduced in chapter one, a more in-depth presentation is necessary. The *Democarassie* model is re-introduced here as an offshoot/offspring/version/derivative of the liberal democratic model that takes into consideration, and therefore accommodates a nation’s unique realities. As delineated in the introductory chapter, as a construct, the *Democarassie* model and the liberal democratic model (democracy in the Western sense) typically share the basics: meaning,

---

<sup>20</sup> Wolof is the *lingua franca* and the most prominent vernacular in Senegal.

tenets, and prescriptions including but not limited to frequent, free and fair election; mass political participation; civil liberties; political rights guarantees and rule of law. However, the *Democarassie* model not only takes into consideration, but also accommodates Senegal's unique realities.

Putting the *Democarassie* model in the context to the research question, one is reminded that a plausible explanation to the political stability Senegal enjoys since independence is a result of the Senegalese model of democracy –the *Democarassie* model. As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the *Democarassie* model is grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, however, conceptualized within the frameworks of C. W. Mills's "power elite"<sup>21</sup> theory and Mahmoud Mamdani's "decentralized despotism"<sup>22</sup> theoretical framework. Mills's "power elite" theory posits a political system with significant elite (political, corporate, and military) influence, against the interest of a participating but citizenry prone to manipulation by the elite. Mamdani describes "decentralized despotism" as, "A form of indirect rule...A hallmark of the colonial state, modeled as monarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian with a king in the center, a chief as the head of the administrative ground and a patriarchy in every homestead or kraal."<sup>23</sup> Both theories-Mills's "power elite" and Mamdani's "decentralized despotism" seem to suit the conceptualization of the Senegalese model of

---

<sup>21</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York; Oxford University Press Inc., 1956).

<sup>22</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 39.

democracy well. Given power dynamic in Senegal, Mamdani's "decentralized despotism" and what Mamdani refers to as "customary authority" is especially relevant. Robert Dahl's polyarchy theory in the context of democratic pluralism<sup>24</sup> is also of immense relevance. Arend Lijphart's consociation theory also lends background and context to the conceptualization of the *Democarassie* model.

Building upon Mills and Mamdani, Dahl and Lijphart's theories the *Democarassie* model is ironically conceptualized also within the concept of "equality"-a society of equals-equality within the elite and equality within the citizenry. Equality is ironic because the model already suggests a class society of elites (customary authorities) and everyone else. In the context of equality, one revisits de Tocqueville and Jefferson; Alexis de Tocqueville and Thomas Jefferson's vein of analysis of democracy in America. In his book, *Democracy in America* de Tocqueville characterizes "de Tocqueville's America" as a society of equals who master the art of banding together to forward their collective interests. In such a society there is political equality within the equal. In a similar vein, Thomas Jefferson envisions a society of yeomen, a society where the "ordinary man" is the harbinger of real power. Jefferson's ideal democratic society is a society where power is retained by the "man," the family, the farm, the local area, the local region, and the biggest entity, the state, but not a remote central government.

---

<sup>24</sup> A system where the holders of sovereign power are "the people", who are also political equals, and these holders of power, manifest their power in pursuit of their diverse, sometimes conflicting interests.



In summation, it makes sense to revisit the four questions posed in the opening of this section. These four specific questions help streamline the conceptualization of the *Democarassie* model:

1) What is the *Democarassie* model? The *Democarassie* model is an offshoot of the liberal democratic model in the sense that it allows frequent, free and fair elections with high voter turnout to take place, because of its plebiscite underpinnings. With these high voter turn-out elections, citizens/voters not only effectively choose their political leaders including the president, but also self-determine their political destiny. The model also shares most, if not all, the guarantees of the liberal democratic model as highlighted in the “elements” of the *Democarassie* model in the case study.

2) What are the basic essentials of the *Democarassie* model? The basic essentials of the *Democarassie* model are similar to the liberal democratic model including, but not limited to; regular election, mass political participation, and the guarantee of civil liberties and political rights.

3) What are the differences/similarities between the *Democarassie* model and the liberal democratic model? Similarities between the two models (as mentioned above) include, but are not limited to regular frequent, free and fair elections; mass political participation; the guarantee of civil liberties and political rights, including the freedoms of speech, press, association, petition, and religion, rule of law; and other constitutional limitations and guarantees. As a result, the *Democarassie* model is grounded and seen as an offshoot of the liberal democratic model. However, the two models have differences.

The main difference between the two models is that the liberal democratic model draws power and legitimacy directly from the people-*demos*, what is characterized here as a democratic model with “direct and total popular sovereignty.” On the other hand, with the *Democarassie* model, power is brokered from the people through various establishments (political, economic, religious, armed forces, and sociocultural) all headed by recognized and revered customary authorities/decentralized despots/power elites at various levels. It is evident that the elite hierarchy and the political exchanges they oversee through the establishments is an important part of the Senegalese model of democracy. Five establishments are identified in this study: political establishments, socio-cultural establishments, religious establishment, economic establishment, and military establishment. Through the lens of decentralized despotism these establishments and customary authorities go a long way in explaining the political stability/democracy nexus in Senegal. The ‘establishments and customary authorities concept’ in Senegal is hardly new, considering Senegal’s colonial history of indirect rule, that was handed down at independence and still perpetuate in post-independent Senegal.

Considering this stratification, even though the *Democarassie* model is seen as an offshoot of liberal democracy, it bears the character of a democratic model referred to here as “indirect and partial popular sovereignty.” In a *Democarassie* citizens make voting decisions based on their own individual judgment, however the influence of customary authorities in this endeavor cannot be underestimated. In other words, even though citizens fully participate in choosing their leaders through plebiscite, under the

*Democarassie* model, people's final choice is heavily influenced by the establishment and customary authority. As a result, unlike the liberal democratic model, with the *Democarassie* model, one cannot underestimate the influence of the establishments and the influence of customary authority decentralized despots in keeping the whole system intact. The customary authorities heading the establishments perform effectively in their service as; pressure valves, circuit breakers, middlemen, power brokers, arbiters, umpires, ombudsman, and referees between the state and the citizens. Even though a picture of a stratified society is painted here, Senegalese do not only believe in political equality, they believe that they are equal. This sense of equality is captured in the famous Senegalese maxim, *Senegal ben bop la* (literally Senegal; one head, meaning shared decisions, shared destiny). The sense of equality is also captured with the Senegalese national motto: *Un Peuple, Un But, Une Foi* (One People, One Goal, One Faith).

The takeaway here is, just like any democratic system dissatisfaction could lead to conflict however, with the *Democarassie* system these establishments and its leaders (customary authorities) are generally able to broker a compromise between the citizens and their government and political system. As a result, in times of crises instead of taking the streets and trying to topple the regime, many Senegalese look up to the establishments and customary authorities to intervene. Even after taking the streets, these customary authorities are capable of minimizing/maximizing violence, or appealing to protesters to refrain from violence and return to their homes. This and the apolitical stance of the military are presented as among the main reasons why Senegal has

maintained her coup-less credentials since independence in 1960. As a result, the *Democarassie* model is conceptualized as a system where a president occupies the center of the political regime. This president is then buttressed by customary authorities that head various establishments, all working in concert to keep peace, order, normalcy and most importantly the perpetuation of the regime.

4) The study now answers the fourth and final conceptualization question. Why the *Democarassie* model? As already argued, despite the demerits of the *Democarassie* model (see how democratic is the *Democarassie* model), it is argued here that this model helped Senegal remain politically stable, even prior to 2000 when Senegal was less than democratic. Any model that can achieve such stability in a region as unstable as West Africa is worth keeping and exploring further: after-all, the literature on democracy reveals that democracy is an ideal that is very hard to achieve, if achievable at all. Most countries referred to as a democracy, including the United States have their own shortcomings and flaws and Senegal is no exception. The point being made here is that, even though the *Democarassie* model could be challenged as less than democratic, it is getting the job done in Senegal.

#### **Data, Data Sources, and Data Collection Method**

The study utilizes the following secondary datasets: demographic, social, economic, political, religious, country, freedom, governance, political instability, state fragility, military, social conflict, and election.

The data sources are as follows: The World Bank's Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI) served as an important source for governance and political instability data. From the *Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie* (ANSD) demographic, country, social, political, and economic data was sourced. Datasets from both the World Bank and ANSD assist in the more profound understanding of Senegal. In gauging freedom in Senegal and around the world, datasets from Freedom House were utilized. The Center of Systemic Peace's Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) provided resources on government and state fragility, social conflict, and political instability. Defence Web served as a data source for military and economic data for Senegal. From the CIA World Factbook demographic, religious, country, and social data was sourced. In examining elections and elections quality in Senegal and in Africa, the African Elections Database provided very important election datasets.

The data collection method in this study qualifies as a content analysis. Even though, the author remanufactured and extrapolated from the data, the study entirely utilized secondary data. The remanufactured and extrapolated data is the end product of a content analysis of data already available.

**The Theoretical Underpinnings and Justification for a Qualitative Explanatory Case Study Analysis as a Research Method for Exploring the Implications of the *Democarassie* Model on Political Stability in Senegal**

This section departs with highlighting the theoretical underpinnings and laying out the justifications of a qualitative case study analysis as the chosen research method, over other research methods.

### **The Case Study Approach**

A review of the literature reveals a treasure trove of literature on case study as a method of inquiry and analysis. Even though case study analysis has become not only mainstream, but a genuine method of inquiry in social science following early and mid-twentieth century debates, from the likes of Emile Durkheim to more contemporary scholars, there are still observers that doubt its value as compared to the quantitative scientific method. However, on the other side of the debate, scholars from the likes of Max Weber, Robert Yin, and Robert Stake staunchly stand in defense of the case study analysis methodology. Even though one delves into the literature for context, in this study, the concern is not to reinvent the wheel, because there is already ample literature on the case study method. What is important here is to justify the reason for a case study as the chosen method of analysis. In other words, why is the qualitative explanatory case study method chosen over other methods of inquiry including the quantitative/scientific method? Within the backdrop of this question, it makes sense to unpack the qualitative explanatory case study method starting with a definition of a case study.

One comes across a broad range of definitions of a case study in the literature. However, after an extensive review a commonality emerges along these lines: A case study: 1) is a real life, real world study involving people, events, and scenarios, in actual reality, not abstracts. 2) Observes, studies, identifies, and eventually offers deeper understanding and explanation. 3) Is an ideal methodology when the subject matter deals with humans who think, driven by rationality, and have freewill; freewill that is heavily

influenced by emotions. Consequently, the strength of a case study is not the numbers and correlation, it is “holistic wholeness” that a case study offers that cannot be captured by any other method of analysis, especially the quantitative method driven by numbers, validity, sampling, and correlations, in naming a few. A case study is particularly important when an inquiry seeks to study human subject and human exchanges. The “exploratory” in exploratory case study underscores the importance of the cause-effect relationship between phenomena and events. As a result, exploratory case study analysis can connect the dots and set out to trail what happened, and also discover the connections of phenomena and/or events. Therefore, in this study an explanatory case study analysis is deemed ideal, because the study seeks to investigate the connections and implications of the *Democarassie* model (a process) on the political stability (a phenomenon).

Other methods of analysis including a quantitative method can be adequate in this inquiry. However, since the study seeks to explore the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal, it is prudent to implement a case study analysis that is qualitative and exploratory in approach because of the following reasons. First, the human decisions that lead to political stability are a phenomenon that could be empirically observed studied in real life in its natural environment. Second, the type of analysis yields to descriptions and drawing inferences, this feature is a must have in this endeavor. Third, the literature shows that in studying the human subjects and human exchanges, the case analysis method is ideal: ideal considering innate human nature;

ability to think, possessing freewill, and decision-making strictly driven with emotions and rationality. Because humans (citizens, voters, customary authorities, political leaders, etc.) make the decisions on the form and system of government driven by the *Democarassie* model that upholds political stability in Senegal, a case study analysis makes sense. Fourth, because of the study's position that the *Democarassie* model explains political stability in Senegal, a causal investigation is necessary; therefore, the exploratory case study analysis must be considered. For these reasons, the explanatory qualitative case study analysis is seen to fit the study well.

As already mentioned, there is no need to reinvent the wheel; the case study method is also extensively represented in the literature. Winston Tellis alone single-handedly offers a succinct overview of the "application of the case study methodology"<sup>25</sup>. Invoking lead authorities in case study research methodology such as Robert Yin, Robert Stake, and other case study authorities, Tellis ran the gamut when: including the history of the case study methodology; the supporter and critics and their points of argument, the designs (exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, instrumental, intrinsic and collective), and many other concerns of a case study methodology. However, in seeking a more profound knowledge of what the case research method is, one revisits a renowned authority on case studies; Robert Yin. Yin posits that the case study research method "is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when

---

<sup>25</sup> Winston Tellis, "Applications of a Case Study Methodology," *The Qualitative Report*, Volume 3, Number 3, (September, 1997), accessed May 16, 2014, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html>.



the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used".<sup>26</sup> From Yin's definition notice the following: "empirical inquiry," "investigate," "real life," "when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident," and "multiple sources of evidence." Consequently, from Yin's definition of the case study method one can deduce that a case study method is an inquiry that is driven by observation of phenomenon in its real life natural environment from multiple sources, especially when the essence of the study cannot be readily and easily captured with numbers, thus the quantitative method.

### **The Qualitative Method**

According to Bill Gillham, qualitative methods are,

Essentially descriptive and inferential in character and focus primarily on the kind of evidence (what people tell you, what they do) that will enable you to understand the meaning of what is going on. Their great strength is that they can illuminate issues and turn up possible explanations: essentially a search for meaning -as is all research.<sup>27</sup>

Therefore, the qualitative method allows the researcher to go beyond descriptions and make inferences for a deeper understanding of the inquiry. The qualitative method could be multiple sourced or one of five methods (observation, interviewing, ethnographic field work, discourse analysis, and textual analysis). Consequently, the

---

<sup>26</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Method* (Hewbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984), 23.

<sup>27</sup> Bill Gillham and Inc. ebrary, "Case Study Research Methods" *Continuum International Publishing*, 2010. ebrary collections (2000), accessed May 24, 2014, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/westga/Doc?id=10404926andppg=16>.

qualitative method goes beyond the numbers, to capture the fleeting illusiveness of the human subject.

Gillham posits that a powerful argument for the qualitative method is what he calls the model's philosophical base, which he summarizes in points and is captured as follows:

1. Human behaviour, thoughts and feelings are partly determined by their context. If you want to understand people in real life, you have to study them in their context and in the way they operate.
2. 'Objective' research techniques - abstracted, controlling - can produce results that are artefacts (artifacts) of the methods used. An artefact (artifacts) is something that only arises because of the method that has been used (like controlled memory experiments in a laboratory or 'opinions' given in a questionnaire). You get results, but are they 'true' for the people concerned in the practice of real life?
3. How people behave, feel, think, can only be understood if you get to know their world and what they are trying to do in it. 'Objectivity' can ignore data important for an adequate understanding.<sup>28</sup>

According to Gillham, the qualitative method enables the researcher to investigate where other methods fall short and in situations with little known facts. This method also enables the researcher to explore complex phenomenon beyond the "scope of more controlled approaches", lending the case to be viewed from different angles. Such allows the researcher to go beyond "significances," into the realm of "processes".<sup>29</sup>

Since examining the implication of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal is the study's main focus, as pointed out in the opening of this section, a

---

<sup>28</sup> Gillham "Case Study Research Methods," 11-12.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 11.

qualitative exploratory case study serves as a befitting research method. In this study, one deals with human subjects and human decision making in a real life and real world situations; In other words, tangible and observable subjects, processes, and events that are empirical and readily observable, not abstracts and inferences. This justifies a case study research method analysis for this study. Referencing the two previous sections, both Robert Yin and Bill Gillham attest to the utility of the case study approach when a study deals with processes and human subject driven by greed, emotions, thoughts, and feeling in naming a few.

In studying the implication of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal, one deals exclusively with processes and human subjects who are solely responsible for such processes including war and peace, type of government and economic system, what is good and evil, what is legal or not legal, in naming a few. The only issue is, even though human subjects strive for rationality, they are limited by emotions, greed, feelings, and etcetera. In relation to this study, studying a model (the *Democarassie* model that is constructed by humans), and its implications on political stability that is upheld by humans, a qualitative explorative case study analysis is found appropriate.

### **Conclusion**

In consideration that the major concerns of the study are all subject to many interpretations, and could therefore result into confusion, it is found prudent to tease out these conceptual issues in this chapter. As a result, the major concerns (political

stability and democratization/democracy) are conceptualized in the context of the study. Within the discussion of political stability, the coup in the context of the study is also hashed out. The *Democarassie* model is also conceptualized. The importance of conceptualizing this model cannot be underestimated, since the *Democarassie* model is completely new and the main contribution of this study. For accountability purposes, it is also deemed important to highlight the type of data utilized in this study; its source, collection, and analysis method. All this is captured in this chapter. The methodology chapter finally offers justifications why the study chose a qualitative explanatory case study analysis as the chosen method of analysis. The case study follows in the next chapter, chapter five.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE CASE STUDY: THE *DEMOCARASSIE* MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN SENEGAL

This case study explores the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal. The inquiry leads to the study's suggestion that political stability in Senegal is driven by Senegalese model of democracy. As indicated in the theoretic framework chapter, in this study the Senegalese model of democracy referred to as the *Democarassie* (Wolof pronunciation of the term democracy). In his book, *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*, Frederic Charles Schaffer refers to the Senegalese democracy as *demokarassi*,<sup>1</sup> this study refers to the same framework and process as *Democarassie*. Both Schaffer's book and this study are referring to the same Senegalese model of democracy. However the central purpose for this study is different from Schaffer's. In his book, Schaffer tried to debunk the conventional wisdom that democracy (the Western liberal democratic model) leads to transparency and accountability. In studying democracy in Senegal, through voter behavior, attitude, and language, Schaffer found that democracy in unfamiliar cultures does not necessarily mean the same as Western democracies. For instance, he discovered

---

<sup>1</sup> Frederic Charles Schaffer, *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

that, instead of voting behavior driven by policy choices, good governance, and/or the candidate's credential, experience, and qualification, the Wolofs of Senegal, tend to vote based on a completely different set of facts and calculations.

These facts and calculations include but not limited to 1) voting because the act of voting forms part of the popular culture (what is model citizen is expected to do), 2) voting because the act of voting is an important function of the clientelism system they thrive in, 3) voting because of religious loyalty (fulfilling the command of a caliph), and 4) voting because of community solidarity (standing with the one that stands with your community). Therefore, Schaffer's book focused on the explaining democracy in unfamiliar cultures. However, even though the *Democarassie* model is discussed at length in this study, the focus of this study is examining the implications of *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal. This renders the explanation of political stability in Senegal the most important purpose of the study, not the *Democarassie* model per se.

As argued in this study, it proves to be a Herculean task to reconcile the liberal democratic model with a nation's unique local realities. For instance, given the communal societal exchanges, the stratified social structure, the patron-client political systems that still prevail in most West African countries, regardless of all the democratization efforts, the liberal democratic model by and large proves to be a misfit. Therefore a model of democracy that reflects society's realities is timely, even overdue; and the *Democarassie* model is suggested to be such model. More precisely, considering 1) the class structure and diverse society with multiple languages; 2) the fact that the

prerequisites of a democratic society is not quite in place; 3) the communal tradition of society is still popular in the sub-region, the *Democarassie* model seems a better fit than the liberal democratic because the *Democarassie* model is more sensitive to actual conditions, and the unique realities in Senegal and West Africa for that matter.

Consequently, the study investigates how and why Senegal is able to maintain relative political stability, and remain on the democratic path, while avoiding coup, except the alleged 1962 coup attempt led by Momodou Dia. Senegal shares this coup-less credential with only one other country in the sub-region, Cape Verde. Apart from these two countries, all the other West African countries have experienced political instability through the coup d'état. As a result, this phenomenon suggests that despite similar challenges and solutions between Senegal and the rest of West Africa, dissimilar results follow. Apparently, it appears that despite similar challenges and solutions between Senegal and the rest of the sub-region (as highlighted in the case study), Senegal seems to be generally successful in maintaining democracy and political stability. Since the study suggests that such political stability is driven primarily by the Senegalese model of democracy, the *Democarassie* model, the main task of case study becomes the discovery of the functioning of Senegal's *Democarassie* model and its implications on upholding political stability in Senegal.

At this juncture it is abundantly clear that Senegal is currently considered both politically stable and a thriving democracy. It is also clear that the Senegalese model of democracy (the *Democarassie* model) is not necessarily a replica, but a derivate of the liberal democratic model that takes into consideration Senegal's realities. What is not

clear is how does the Senegalese democratic model work? More importantly, how does this model reinforce political stability in Senegal? This is where the case study becomes instrumental. Grounded in the quest of explaining political stability in Senegal, the main purpose of the case study is to reinforce the thesis and central position that political stability in Senegal is driven principally by the *Democarassie* model. As mentioned earlier, the *Democarassie* model delivered, even during the Senghor years (1960 -1980), an era during which Senegal was not considered democratic. Therefore, the study stands steadfast behind the proposition that political stability in Senegal is driven by the *Democarassie* model. Examining the implications and linking political stability to the *Democarassie* model (the latter explaining the former), the case study in particular, and the dissertation in general adds to the general discourse on democracy and political stability.

With the notion that the liberal democratic model is not a “one-size fits all” model, the case study aspires to illustrate how the *Democarassie* model (a derivative of the liberal democratic model), reinforces political stability in Senegal. Guided by the literature review, the case study provides the platform for a more intimate study of the relationship between political stability and democracy in a “real world” practical situation through the study of the *Democarassie* model and political stability in Senegal.

The theory part of the argument that the *Democarassie* model drives political stability in Senegal was dealt with earlier, in the literature review, the theoretical framework, and the methodology chapter. The case study now deals with the practical implications of the *Democarassie* model and its implications on political stability. In



doing so the case study incorporates a two-pronged function. 1) It functions as a bridge of democracy in theory and democracy in action through the *Democarassie* model (a country-specific model of democracy reflecting realities on the ground). 2 The study examines the implications and links the *Democarassie* model to political stability in Senegal. As a means to an end; in conjunction with utilizing theory from the literature reviewed and information from the methodology chapter, the case study extensively examines the *Democarassie* model and its implications on political stability in Senegal since independence in 1960, but in earnest after 2000.

With the above stated goals in mind the case study unfolds as follows: First, the case study departs from the stand point of a “comparative prelude”. This comparison highlights the fact that, even though Senegal and other countries in the West African sub-region share similarities in challenges and solutions, different outcomes result-democracy and political stability for Senegal as compared to democratic challenges and political instability for the majority of the countries in the West Africa sub-region. Second, issues and political stability in Senegal are hashed out, revealing a country that is both democratic and politically stable. Third; to lay out the *Democarassie* model as an offshoot and model of the liberal democratic model that suits Senegal better; democracy the Senegalese way. Fourth, showcase the role of “decentralized despots and the establishments” they head. Fifth, show the practical implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal. This leads to the illustration of how the *Democarassie* model explains political stability in Senegal.

With emphatic reference to the conceptualization of the *Democarassie* model in theory as captured in the methodology chapter, the nuances of the *Democarassie* model (in-action) is extensively discussed here, with special attention paid to the role of “establishments and customary authority” in the upholding of political stability through the *Democarassie* model. As mentioned above, the case study now opens with the section referred to as “a comparative prelude” between Senegal and the rest of the countries that make the West Africa sub-region.

### **A Comparative Prelude**

To lend background and substantiate the inquiry whether political stability in Senegal is driven by the *Democarassie* model, introducing the case study with a comparative prelude becomes necessary. Even though the focus of this dissertation is a case study of Senegal on the subjects of political stability, democracy, and democratization, a comparative analysis of Senegal and the rest of the West Africa sub-region serve as a prudent launching pad. The comparative analysis outlines the challenges that are being faced, and the solutions that are being implemented by West African countries, as compared to challenges that are being faced, and solutions that are being implemented by Senegal specifically. This comparative analysis is expected to illuminate similar challenges and solutions, however different outcomes have occurred: West Africa’s record proves to be one of political instability as manifested in coup galore as compared to Senegal’s “coup-less” credentials vis-à-vis her relative politically stable record. The portrayal of similar challenges and solutions, however dissimilar outcomes, serve not only as background and context for the study, but also paves the way leading to

the crux of the problem; the problems of political stability, democracy, and democratization in both Senegal and the West African region.

Political instability in post-independence West Africa is manifested in the frequency of coups and many other variations of instability. Political instability in the sub-region is considered here as the presence of violence and unrest, and is found to result from four chronic challenges summed up as follows: political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural. These challenges are believed to breed instability, which in turn leads to the numerous coups and other sorts of instability the sub-region has experienced since the 1960s. These challenges are further discussed.

#### **West Africa: Challenges and Solutions to Democracy and Political Stability**

The catalog of challenges starts with the most pervasive source of instability, the political challenges. Political challenges are manifested in the form of both internal and external conflicts such as coups, rebellions, uprisings, riots, cross border attacks, secessions, street protests, marches, and other forms of demands. Political instability generally results from many factors, including but not limited to, the colonial legacy of “divide and rule,” cronyism, chronic corruption, mismanagement and mal-appropriation, one-party rule, “presidents for life,” and wanton disregard for the rule of law.

Economic challenges constitute another source of instability. Economic and political challenges tend to have a symbiotic relationship, feeding upon each other.

Economic challenges, among other things, result from economic stagnation, even deterioration stemming from unfavorable balance of trade in the international market,

mono cash-crop, high unemployment, and high population growth, class systems, and many others.

Environmental challenges, the third source of instability, results from, but is not limited to famine, drought, deforestation, desertification, over fishing and over grazing. Exacerbating the environmental challenges is the fact that many of these challenges mentioned feed upon and worsen each other. In Senegal for example, the drought condition that is most prevalent in the Podor and Matam region in northern Senegal is seen as the major culprit for the famine experienced in this region and beyond. This famine then leads to overgrazing and adds to the deforestation problem, which in turn results in another problem, desertification. With life getting increasingly unsustainable, the natives of these areas see moving to cities and further south, a survival necessity. This migration leads to urban problems of overfishing, overpopulation, health concerns due to housing and traffic congestion, inadequate sanitation in medical facilities, and other challenges as delineated.

Socio-cultural challenges are also cited as the fourth source of instability. Such challenges include diverse ethnic groups, and languages, young and exploding populations, rural to urban migration, literacy, health, women and family issues. Staying with Senegal as an example, driven by unsustainable living in rural Senegal, the rural-urban migrations that ensue create unintended consequences of its own. Dakar and the surrounding area's population have now exploded to over three million in a country of twelve to thirteen million people. Such a spike leads to high unemployment rates close to fifty percent in some counts, health and housing issues and many other challenges

discussed in the case study. The issue of ethnic diversity also plays a role. In Senegal for instance, the Wolof (major ethnic group in the Dakar and other urban areas) and the Diola (major ethnic group of the Casamance region) dynamic serves as a microcosm of a greater ethnic diversity problem. Unlike many north/south conflicts in Africa that are generally driven by religious and other cleavages, the conflict in southern Senegal-the Casamance is overwhelmingly driven by ethnic divide and economics; thus, a Wolof/Diola dynamic of suppression, even colonization as held by some observers. The Diolas (and other minority groups) of Casamance believe that they have been suppressed since independence, and even before by the government of Senegal with its seat in Dakar. Dakar is controlled mainly by the Wolof, and this group directly or indirectly controls Casamance. As a result, the Diolas identify more with their Gambia Diola brethren in the southern region they share, than with the Wolofs of Dakar and the northern regions of Senegal. The dynamic results in dismal economic and infrastructural development in Casamance; a region called the “bread basket of Senegal”. The indigenes of Casamance grieve that they do not have much to show for their bountiful rivers, fertile land and lush vegetation.

The challenges introduced above will be subsequently revisited and discussed in greater detail in the ensuing case study. The focus at this point is to highlight the fact that these challenges are endemic realities of post-independence West Africa, including Senegal. As responses to these challenges, solutions implemented are delineated.

In retrospect, one could argue that the “independence honeymoon” period was short-lived. The honeymoon period that survived on a heavy dose of nationalism, self-

determination, and nation-building soon became infighting within the new African elite. Such infighting not only hampered progress and development, but exacerbated instability, prompting most African leaders in 1960s and 1970s to transform their states to a one-party state. During this period, instability was manifested in many different fashions (coups, rebellions, riots, protests etc.). As already alluded to, amongst multiple responses (solutions) to the political challenge (the most pervasive challenge), that is exacerbated by economic, environmental, and socio-economic challenges, many countries in the sub-region, including Senegal experienced with the one party system, “president for life”, and the nationalism. Senegal remained a one party state for almost twenty years, with no formidable opposition party accompanied by a heavy dose of “nationalism calls” (country first) between the early 1960s to the early 1980s.

Among the first solutions, from the dawn of independence through the first decade, a period an observer refers to as “the decade of disappointment” or the “lost decade,” was the call for nationalism. West African leaders of all stripes, ranging from the nationalistic Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Touré, to the accommodating black Frenchman Léopold Sedar Senghor, continued experimenting with the call for nationalism into the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, such nationalist calls soon dissipated to single-party politics in the name of nation-building. Even moderate African leaders experimented with one-party politics, while outlawing the opposition and clamping down with vengeance on dissenters. A case in point: Léopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and his response to Prime Minister Mamadou Dia’s December 26<sup>th</sup> 1962 alleged coup attempt. Following the alleged abortive coup plot, Dia was forced to resign and was

imprisoned between 1962 and 1974. Senegal remained a one-party state without any formidable opposition until 1980. As it has now become evident that during periods of one-party rule, leaders tend to stratify with inner circles. Cronies in the inner circle tend to trade their loyalties for the “goodies” the ruler and the state have to offer. This in itself promotes political instability. Many observers posit that Houphouët Boigny was well known for maintaining his thirty-three year rule over Ivory Coast with this strategy: a moderate dictatorship where the inner circle is pacified with goodies, and the inner circle in return kept “the people” (citizens) either contented or silenced.

As nationalist calls and one-party rule in the name of nation-building became untenable as a result of both internal and external pressures, some African leaders saw democratization, “socialismization”<sup>1</sup> and authoritarian rule attractive alternatives in combatting instability. As a result, following independence various countries experimented with various forms of democratization. These include Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius and Senegal. Other countries experimented with socialism, African socialism or some form of authoritarian rule. Countries such as Guinea Conakry followed in the Socialism traditions, and Guinea Bissau followed some form of African Socialism. Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s Togo serves as an example of a West African country that adopted authoritarian rule.

Second, as an economic solution, from the 1960s onwards, in a bipolar world order, West African countries experimented with the two major world economic systems:

---

<sup>1</sup> “Socialismization” is used in the context as an alternative to democratization. Socialismization is the process towards establishing a variant of a socialist state

Western capitalism and Eastern centrally controlled economic system. However, by the early 1980s, most if not all the West African countries settled with some variant of Western capitalism. One could argue that capitalism triumphed and became the economic standard, because African nations eventually adopted the modernization argument and by the late 1980s many were well on their way in the modernization paradigm, with the notion that modernization in the Western sense is the ticket out of poverty into prosperity.

As a result of adopting the modernization theory, West African nations tried to “play catch up” with the West while ironically ignoring the prerequisites of modernization. Topping the prerequisite list is: A) lack of a significant industrialization and economic base as most West Africa economies are generally driven by non-industrial agriculture or a single cash crop that is earmarked for export. B) West African countries lacked a substantial working class; deficient in high skill labor, highly educated workforce, and credit. It is also observed here that West African governments overlooked the fragmented society and the real challenges citizens encounter daily as a result of class structures, gender streamlining, multiple ethnic groups’ struggles, rural-urban problems, high illiteracy, work culture that promotes or even rewards patronizing and embezzlement. C) West Africa lags behind developed countries, especially in the west in the consolidation of democracy. The political systems prevalent in the sub-region only maintained minimum tolerance for political participation and dissent; opposition leaders jailed, dissenters silenced with violence or “goodies,” political parties banned, opposition parties membership criminalized, and elections rigged. Also, nation-building



efforts prove to be self-serving benefitting the political leader and cronies, and not necessarily the general citizenry. Examples abound from building modern airports, to monuments, and skyscrapers, and purchasing a fleet of shining vehicles for the state amid slums and destituteness. Even though a city might look modern and prosperous (Abidjan, Dakar, Lagos), citizens have very limited access to such facilities. Many African presidents became blinded with their pet projects (white elephants to critics) and personal gains while amassing personal wealth and building an inner circle that ensures the “presidency for life.” The case in point is that of the infamous Mobuto Sese Seko and his large stock of wealth. In 2004, Charlotte Denny of the *Guardian* reported that Mobuto’s accumulated wealth earned him the position of the wealthiest in the world in the rank of Suharto and Marcos. According to the *Guardian*, these three leaders ripped-off their countries in excess of \$50 billion dollars. Mobuto alone stealing over half of the \$12 billion aid money to Zaire, now Congo.<sup>2</sup>

Third, and still serving as an economic solution is the implementation of austerity measures as early as the late 1970s. African states had to implement austerity measures in compliance with the prescriptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Such austerity measures needed to be put in place in order to qualify for much needed financial aid from these Establishments. Even though in hindsight, there is significant evidence that such austerity measures produced destructive results to West

---

<sup>2</sup> Charlotte Denny, “Suharto, Marcos and Mobuto Head Corruption Table With \$50bn Scams,” *Guardian*, March 26, 2004, accessed 9/5/12, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/26/indonesia.philippines>.

Africa's economic health and beyond. As agreed to by many observers, Jeffrey Herbst wrote, "The structural adjustment programs currently proposed for Africa make the political climate much riskier for leaders while weakening the central apparatus of the state on which the rulers have long relied to stay in power."<sup>3</sup> Despite the negative repercussions, austerity measures were set in place regardless, because 1) for compliance reasons and as a condition of debt; and 2) to bring their economies in line with the rest of the global economy, in the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond. Also, considering West Africa's peripheral position in the global scheme of things and its dependency on ex-colonial masters, West African countries had no other attractive choices but to implement austerity measures, ignoring the fact that in the sub-region the public sector happens to be the largest employer and subsidizer of education, public health, and other social services. As a result, many critics argued that such austerity measures did little more than reinforce political instability, therefore doing more harm than good.

Fourth, West African governments had to (and still do) deal with their peripheral positions; therefore, torn apart on whom to serve: the core (ex-colonizers-developed world) or the core-("the West African people"). In response, and with a heavy dose of nationalism at times, various African leaders tried an array of solutions. Such solutions ranged from nationalizing factories, mines and industries as in the case of Sekou Touré of

---

<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," *World Development* 18, no. 7 (1990): 949, accessed September 5, 2012, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/229661845?accountid=15017>.

Guinea (Conakry), to the promotion of “going back to the base”<sup>4</sup> as advocated by Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau; to projects such as Kwame Nkrumah’s Akosombo Dam in Ghana (a white elephant to critics). West African countries also implemented impractical industrial and agricultural policies by blindly promoting an export monocrop at the expense of other sustenance crops as in the case of cocoa in Ghana and Ivory Coast. The industries that blossomed were inadequate for the reason that the production cycle was not complete, and the equipment maintenance, repairs and spare parts were entirely imported; besides the fact that industry leaders are generally expatriates from the West.

Presidents such as Senghor also tried to ameliorate Senegal’s peripheral position from a philosophical angle by promoting the idea of Negritude. Even though the understanding of Negritude goes beyond simple definition, but for simplicity reasons we will borrow Senghor’s definition and define negritude as “Negro-African cultural values.”<sup>5</sup> With Negritude heavily anchored in a brand of nationalism that recognizes the uniqueness and the contribution of the African world, Senghor was able to harvest the best of both worlds: remaining a true Frenchman, while simultaneously remaining grounded in his “African-ness.” Unlike many African leaders of his time of the stripe of Sekou Touré who advocated Africa-centric nationalism, Senghor envisioned a political arrangement where Senegal could be part of a greater French Republic, while still

---

<sup>4</sup> Exploring an African way to self-sufficiency as championed by Amilcar Cabral (1924-1973) of Guinea Bissau

<sup>5</sup> Jacques Louis Hyman, *Leopold Sedar Senghor* (Edinburg, Edinburg University Press, 1971), 23.

maintaining its unique “African-ness.” Senghor believed that Senegal could benefit immensely from this “*Unum in pluribus*” (one in many) arrangement.

Also as a solution to dealing with its peripheral position, West African countries entered into interregional pacts in order to promote inter-state cooperation, to promote trade, and collective security amongst others. These pacts resulted in regional co-operations such as ECOWAS and the more recently ECOMOG, the sub-regional peacekeeping force.

Fifth, even though all of the West African states joined the Non-Align Movement and tried to distance themselves from the travails of the Cold War, West African leaders often found it necessary to align with either East or West, as seen beneficial to the leader and not necessarily “the people” or the region. Like the other leaders in the African continent, West African leaders “played off or tried to play off” the East against the West for their own benefit. Examples span all cadre of African leaders from “the good” Kwame Nkrumah, to “the bad” Mobuto Sese Sekou, to “the ugly” Jean-Bédel Bokassa of Central African Republic.

Sixth and arguably the most discussed are issues surrounding democracy and democratization as political instability solutions. One could argue that the majority of West African leaders only became “genuinely” interested in democracy in the beginning of the 1990s. Apparently, façade or pseudo-democracy, political instability exacerbated by economic, environmental, and socio-cultural challenges characterized post-independence West Africa prior to the 1990s. However, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the subsequent end of Marxism-Leninism (as we know it), democracy became “the only game in town”. West African leaders migrated to the democracy field in

droves, but most observers agree that democracy in West Africa serves nothing more than a tool for legitimacy. A good number of leaders even the most oppressive in the pedigree of Sgt. Samuel K. Doe of Liberia considered their administration a democracy. Even though the 1990s ushered in a new era on democratization, considering the democratization improvements of countries such as Ghana, Mali, and Senegal, such observation does not suggest that democratic transition has been completed, nor that democratic consolidation is in full swing.

With the challenges and solutions highlighted above serving as background, it is evident that West African countries encountered and are still encountering a wide range of challenges (political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural)- endemic reality of post-independence West Africa). As discussed above, in response to such challenges, West African governments have since experimented with many solutions to combat the challenges.

Despite the instability that characterized the sub-region, one country stands out to be relatively democratic even before independence and in earnest since the 1980. This country has also enjoyed relative political stability since independence and even before; this country is Senegal. Prior to investigating the uniqueness of Senegal in maintaining political stability while avoiding coup d'état and steadily marching towards democratization, it is paramount to succinctly point out that Senegal shares similar challenges and solutions with the rest of the sub region. These challenges and solutions are delineated.

### **Senegal: Challenges and Solutions to Democracy and Political Stability**

Like most West African countries, Senegal gained its independence in the 1960s, on April 4, 1960. Also, like the rest of West Africa, Senegal has its share of “stability testing” challenges (political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural). High on the political challenges list is the alleged coup plot orchestrated by Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in 1962, prompting one-party rule between 1962 and 1980. Apart from this abortive coup plot, Senegal also experienced numerous relatively orderly street and peoples’ protests and marches. However, one could argue that the most menacing source of political instability has its genesis in the secessionist aspirations of the Casamance region, since the 1980s. Even though the Senegalese government is trying to solve this crisis diplomatically, nonetheless, from time to time violence flares up to threaten not only, Senegal but her neighbors The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.

In addition to political challenges, like the rest of the West Africa sub-region, Senegal also faces economic challenges, including a devalued currency, high inflation, an export monocrop (peanut/groundnut) with dwindling market value, high unemployment, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and austerity measures. Data from the CIA World Factbook help paint the economic picture of Senegal: Even though inflation is currently tamed at 0.8% (2013), in 2008 inflation was a record high of 5.8%. Senegal’s GDP ranked 120 out of 229 countries and territories; however it shows an impressive growth rate of 4%. In 2013, Senegal posted a budget deficit estimated at 5.3 of GDP, adding to the public debt of 38.4% of GDP. Unemployment in certain sectors of the economy appears remarkably high, but sketchy at best, the latest rates found were in

2007; a rate of 48% unemployment. Export commodities are generally agricultural amounting to 2.691 billion in 2013 as compared to 5.733 billion in imports.<sup>6</sup> These figures paint a picture of a developing country making strides, but still faced with enormous challenges. These political and economic challenges are further complicated by environmental challenges, including famine and desertification (mostly in the Matam and Podor regions in northern Senegal), persistent drought, deforestation, overgrazing and overharvesting of seafood products, and problems of drying and saline river basins.

With its diverse ethnic groups speaking multiple languages, a young and exploding population characterized by gender and children's issues; it is obvious that Senegal also struggles with socio-cultural challenges. In Senegal, at least five major groups coexist namely; the Wolof 43.3%, Pular 23.8%, Serer 14.7%, Diola 3.7%, and Mandinka 3%.<sup>7</sup> In addition to these major ethnic groups there are minor ethnic groups such as the Balant, Manjack, and immigrant groups such as the Lebanese and the French in naming a few. It is also worth mentioning an intra-ethnic group cleavage. Ethnic groups such as the Wolof are further divided into subgroups with a regional flavor, such as Baol, Saloum, and Lebu, each with more loyal to the clan rather than the larger ethnic group in general.

---

<sup>6</sup> "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6/23/14, last modified June 20, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html>.

<sup>7</sup> "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6/23/14, last modified June 20, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html>.

Data from Senegal's National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANSD) shows an exploding population with an annual growth of 2.48%. Such population is comprised of 49.93% male at 6,428,189 and 50.17% female at 6,445,412, totaling to a population of 12,873,601 (2013 projection), 2,956,023 of this population reside in the (550km<sup>2</sup>) Dakar region, making Dakar over populated, with a population density of 65 people per *square kilometer*. Besides the Dakar region where the capital Dakar is situated, there are thirteen other regions, giving Senegal its fourteen regions.<sup>8</sup> 2013 figures show the following: life expectancy averages 60.95 years, children per mother stands at a staggering 4.52, and an infant mortality rate of 52.72/1000. Literacy rate for women is lower at 38.7 (2009) as compared to men at 61.8.<sup>9</sup>

Considering the challenges and solutions as highlighted above, it is evident that Senegal's challenges mirror the rest of the West African sub-region. However, since its independence in 1960, Senegal is the only one of two West African countries that has avoided the coup d'état experience followed by military rule. It becomes evident that, even though Senegal's challenges mirror the rest of West Africa, Senegal has managed to maintain relative democracy and political stability since independence. Consequently, despite similar challenges between Senegal and the rest of the West Africa sub-region, the outcomes prove to be considerably different. Naturally, the question that needs to be asked is: Is it by design, chance, or mere luck that since the 1960s, all West African

---

<sup>8</sup> "Senegal in Brief," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (ANSD), accessed June 23, 2014, <http://www.ansd.sn>.

<sup>9</sup> "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6/23/14, last modified June 20, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html>



nations- independent in the 1960s- experienced political instability in the form of coups d'état, except Senegal.

With reference to the above comparison of similar challenges but different outcomes, the significance of the study hinges upon the greater discourse and scholarly debates on democracy, democratization and political stability. Nonetheless, the focus of the study is the discourse and debates about democratization and political stability as related to Senegal specifically, while keeping in mind the West African region in general. The literature review shows that the current literature and scholarly debates extensively deal with democratization and political stability in general. However, there seem to be a gap in the discourse and debate when it comes to democratization and political stability in the West-African sub-region, and Senegal in particular. Therefore, studying Senegal as a model country, relatively democratizing and politically stable, in an unstable sub-region tends to help fill this void.

By studying Senegal's model of democracy, and her strategy in sustaining political stability, one might discover the relationship between the "Senegal model" and political stability. With this discovery a model of democracy that fosters political stability in an unstable sub-region helps enhance our understanding of democratization and political stability in this unstable part of the world. Consequently, discovering the bedrock of the *Democarassie* model and its relationship to political stability in Senegal can help identify a preferred model of democratization that "works" and "fit" Senegal and perhaps West Africa more practically. With the Senegalese version of the democracy model grounded in liberal democracy one could argue that like most foreign

ideas that “work” and are comfortably adopted in Africa, the *Democarassie* model shares the common denominator. Such idea(s), including the *Democarassie* model, are incorporated, adapted, tailor-made, customized and married to Africa’s realities and societal values; flexible enough to incorporate the “old and the new”. Examples of such amalgams of foreign and indigenous African ideas abound and are manifested in religion, attire, language, medicine, music, mores, attitudes, even food; and democracy is no exception.

As captured above, Senegal and the rest of the West-Africa region share similar challenges (political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural). In response to such challenges, similar solutions were implemented; however, it seems as though the outcomes are dissimilar. While many of the sub-region’s countries became increasing undemocratic and politically unstable during one time or the other, Senegal seems to remain relatively on the road of democratization and stability, especially political stability. Such a perplexing situation leads to the possible conclusion that Senegal’s model of democracy fits Senegal well, and perhaps the model is more country-centric; one that reflects realities in Senegal. Senegal is showcased because of her model of democracy (the *Democarassie* model) and her enviable record of political stability, which she has enjoyed since independence. This is a major achievement in a region plagued with instability and lack of democracy.

As already noted, and reiterated here, West Africa is plagued with political instability exacerbated by economic, environmental, and socio-economic challenges.

Generally speaking, liberal democracy supports democratization that in turn reinforces

political stability in the West; however, this is not totally true for West Africa.

Considering the fact that the liberal democracy model that has generally been haphazardly adopted by West African countries for over half century and in earnest for quarter century, it can be argued that the liberal democracy model that is yet to totally consolidate in West Africa generally failed to foster political stability.

### **The State of Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy in West Africa**

As already indicated, it seems, thus far, despite close to a quarter century of experience with the liberal democratic model, democracy is yet to fully consolidate, prevent coups, and generally foster political stability in the West Africa sub-region; Furthermore, the literature reveals an paradoxical nature of the current state of democracy in West Africa. It seems electoral democracy is on the rise; however, meaningful democracy is in retreat. It is also evident that West African countries, such as Ghana, managed to turn their political situation around from coup-prone military dictatorships to emerging, even model democracies. However, then majority of the West African countries have taken the opposite route; from relatively democratic designations to the Freedom House Designation: “Partly Free” or “Not Free.” Two very striking examples are two neighbors; Senegal under the leadership of President Wade (from free to partly free) and back to Free under Sall in 2013,<sup>10</sup> and the Gambia under the leadership of Jammeh (from partly free in 2011 to not free in 2012).<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> “Freedom in the World: The Gambia,” Freedom House, accessed June 4, 2014 <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/senegal#.U7a2-JRdW3I>.

<sup>11</sup> “Freedom in the World: Senegal,” Freedom House, accessed June 4, 2014, <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/gambia#.U7a18JRdW3I>.

As a result, one realizes that the liberal democratic model is anything, but a “one size fits all” model. Prompting the question, why do Western nations, particularly the U.S., place the promotion of the liberal democratic model at top of their foreign policy agenda, especially toward developing countries and emerging economies, including West Africa? Such liberal democracy-laden foreign policy is promoted regardless of the vast cultural, political, socioeconomic, even religious diversity between the West and West Africa. Western nations, the United States in particular, still push for the adoption of liberal democracy as a prerequisite for diplomatic relation and as a condition of aid. But, the question remains, does the Western liberal democracy model fit West Africa? With reference to the lack of consolidation despite over a quarter century of experience, coupling with the prevalence of political instability in West Africa; evidently the model falls short. The follow-up question then becomes, is the time ripe for revisiting the liberal democracy as a model for West Africa? Should the discussion include idea of redesigning, refitting or even replacing the liberal democratic model with a democratic model that reflects West Africa’s realities? Perhaps the time is ripe for the exploration of an offshoot of liberal democracy that fits nations individually or regions collectively, but must reflect “realities on the ground.” As already alluded to, the liberal democracy model in its current form generally falls short of arresting coups and promoting political stability because it does not reflect West Africa’s realities. These observations highlighting the deficiencies of the liberal democratic model in the case of West Africa leads us to the discussion of political stability and democracy in Senegal.

### **Plausible Explanations to Political Stability in Senegal as a Democracy**

One might wonder, why the *Democarassie* model? More precisely, what is the reasoning behind the study's position that the *Democarassie* model explains political stability in Senegal, when there are other explanations to political stability in a democracy, and Senegal is a democracy? The other explanations include, but are not limited to the following:

#### Social

Open, tolerant, classless, egalitarian

#### Economic

Economically Developed/Matured  
Acceptable access to resources  
Opportunity and upward mobility  
Acceptable standard of living

#### Education

Advance and Accessible

#### Political

Mature and Transparent

#### Government

Accountable and Responsible  
Fair and Impartial

Economic, social, academic, political and government explanations are all capable of explaining political stability, or can all be drivers of political stability; however, "the devil is in the details." Neither single-handedly nor collectively, are these explanations incapable of fully explaining political stability in Senegal. A second look of Senegal reveals inefficiency in all these explanations, however Senegal is still politically stable. Therefore the explanation for political stability in Senegal lies elsewhere. Take the economic explanation first. In developed stable

democracies, the economic system is usually fully developed and mature with built-in mechanism to access the majority of citizens. There are also opportunities for upward mobility and acceptable standard of living, this is not quite true with Senegal. In developed stable democracies, society is relatively open, tolerant, classless, and egalitarian; this is not quite true in Senegal. In developed stable democracies, education is advanced and readily accessible, this is not quite true in Senegal. In developed stable democracies politics is matured and relatively transparent; Senegal has issues in this area. In developed stable democracies government is accountable and responsible, and strives to be fair and impartial; Senegal also has issues in these areas. By now a pattern has formed. This pattern confirms the fact that even though Senegal lacks in all these explanations, it still manages to remain relatively stable. Again, the explanation of political stability resides elsewhere, and it is this study's position that the explanation for political stability in Senegal is with the *Democarassie* model. The study now gives a closer look at the *Democarassie* model, after looking into the state of political stability and democracy in Senegal.

### **The State of Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy in Senegal**

It is an illusion to believe that just because one refers to Senegal as politically stable, Senegal does not experience any unstable under-currents, or threats to stability. As highlighted by Defence Web, even though considered stable, Senegal is faced with threats to stability including, "A growing youth population, limited employment prospects, increased urbanization, weak private sector investment, and the gradual

erosion of good governance and transparency.”<sup>12</sup> However, in examining the state of political stability, and underscoring political stability in Senegal, the data presented from various reliable sources proves to be very instrumental. The study examines and implements data from The Robert S. Strauss Center’s Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index (SFI), and Country Watch’s Political Stability Index (PSI), amongst others.

The Robert S. Strauss Center’s Social Conflict in Africa (SCAD) proves to be one of the most comprehensive and complete databases on the sources of conflict; a precursor of instability. The beauty of this database is the versatility that allows individual country searches and the conflict type the country experiences. A country search reveals the following sources of instability Senegal experienced. As per the SCAD database between August 1, 1990 (Event 4330001) and October 22, 2012 (Event 4330167), 167 instability events were cataloged.<sup>13</sup> The database put the instability events in context by breaking the events down to types (event types) as follows:

1. Violence
  - a. Pro-Government Violence
  - b. Extra Government Violence
  - c. Anti-Government Violence
  - d. Intra-Government Violence
2. Strikes (General and Limited)
3. Riots (Spontaneous)
4. Demonstration (Spontaneous and Organized)
5. Insurgency and Civil War

---

<sup>12</sup> “Senegal Armed Forces,” Defence Web, accessed June 2, 2014, [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=32272:senegalese-armed-forces&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32272:senegalese-armed-forces&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255).

<sup>13</sup> “Social Conflict in Africa Database SCAD,” Robert S. Strauss Center, accessed May 27, 2014, <https://www.strausscenter.org/country-search.html?countrycode=433>.

From the SCAD data one observes that just like many advance democracies, Senegal is generally challenged with “low intensity” conflict. The most challenging conflict in the last two decades, since the early 1990s, is secessionist insurgency challenge imposed by Casamance secessionist movement. Some observers, including the Center for Systemic Peace refer to this conflict as an ethnic warfare/conflict. Perhaps rightly so because the insurgents mainly share Diola ethnicity, the ethnic majority in the Casamance region of Southern Senegal. Besides insurgency as a source of conflict, other sources of instability are generally expected in a democracy. As SCAD indicated, these other sources of conflict include violence (pro/anti-government), strikes (general and limited), and demonstrations (spontaneous/organized). The SCAD data helps make the case that Senegal is relatively stable, because the conflicts that challenge Senegal are generally within the parameters of a democracy; as a matter of fact, an advanced democracy, where people have to right to assemble and petition their government. This will be discussed further later in the case study.

To put Senegal’s fragility score in context to its West African neighbors, Table 5.1 is constructed. With a fragility rating of 9 (only second to Cape Verde’s as indicated in Table 5.1), Senegal is considered stable as compared to the other West African countries in the data set. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) measures conflict, governance and state fragility and presents the results in what they call, the Global Report. Even though the 2014 Global Report is compiled, according to the CSP website, the release is delayed at this point in May 2014. Therefore, the latest data available to the



public at this time is the 2011 data. A score of 9 for Senegal represents moderate fragility

since moderate fragility falls between a score between 8 and 11.

Table 5.1 Center for Systemic Peace Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility

Country	Fragility Rating
Cape Verde	6
Senegal	9
Benin	12
Togo	13
Mali	14
Ghana	14
Gambia	15
Mauritania	16
Nigeria	17
Burkina Faso	17
Guinea Bissau	17
Niger	18
Liberia	18
Guinea	18
Sierra Leone	19
Ivory Coast	20


Compiled by author

Source: Table 1 State Fragility Index Matrix 2010.

Center for Systemic Peace Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf>

Besides the unsuccessful 1962 coup, Figure 5.1 also presents Senegal as politically stable. It is especially important to note the longevity of a period of stability from the mid-1960s to the early 2000s. As depicted in Figure 5.1, since the early 1990s, the only main challenge to stability is the Casamance ethnic warfare.



Periods of stability (blue) and instability (red) are denoted by vertical dotted-lines

Source: Center for Systemic Peace. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/africa/Plsen.htm>

Figure 5.1: Political Stability in Senegal 1960-2004 (Center for Systemic Peace)

Evidently, Senegal was political stable even during the Senghor years when Senegal was a one party state, and also during the 1980s when Senegal was more or less considered an anocracy.

Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi's publication of the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) on behalf of the World Bank proves to be very instrumental in not only capturing stability in Senegal, but also other variables of governance in Senegal and more than two hundred countries. The WGI dataset allows a researcher to place Senegal in comparison to any country or region on all the indicators of governance. The six governance indicators identified in the WGI includes: 1) Voice and Accountability, 2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 3) Government Effectiveness, 4) Regulatory Quality, 5) Rule of Law and 6) Corruption Control. Even though all the WGI are important, respectable governance indicators, the concern of this study is "Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism" indicator. Such precipitates the necessity to unpack this indicator and further explore Senegal vis-à-vis the rest of West Africa as captured in Table 5.2. According to the WGI, on the Political Stability indicator, Senegal falls in the top five in the sub-region. More importantly, while the other countries in this category are slipping between 2002 and 2012, only Senegal and Ghana increase their stability rating. As indicated in Table 5.2, Senegal increased from its political stability rating from 34.62% in 2002 to 41.23% in 2012. Also evident is that with a rating of 41.23% as compared to Cape Verde's impressive 72.04%, Senegal still has some catching up to do.

Table 5.2 WGI: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

Country	2012 Political Stability Index	2002 Political Stability Index	
Benin	57.35	71.63	↓
Burkina Faso	26.04	31.73	↓
Cape Verde	72.04	67.31	↓
Gambia	45.02	70.19	↓
Ghana	49.76	38.94	↑
Guinea Bissau	18.48	19.71	↓
Guinea	10.90	10.10	↑
Ivory Coast	11.37	2.40	↑
Liberia	31.75	.96	↑
Mali	3.79	56.25	↓
Mauritania	16.11	55.77	↓
Niger	13.74	37.98	↓
Nigeria	3.32	7.21	↓
Senegal	41.23	34.62	↑
Sierra Leone	37.91	21.15	↑
Togo	33.62	43.75	↓

The higher the number, the more stable the country.

The up and down arrow indicates progression or regression in the ten year period.

Compiled by author. Source: Data from Worldwide Governance Indicator;

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

Daniel Kaufmann, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, The Worldwide Governance Indicators:

Methodology and Analytical Issues (September 2010). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.

5430. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130>

### **Democratization and Democracy in Senegal**

Senegal partisans would like Senegal be referred to as a democracy, actually a model democracy in the West African sub-region, and many observers have referred to Senegal as a democracy, especially following the presidential election of 2000. On the same token, Senegal's political system has been associated with many other names other than a democracy. Even though; many observers, news media outlets, think tanks, in naming a few, all designate Senegal as a democracy, this has not always been the case. As captured in Table 5.3, the Africa Election Data helps to illuminate the political situation in Senegal from independence in 1960. As Table 5.3 indicates, Senegal became a democracy after 2000 (this is still debatable). Over the years, Senegal is referred to as an emerging democracy, a flawed democracy, an anocracy; but since 2000, Senegal finally, earned the democracy designation in general terms or at least in the "thin" of the concept, an electoral democracy.

However, between 1960 and 1980, Senegal transitioned back and forth from an emerging to a restricted, to a one party state, back to a restricted, then back to an emerging democracy. This back and forth progression is better understood when one follows facts surrounding presidential elections and elections outcomes during this time. Table 5.4 reveals that with the elections of 1963, 1968, and 1973, President Senghor was unopposed. The reason behind the lack of opposition, is following the 1962 abortive coup, Senghor was able to consolidate power and suppress dissent. By the elections of 1978, a very weak opposition candidate emerged, however was no match to Senghor as indicated in the 1978 election results: Senghor was able to garner 63.1% of the votes as

compared to Abdullah Wade's 17.8%. This trend will continue into the subsequent elections of 1983, 1988, and 1993. These three elections were contested between Senghor's handpicked successor Abdou Diouf and the main opposition candidate Wade and other less significant candidates. The tide will turn for the first time, and power will change hands from an incumbent president to the opposition with the election of 2000. The 2000 election is especially significant because it was touted around the world as a truly free, fair and democracy, giving the Senegal the designation; a democracy amongst other things.

One can argue that democracy is analogous to 'free' in the Freedom House's freedom in the World designation. The Freedom House data in Table 5.5, helps make the case that Senegal is a democracy since mainly democracies are designated "free." In the almost eleven years between 2003 and 2013, Senegal is designated "free". It is affirmative that Senegal experienced challenges between 2009 and 2012 ("partly free"), but after the peaceful transition of power, as a result of the 2012 election, Senegal was able to recaptured the "free" designation in 2013 with a current Freedom Score of 2.5 ("free").

Now that the case is made that Senegal is both relatively politically stable and democratic to a tolerable extent, the focus now turns to nuances of democracy and the workings of political stability in Senegal: More precisely, the examination of the *Democarassie* model and its implications on political stability in Senegal.

Table 5.3 African Elections Database Political Designation for Senegal 1960 to 2014

YEAR	POLITICAL SITUATION
1960-1963	Emerging Democracy
1963-1966	Restricted Democratic Practice
1966-1974	One Party State (UPS)
1974-1978	Restricted Democratic Practice
1978-2000	Emerging Democracy
2000-	DEMOCRACY

Compiled by author.

Source: African Election database <http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html>

Table 5.4 Senegal Presidential Elections since Independence-1960 to 2011

ELECTION YEAR	INCUMBENT	% OF VOTES	OPPOSITION LEADER(S)	% OF VOTES*	VOTER TURN OUT	WINNER
1963	Senghor	100.0%	Unopposed	0%	86.3%	Senghor
1968	Senghor	100.0%	Unopposed	0%	94.7%	Senghor
1973	Senghor	100.0%	Unopposed	0%	97.0%	Senghor
1978	Senghor	82.20%	Wade	17.80%	63.1%	Senghor
1983	Diouf	83.45%	Wade	14.79%	56.7%	Diouf
1988	Diouf	73.20%	Wade+3	25.80%	58.8%	Diouf
1993	Diouf	58.40%	Wade+6	32.03%	51.5%	Diouf
2000	Diouf	41.30%/ 41.51%(R2)	Wade +6	31.01%/ 58.49% (R2)	62.2%	Wade
2007	Wade	55.90%	Seck +13	14.92%	70.6%	Wade
2012	Wade	34.8/ 34.20% (R2)	Sall+12	26.58%/ 65.80% (R2)	51.6/ 55.0%	Sall

Compiled by author.

Source: African Election Database <http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html>

Legend:

\*Percentage of valid votes.

Elections Years in blue depicts the democratically significant elections.

R2= Round Two Runoff Election.

+# following "main opposition leader" depicts number other serious opposition candidates.

Table 5.5 Freedom House: Senegal Freedom Score 2002-2013

YEAR	STATUS	FREEDOM SCORE	CIVIL LIBERTIES	CIVIL RIGHTS
2013	Free	2.5	3	2
2012	Partly Free	3.0	3	3
2011	Partly Free	3.0	3	3
2010	Partly Free	3.0	3	3
2009	Partly Free	3.0	3	3
2008	Free	2.5	3	2
2007	Free	2.5	3	2
2006	Free	2.5	3	2
2005	Free	2.5	3	2
2004	Free	2.5	3	2
2003	Free	2.5	3	2
2002	Partly Free	3.5	4	3

Compiled by author.

Source: Freedom House-Freedom in the World

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/senegal>



### **The *Democarassie* Model: Democracy the Senegalese Way**

A powerful revelation stemming from the literature review is that despite a quarter century of experience, democracy is by and large yet to consolidated in this sub-region, except for few bright spots; Ghana, Senegal, and Cape Verde, amongst others. As a result, what is suggested here is that there is a good chance that those countries including Senegal discovered their own version of the liberal democratic model that addresses their realities better. With this in mind, arguably, Senegal is fortunate enough to discover a unique offshoot of liberal democracy that works well for Senegal. This model is already introduced as the *Democarassie* model.

The *Democarassie* model is a model of democracy that resonates with Lijphart's consociation model of democracy, where power is shared and/or brokered through establishment heads and their networks. Such thinking is hardly new because Lijphart's endorsement of consensus for Africa is an endorsement of the Lewis Model as a model of democracy for Africa, given the pluralistic nature and deep cleaves that characterizes African societies including West Africa. Such deep cleavages range from tribal, to religious, to linguistic, to cultural, to economic and regional cleavages. Concurring with Lewis that majoritarian democracies only serve the majority, and also concurring with Lewis that "all who are affected by a decision should have a chance to participate in making the decision either directly or through chosen representative,"<sup>14</sup> not only the

---

<sup>14</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 31.

majority, Lijphart posits that as far as the Lewis Model is concerned, the consensus model serve pluralist societies such as African societies better. Pluralist societies tend to operate within the parameters of consensus building and coalition governments.

Consensus building and coalitions are what the *Democarassie* model offers: A model of democracy for a pluralist society where government is limited by a constitution, where rule of law is adhered to, where civil rights and liberties are protected, and where political participation is high; however, the state and society alike, highly considers and pays close attention to the “establishments” and “customary authority.” Such is indicative of corporatism. In other words, Senegal’s *Democarassie* model could also be understood from a corporatism theory standpoint.

Before looking into corporatism in the context of Senegal, it is prudent to start with a reflection and a definition of corporatism as used in the context of this study. In the consideration of corporatism, the study draws from the contributions of Phillippe Schmitter and Howard J. Wiarda. Schmitter considers corporatism as, “A system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or idea-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interest of civil society with decisional structures of the state.”<sup>15</sup> In a similar vein highlighting the organized natural interests in society and their relationship to the state, Wiarda posits that corporatism exists where:

- 1) Society is organized in whole or in part, not on an individualistic level, but in terms of functional, societal, or

---

<sup>15</sup> Phillippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 1974): 85-131, accessed June 25, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406080>.

“corporate” units (family, clan, region, ethnic group, military organization, religious bodies, labor or business groups, interest groups etc.) that make up the nation. 2) The state seeks to structure, limit, organize, or license these groups as a way of controlling them-limited pluralism. 3) The state tries to incorporate these groups into the state system, converting them into what are often called "private-sector governments"; while the groups themselves seek both to take advantage in terms of programs and benefits for their members from such incorporation, and at the same time preserving some, usually contractually defined (as in a constitution or basic law) autonomy or independence *from* the state.<sup>16</sup>

Wiarda's postulation above is in line with the literature; corporatism could be viewed as the “third way,” a middle-of-the-road system between Liberal Pluralism and Marxist-Leninist systems. Liberal Pluralism (in its purest form) interest groups are the harbinger of power and the state only assumes the role of an umpire, ombudsman, arbiter etc. Marxism (especially in its Leninist form), the all-powerful state, is in control (sometimes total control); interest groups and the proletariats play an insignificant subordinate role. With these two systems forming the two extreme poles of the spectrum, Corporatism (where the state is relevant and effective, but interest groups are equally relevant and effective), fits neatly in the middle of the spectrum.

Considering the function of establishments and the role of customary authorities in Senegal and the various constituencies and interests they serve, all in the context of the *Democarassie* model, exchanges based on corporatism is a major underpinning of the model. As already mentioned, in this study three establishments/interest groups/ “corporate” entities are identified: the political, citizen and society (religious

---

<sup>16</sup> Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great 'Ism'*, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1997), 9.

sociocultural), and economic); and the military. The functions and the roles of these three establishments/interest groups/ “corporate” entities all headed by customary authorities unfolds in the rest of the chapter, subsequent to the discussion of the values and elements of the *Democarassie* model that follows.

### **The Values**

In addition to effective constitutional limits on government, the guarantees of civil liberties, political rights, and rule of law, the *Democarassie* model offer the following values. Even though these values were presented in chapter three; in the interest of fleshing out the values of the *Democarassie* model, it is found prudent for the case study to revisit these values.

Even though the *Democarassie* model is grounded in the liberal democratic model, what make it unique to Senegal is that the *Democarassie* model not only considers, but accommodates society’s unique realities; the reality of cleavages, establishments, and customary authority. As a result of this accommodating characteristic of model, the *Democarassie* model addresses Senegal’s unique realities; therefore arguably fitting Senegal better, when compared to the Western liberal democratic model.

In addition to the accommodating characteristic of the model, the *Democarassie* model also utilizes religion, culture, language, heritage, nationalistic sentiments, patronage, and age/gender roles as “unifying glue.” The model is well aware of the cleavages within the Senegalese society; therefore it counters the negative effect of divergent cleavage, with the “unifying glue” to converge the cleavage. The “accommodating characteristics” and the “unifying glue” are seen as the strengths of the *Democarassie* model over the liberal

democratic model. These “strengths” of the model help uphold political stability in Senegal. The strength of the model is better understood when one understand the values, element, and the institutions (establishments and customary authority), and how all these components work together to uphold political stability in Senegal. One starts with examining the values of the *Democarassie* model as follows:

“Kinder and gentler”  
 Sensitive to local realities  
 Accommodating to religious and socio-cultural exchanges  
 Adaptive to existing systems (political, economic, cultural etc.)  
 High degree of freedom and liberty  
 High level of political participation  
 High degree of tolerance (religious, ideological, and associational)  
 High level of inclusion and acceptance  
 Convergent cleavages

### **The Elements**

Within the backdrop of the above highlighted values, the elements of the *Democarassie* model presented in chapter three are also revisited because of their importance in the case study. The elements of the *Democarassie* model follows:

1. Political freedoms and Civil liberties
2. Religious and Ethnic Freedom
3. Political Participation and Elections (frequent and relatively free and fair)
4. Rule of Law and Functioning of Government
5. Due Process
6. Pluralism and Collective bargaining

As mentioned in chapter three, the elements of the *Democarassie* model are quite similar to the elements of the liberal democracy model. This is expected because the former is grounded in the latter. Consequently, it is evident that the elements of the liberal democratic model are present in the *Democarassie* model, because if nothing else

Senegal is generally considered a democracy.<sup>17</sup> The question then become, what is Senegal's track record on these elements of the *Democarassie* model? How deeply entrenched are these element? What is the degree of adherence? How meaningful are the elements in political, socio-cultural and economic exchanges? The significance of these values and elements manifest in the operations of the establishments and customary authorities. This becomes clearer in the discussion that follows.

**The Institutions: The *Democarassie* Model-Decentralized Despotism, and the Role of Establishments and Customary Authority and its Implications on Political Stability in Senegal**

In this study "establishments" are analogous to institutions, and within the *Democarassie* model, three major establishment/institutions are identified:

- 1) Political Establishment: Political and Government System
- 2) Citizen and Society Establishment-Religious, Socio-cultural, and Economic
- 3) Military Establishment: The Armed Forces

One cannot fully understand the *Democarassie* model concept without understanding institutions referred to in this study as establishments and customary authorities. Especially important is the role of customary authorities in political, religious, socio-cultural, and economic, security exchanges and their function in upholding of political stability allowing the perpetuation of the political system. Through decentralized despotism theory lenses, the case study turns its analysis to the role of establishments and customary authority in strengthening political stability through the *Democarassie* model. As already alluded to, by keeping 'the people,'

---

<sup>17</sup> Different observers refer to Senegal's democracy as an emerging, flawed, pseudo democracy, and anocracy, in naming a few.

happy and satisfied, or at least minimally contented or vested, or at least, committed, customary authorities/establishment head's share the vested interest of keeping the center (political system) intact, thus protecting the president and the regime. Among other roles, these customary authorities serve as power brokers in maintaining the status quo.

Together the establishments and its customary authorities could be viewed to as guardians of "the system." At the helm and throughout the ranks in the various establishments, are establishment heads armed with significant soft power, connections, and far-reaching influence. As mentioned in the theoretical framework chapter (chapter 3), these establishment heads are seen in the image of Mahmoud Mamdani's customary authorities/decentralized despots or C. W. Mills's power elites, or simply seen as power brokers and middlemen between the political system and the people. Hence, interchangeably this study refers to these establishment heads as customary authorities, or decentralized despots. The establishment heads are also viewed as power elites and power brokers. These customary authorities could also be visualized in the functionality of "circuit breakers", "pressure valves" or "pressure conduits." As mentioned above, customary authorities could be viewed as power elites; however, in the case of Senegal the elite class (customary authority) is considered more as a non-despotic "guardian" of the nation, than a ruling class. Either by heritage, appointment, or connection to the regime, these elites happen to occupy the helm of what is referred to in this study as "establishments."

One could argue that the power elite concept is hardly a new concept. Even in liberal democratic Western countries, elites (a ruling class, upper class, corporations and industry) wield significant political influence. However, with the *Democarassie* model customary authority influence seems to be welcomed. Customary authorities' influence tends to bear heavily on citizen's political decision, nevertheless, unlike the power elites in advanced Western liberal democracies, these customary authorities are not only accepted as the civil praetorian guardians of society, but placed on a pedestal; highly revered and respected, arguably to the point of worship. A good example is the marabout (religious leaders)/*talib* (flock) relationship. Ironically, customary authority influence is not considered coercive, or seen as a threat, but recognized, respected, expected, accepted, welcomed, even worshipped and revered as divine authority. Such positive attitude towards the establishments and customary authority is deeply woven in the fabric of Senegalese political, religious, economic, and socio-cultural exchanges.

Furthermore, even though the *Democarassie* model extends popular sovereignty, unlike the liberal democratic model and the guarantees of "direct and total popular sovereignty," popular sovereignty, under the *Democarassie* model is significantly vulnerable to customary authorities' influence. Considering the great influence of customary authorities, one observes a model that only allows "indirect and partial popular sovereignty" instead. It is not an exaggeration to posit that because of the depth of their influence, these customary authorities have the capacity to dictate and/or direct when it comes to the people's sovereignty; thus the indirect and partial popular sovereignty mentioned above. The dictating and/or directing could be as simple as the *Grande*



*Marabout*'s endorsement of a candidate. The endorsement amounts to an edict (*ndigeul*) dictating that the followers vote for a certain candidate, or politically behave in a certain way. An edict can be as direct as blatantly asking followers to say, break up a riot, vote for or against a particular candidate, support or oppose a piece of legislation.

In terms of the *Democarassie* model and the maintenance of political stability, even though establishments' customary authorities divide the nation into cleavages and constituents all bringing demands to bear on the political, religious, socio-cultural and economic system, it is in their common interest to operate as convergent cleavages. In the process, the customary authorities arguably assume the role of king maker. Common and shared interest in upholding the status quo (most of the time) dictates that customary authorities work together, and not against each other; a huge advantage in maintaining political stability in Senegal. This partially explains why all cleavages realize the necessity of cooperation: to keep the overall political system, the status quo, the regime intact. Obviously, various establishments and customary authorities serving different constituents and interests, reveal cleavages within the Senegalese society. However, it is also evident that such cleavages are not as deep, and most importantly, such a cleavage tend to be convergent, and not divergent. Such convergent nature of cleavages is especially important in maintaining political stability in Senegal.

It is apparent that all customary authorities (political, religious, socio-cultural, economic, society, and military) enjoy considerable respect, acceptance, and are seen as guardians of the nation. In return these customary authorities reciprocate by attending to the needs of the people. This two-way relationship proves to be an enduring and sacred

relationship where both leaders and the led assume and play important roles: The people seek guidance and defer to authority as necessary, especially at the time of national crisis, and the leaders offer great services and deliver to the common people. These services include advice and guidance (including political advice) as in the case of religious leaders; jobs and access to resources, as in the case of political and economic leaders; moral and material support, as in the case of heads of communities and households.

As mentioned earlier, the *Democarassie* model and the role of customary authorities are viewed through a “power elite” or “decentralized despotism” lens. One could score points in arguing that this model is nothing more than a model of patronage, a patron-client system. Nonetheless, because of its uniqueness and responsiveness to societal realities, the *Democarassie* model is able to achieve for Senegal what the liberal democratic model fails to achieve for the sub-region. As it becomes clearer later in the case study, the establishments and customary authority form the bedrock of political stability and occupies a special place within the *Democarassie* model.

The three major establishments, each headed by customary authorities are briefly introduced here. First, the political establishment: The political establishment incorporates the entire political and government apparatus all headed by strategic customary authorities within the ranks. Within the political system customary authorities are present in all branches of government including the executive, legislative and the judiciary. In the government apparatus, customary authorities are present in all ministries and in all tiers of the government apparatus from the central government in Dakar to the 14 Regions, 45 *Departements* 110 *Communes*, 103 *Arrondissements*, and 320

*Communautes Rurales*.<sup>18</sup> This arrangement forms the decentralized political apparatus the *Democarassie* model thrives in.

Second, the Citizen and Society Establishment-Religious, Socio-cultural, and Economic establishment: Considering the far reaching influence of the religious establishment, it is prudent to start with the religious aspect of this establishment, with a focus on the various Muslim brotherhoods. The study focuses on the four major Muslim brotherhoods; the *Mouride*, the *Tidjaniyya*, the *Layenne*, and the *Qadriyya*. Even though Senegal is 94% Muslim, the religious establishment includes the head of the Catholic Church. The head of the Catholic Church, who is the Cardinal of the Dakar Archdiocese and the bishops under him, are also seen as religious customary authorities, even though there are only about 300,000 Catholics in a country with a population in excess of thirteen million. Arguably the religious establishment (the Muslim Brotherhoods and the Catholic Church) is the most influential when it comes to brokering public support and lending legitimacy to the system. The religious customary authorities amongst other functions lend support, guidance, legitimacy, advice and most importantly votes for the president and the party in power. In return the president and the administration reciprocates by making resources available, allowing autonomy, and extending privileges, material, and other benefits. The case study will go into greater detail to showcase the symbiotic relationship between the president and his party at the center of the customary

---

<sup>18</sup> "Senegal in Brief," *Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie* (ANSD).

authorities. In effect, the customary authorities operate in concert to buttress the president and his administration and in return receive the spoils that they further distribute to their clients. This exchange, in and by itself, helps keep the regime in place and further cement stability.

The socio-cultural aspect of this establishment includes all classes and social cleavage with Senegalese society, including city, regional, and local, the body politic outside government, interest groups, political parties, household heads, and so on.

The economic aspect of establishment includes all specially connected and privileged business and industry leaders who also find it imperative to work with, and lend their support to the president, his administration and the political system in general. In return the president and the system reciprocate by doling out resources, access, privileges, benefits, in naming a few incentives. Within this arrangement, the economic establishment's customary authorities work tirelessly to keep the president and the system in place.

Third, the Military Establishment: The customary authorities here are the top brass that occupy key leadership positions in the armed forces establishment. Again the president and the system have considerable influence on who occupies these top military positions. These handpicked military leaders in turn play their part in keeping the president and the system in place and the perpetuation of the regime by keeping the military out of politics and political intervention.

From the discussion above, the role of customary authorities in upholding political stability is becoming apparent and those at the helm of every establishment are

recognized and revered customary authorities at every level. It goes without saying that it is imperative for the power elite class and all the decentralized despot/customary authorities to function in concert to maintain the center, because they all have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the regime. Such an arrangement precipitates the inquiry, whether democracy in Senegal draws strength from the *demos* or the establishment heads-customary authorities/decentralized despots/power elite. If that is the case, this model of democracy seems to be flawed. Flawed or not, the study argues that this model has helped keep Senegal politically stable for over half a century, even though it seems flawed. Following this general discussion on the establishments and customary authority, it is found prudent to more intimately explore each establishment headed by customary authorities, starting with the political establishment.

**Political Establishment: Political System, Government Apparatus (National, Regional, Local), Political Party Machine, and the Body Politic**

The political establishment includes the political system, the government apparatus, political parties, the party machine and the body politic. The political system includes the three branches of government (presidency, the cabinet, parliament and ministers, and the judiciary); the government apparatus includes the national, regional and local government units; political parties, the party machine, body politic and the grassroots include all those directly or indirectly functioning and primarily involved in the political process.

Politically, Senegal operates as a semi-presidential system grounded in the French Fifth Republic of 1958.<sup>19</sup> In a semi-presidential system, a popularly elected president co-leads with a legislature empowered Prime Minister and a cabinet. The institutions of government in the Senegalese semi-presidential system are the typical three branches: the President of the Republic; the National Assembly (parliament); and the Judiciary. Since, it is a semi-presidential system, a fourth branch is the government with the Prime Minister and the head. This Prime Minister is also the head of all ministers. Currently, (June, 2014) Prime Minister, Ms. Aminata Touré, heads thirty two ministries each headed by a minister. In addition to these branches is the Economic Social and the Environmental Council. This council was created by Law No. 2012-September 16, 2012.<sup>20</sup>

The above particulars confirm that with the Senegalese semi-presidential system there is definitely separation of power, and relative checks and balances. However, the question is how genuine is separation of power and checks and balances? A second glance raises concerns on both. Especially notable are issues with checks and balances considering the president's power and influence in hiring and firing from the Prime Minister to members of the other branches of government. The study draws attention to this overwhelming presidential power. The power the president wields allows him

---

<sup>19</sup> "Constitutional History of Senegal" Constitutionnet, last modified July 11, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-senegal>.

<sup>20</sup> "Institutions" *Gouvernement Du Senegal*, last modified January 7, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014. <http://www.gouv.sn/-Le-Gouvernement-.html>.

considerable advantage over the members other branches, that are supposed to be separate and capable of countering presidential power with their checks and balances. As a result, the weight of the president's power can easily make members of the other branches recapitulate, or compel them to support or even rubber stamp the president or risk losing their positions. Consequently, an important point to be made here is, even though the *Democarassie* model help uphold political stability, this overwhelming presidential power is one of its shortcomings. The study now turns to the 2001 Constitution of Senegal (latest) to map out presidential power and influence in the hiring and firing of members other branches of government.

*Title III, Article 49* of the current Senegalese Constitution reads, "The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister and terminates his<sup>21</sup> function ... On the proposal of the Prime Minister, the President of the republic appoints the Ministers, establishes their and terminate their functions."<sup>22</sup> *Title III, Article 51* empowers the President to submit a bill of law to referendum; with a mere opinion from the President of the National Assembly and the Senate. *Title III, Article 52* allows the president additional "exceptional" powers in times of crises.<sup>23</sup> Articles 49, 51, and 52 captured above partially explain why Senegal has strong presidents. Because of their constitutional power, especially the power and influence in hiring and firing, a president can easily eclipse the

---

<sup>21</sup> The current Prime Minister in August, 2014 is female, therefore her function

<sup>22</sup> "Constitution of the Republic of Senegal," World Constitution Illustrated, ed. and Trans. Jefri J. Ruchti, accessed July 3, 2014, <http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN048952.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> World Constitution Illustrated, "Constitution of the Republic of Senegal."

members of the other branches. Unlike the United States presidential system, or even the English parliamentary system, the President of the Senegalese Republic can directly influence the decision of who is part of the political and government apparatus from the Prime Minister, to the ministers, to the parliament, the Economic and Environmental Council, and even the Judiciary. Take the President's influence on the National Assembly's composition for example, with the 100 members, 65 members are chosen by the president and the overwhelming majority of the 35 other members are from the president's party. The justices of the highest court are also named by the president. The president also names the governors of all the 14 administrative regions<sup>24</sup>. These leadership positions are occupied by what the study refers to the customary authorities. Therefore, if these customary authorities are rewarded with the positions they serve in, and serve at the pleasure of the president, and could fall out of favor if the president so decided, these customary authorities do not have much of a choice but to work tirelessly to gain the accolades of the president and work even harder to keep the president and the status quo in place. Their survival is directly dependent on the president's survival. In ensuring their survival, these customary authorities turn to their deputies, who turn, turn lower deputies further down the line through the political party, party machine, body politic and the grassroots at the national, regional and local level of government and civil society. This trickling down effect eventually reaches the lowest echelon of the constituency. At the end of the process, the distribution of spoil, favors, access, resources

---

<sup>24</sup> "Senegal: Government," Michigan State University Global Edge, accessed July 3, 2014, <http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/senegal/government>.



and so on, are widespread and far reaching; all culminating in servicing and maintain an elaborate patronage system. In return the clients/constituencies ensure that they reward by retaining the deputies with their votes and support, those deputies ensures that the superior deputies remain in place; such a trend reverberates all the way back to the president; thus help keep the president and the regime in place.

Consequently, it seems the hallmark of the *Democarassie* model is “well oiled”, elaborate patronage system, where customary authorities and deputies takes care of constituencies, and the constituencies reciprocate by rewarding them with votes and grassroots support, thus keeping them in office. This exchange is hardly democratic, but keeps the democratic process in motion. One could argue that this communal model of democracy resonates with Senegal communal history: A system where expectations run high that the powerful, the well born, the well placed, the fortunate are obligated to take care of the less fortunate, and the less fortunate in turn pledge their allegiance to the higher ups. This arrangement is what Cheikh Anta Diop captured in his analysis of the Senegalese caste system and the relationship between the two castes; the “superior” caste -the *gor* (including the *ger* and *nen*) and the “inferior” caste, the *djam* (slaves).<sup>25</sup> Diop captures the relationship this way.

Unlike the attitude of the nobles toward the bourgeoisie, the lords towards the serfs, or the Brahmans towards other Indian castes, the *ger* (superior caste) could not materially exploit the lower caste without losing face in the eyes of others as well as their own. On the contrary, they are obliged to assist the lower caste members in every way possible; even if less wealthy,

---

<sup>25</sup> Cheikh Anta Diop, *Precolonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the formation of the Modern State*. (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 1.

they had to “give” to a man of the lower caste if so requested. In exchange, the latter had to allow them social precedence.<sup>26</sup>

As a result, according to Diop, “The originality of the system resides in the fact that the dynamic elements of society, whose discontent might have endangered revolutions, are really satisfied with their social condition and do not seek to change it.”<sup>27</sup> Even though less pronounced, the caste system in Senegal is still in place and the sacred bond between the customary authorities (the fortunate/leaders/the upper class) and the client/constituency (the less fortunate/lower class) is still faithfully observed. This underlies the *Democarassie* model that in turn upholds political stability. Effectively, members of the lower class expect favors from their leaders and anyone else in the community they see as more fortunate, even if that person has to raid state coffers, bend rules, practice nepotism, and grant extra special favors. This is one of many the reasons why corruption is an endemic Senegalese problem, but ironically such corrupt exchanges keep satisfaction high, tensions low and people vested, and in the process foster political stability.

#### **Civic Establishment: Religious, Socio-Cultural, and Economic Dimension**

The civic establishment includes a religious, socio-cultural and economic dimension all headed by customary authorities.

---

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 1.

### **Muslim Brotherhoods and Religious Dimension**

As far as maintaining stability, political or otherwise, the religious establishment and its customary authorities are arguably one of the most influential and effective.

Considering that 94%<sup>28</sup> of Senegal's population is Muslim, from the president, to the top armed forces chiefs, to top political, cultural, business, and household leaders, an overwhelming majority of the Muslim population identify with these brotherhoods. The brotherhoods are all headed by what is referred to in this study as customary authorities.

Given their influence and role, these customary authorities serve as glue that keeps society together, regardless of existing cleavages such as; ethnicity, gender, age, and social status, in naming a few. The brotherhoods smooth out and dilute, thus converge, instead of the normal divergence of cleavage lines. Also, regarding the power and influence of the religious establishment and the brotherhood justification grounded in Islam, Islam has almost a millennium of history in Senegal, and therefore it has been deeply rooted since the eleventh century. Such compares to Senegal as an independent country for just over half-century, precisely sixty four years. However, it is interesting to note that Senegal is a secular country. Therefore, even though not included as part of the Muslim brotherhoods, the Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church is viewed as a religious customary authority, because the 300, 000 ( 5% of the population) mainly Roman Catholics enjoy meaningful religious freedom and are politically relevant. Even the 1% animist population also worships as they please. This informs the fact that even

---

<sup>28</sup> "World Almanac of Islamism," The American Foreign Policy Council, accessed June 7, 2014, <http://almanac.afpc.org/senegal> .

though Islam is deeply entrenched in Senegal, religious freedom and tolerance is also genuinely observed, thus the laicity alluded to.

The four major Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal are; the *Tidjaniyya* (the largest), the *Mouride/Muridiyya* (second largest and most economically prosperous, and most tightly knit), the *Layenne* (third largest), and the *Qadriyyah*, (the smallest, but oldest). Accordingly, each brotherhood is hierarchical headed by a figure called the *Caliph*, (surrounded with deputies), and in the millions, both in Senegal and around the world (the Mouride especially), are followers referred to as *Talibs*. The *Talibs* pay tribute, offer support of the financial type and others, execute the Caliph's commands (*ndiguel*), habitually without question. All the brotherhoods in Senegal are grounded in the Sufi-Islamic order. According to Michael Lings, one of the preeminent Western scholars of Sufism, Sufism is described as follows:

From time to time a Revelation 'flows' like a great tidal wave from the Ocean of Infinitude to the shores of our finite world; and Sufism is the vocation, and the discipline and the science of plunging into the ebb of one of these waves and being drawn back with it to its External and Infinite source...Sufism is a kind of mysticism.<sup>29</sup>

Citing 14<sup>th</sup> century Ibn Khaldun, BBC Religions describes Sufism as,

...dedication to worship, total dedication to Allah most High; disregard for the finery and ornament of the world, abstinence from the pleasure, wealth, and prestige sought by most men, and retiring from others to worship alone..... Sufis are emphatic that Islamic knowledge should be learned from teachers and not exclusively from books. Tariqas can trace their teachers back through the generations to the Prophet himself. Modeling

---

<sup>29</sup> Michael Lings, *What is Sufism?* (Cambridge, UK: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1975), 11-12.

themselves on their teachers, students hope that they too will glean something of the Prophetic character.<sup>30</sup>

Understanding the philosophical underpinnings of Sufism and the Caliph/Talib relationship goes a long way in shedding light on the power of the Muslim brotherhood Caliphs and their influence in upholding political stability in Senegal. In regard to the Caliphs' power and influence, Elizabeth Blunt of BBC News posits that, "Senegal's most powerful men are not politicians, but the leaders of the country's Islamic Sufi brotherhoods, to which a very large proportion of Senegalese belong, and whose influence pervades every aspect of Senegalese life."<sup>31</sup> Blunt's statement is hardly a surprise to anyone with any knowledge of the Senegalese brotherhoods. These Caliphs, who are direct descendants of the founder, are not generally considered gods, or even prophets, but to the most devout of their followers, they occupy a space very close to a prophet, or even God. A good example is the sect of the Mouride brotherhood known as the *Baye Fall* and their unwavering belief and support for the Caliph. Another example, even though some Muslims have reservation, many talibs of the *Layene* brotherhood believe their founder Limamou Thaiw, is a prophet. The two points made here underscore the reason behind the position that the religious establishment is one of the most influential and the most effective. First, Sufism (the anchors of the brotherhoods) traces the "teachers" back to the Prophet Mohammed; therefore placing the "teachers"

---

<sup>30</sup> "Sufism", BBC Religions, last modified September 8, 2009, accessed June 7, 2014, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sufism\\_1.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sufism_1.shtml)

<sup>31</sup> Elizabeth Blunt, "Senegal's Powerful Brotherhoods," *BBC Religions*, Accessed June 7, 2014, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4268342.stm>

on a very high pedestal, and these caliphs, among other roles are viewed as “teachers”, partly explaining the devoutness of the talibs. Second, since these caliphs are seen almost as supernatural, their commands are not usually questioned. Apparently, the power and influence of the religious establishment and religious customary authority is beyond doubt. Even though these religious leaders are powerful enough to upset the political harmonic balance and instigate instability, most of the time they show resolve and reservation, and endeavor to remain apolitical. This does not mean that these leaders are completely detached from politics. There are many occasions when these religious leaders have to take positions and make political decisions. It is affirmative that disagreements occasionally surface, and the religious leaders protest, but such protest is not geared toward agitating violence and instability, even though this is within their power. In retrospect, there generally exists a cordial and harmonious relationship between the political apparatus and the religious establishment. The study now turns to the religious establishment, their relation with the political system, and their role in maintaining political stability, within the *Democarassie* model framework.

The relationship between the religious establishment and the Senegalese state, and arguably the upholding of political stability, is captured well in a special report by David Dickson for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). After characterizing Senegal as exemplary, where political Islam is constructive, as compared to other regions in Africa and other nations with a high Muslim population such as Nigeria, Dickson posits that the harmonious relationship between the Muslim leaders and the Senegalese state dates back to the colonial period. “The French, fearing jihad, deferred to these (religious) leaders on

religious affairs in exchange of acceptance of the French control of administrative matter, such as taxation”.<sup>32</sup> In a different context, one can argue that “fearing jihad”, is still real, and a major driver behind this symbiotic relationship between the religious leadership and the state. In this symbiotic relationship the Senegalese state works diligently not to agitate the religious establishment, and in return the religious establish works equally hard not to interfere, intrude, or in the least antagonize political affairs. Though, this not always the case; many a time the people, general followers and more devout *talibs* alike, expect the religious leadership to intervene, give direction and take position, and they, in varying degree do, especially at the time of crisis. Because their positions have far reaching consequences and repercussions, frequently the position taken is on the side of peace, unity, and love of country.

From the president, to military leaders, to cultural, business and community leader, to ordinary citizens, if there is one thing they have in common, is commonality of brotherhood membership: In the excess of ten million people, Senegalese of all stripes, social class, and ethnic groups (some more closely than others) overwhelmingly identify with one of the Muslim brotherhoods. With this huge number of followers, the religious customary authorities can undoubtedly fulfill their role as vanguards of political stability very effectively. Conversely, these leaders could also be agents of political instability, but Senegal’s political history shows that religious leaders are most of the time on the side of peace and stability; notwithstanding the fact that they sometime disagree with the

---

<sup>32</sup> David Dickson, “Special Report: Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research Agenda,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed June 7, 2014, <http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/amcdouga/Hist446/readings/political%20islam%20subsaharan%20africa.pdf>

president and his administration, and publicly display their disagreement. However, the first president, President Senghor, set the precedent of cordiality and symbiotic relationship between the presidency and the religious establishment. From the first president to the current president, President Sall, all display great respect and honor towards the religious leader. Even though President Senghor was Catholic, he strongly identified with the Muslim majority and had strong ties and healthy relationship with both the Mouride, and the Tidjaniyya leadership, and other brotherhoods as well. Even though, President Senghor's successor, President Diouf was one of those presidents who avoided "wearing his religion on this sleeves," he also established a cordial and harmonious relationship and close ties with the religious leaders. The third president, President Wade's devotion to the Mouride brotherhood was overwhelming to the point of upsetting others. Wade, without reservations, identified fully, and considered himself a devout Mouride, to the extent of making his first order of business after winning the elections in 2000, a visit to Touba (home of the Mouride leaders and the Mouride in general). The current president, President Sall is following the footsteps of his predecessors, by keeping close ties, and creating allies with the religious establishment, especially the two biggest, the Mouride and the Tidjaniyya.

Considering this tight, cordial and harmonious relationship between the religious establishment and the political leadership, also considering the caliph/talib relationship, one cannot help but wonder, if the caliph and the religious establishment is too strong and too influential to overshadow the political apparatus. Since Senegal is considered a democracy, any inquiry concerned with the question of the separation of religion and



state (a very important pillar of democracy) becomes a genuine concern. In addressing this genuine concern of the separation of religion and state, one submits that, besides the regular disagreements stemming from democratic exchanges, (the fact is that in Senegal sometimes these disagreements have religious undertones), and besides the agitation of very minority extremists within the brotherhoods, Senegal is genuinely a secular country, with no intentional mix between religion and state. Despite a very high Muslim population (94%), this country has all the attributes of a secular country, and the overwhelming majority believes it should stay this way. As a result, it is safe to posit that there is generally or in theory a separation of religion and state, however, in certain areas, especially dealing with culture, the lines are very blurry. One must remember that religion in Senegal is so pervasive it touches every aspect of Senegalese life, therefore religion transcends "religion," it is a way of life. Religion forms the socio-cultural pillars for society and to a certain extent, guides economic exchanges. Therefore, one posits that, in Senegal there is decent separation of religion and state, however there is no separation of religion and culture, and this tends to complicate the separation of religion and state. This brings us to the discussion of culture and the religious establishment, within the *Democarassie* model and the upholding of political stability in Senegal.

### **The Socio-Cultural Dimension**

As mentioned, there is definitely a lack of separation between religion and culture, a plausible explanation such an entanglement is, even though Senegalese culture predates Islam, in Senegal today culture is firmly grounded in religion (Islam and Christianity). Considering a 94% Muslim population and the fact that the Islam existed

and flourished in Senegal for a thousand years, the influence of Islam in Senegalese culture should not be a surprise. Christianity is also as deeply rooted, even though its presence is centuries younger. As a result, religion and culture in Senegal is inseparable, and the role of the religious establishment is undeniable. The religious customary authorities also assume the important role of cultural leaders. In effect, the religious leader can offer religious and spiritual guidance, and simultaneously offer counseling on marriage parenting, cultural ethics and morals, in naming a few. In effect, followers look up to the religious establishment and its customary authorities, the caliph and his deputies, for religious and spiritual guidance in connecting with their creator in preparation for the Day of Judgment and afterlife. However, simultaneously, followers seek cultural guidance for a more fruitful life while on earth. One observes a connection; many followers believe the religious quality of cultural life determines the rewards the afterlife has to offer. Therefore, one's cultural life is heavily influenced by religion. Since Muslims strongly believe in the afterlife, the Day of Judgment and the narrative of heaven and hell, the rewards and punishments of the afterlife seems to deeply influence one's earthly decisions. As a result, believers/followers strive hard to stay on task with the teachings, the wishes, and the directives of the "teacher" (the caliph and his deputies), in the process, ensure that one's cultural life is in line with one's religious life, all under the directions of the caliph. This partly explains the reason behind dutiful devotion, without the asking question, or challenging the Caliphs directives. In this regard, a practical example that comes to mind is the observance of fasting during the Ramadan and celebration of *Eid Al Fitr* that follows (the first day after Ramadan). Both Ramadan

and *Eid Al Fitr* are grounded in Islam however, anyone familiar with Senegalese culture is aware of the cultural importance of both. In showcasing the importance of the Caliph in this religious/cultural affair, the fasting of Ramadan continues, and the celebration of *Eid Al Fitr* does not start until the Caliph makes that decision. Even though this is strictly a religious undertaking, the Caliph's word is final. Frequently, various brotherhood caliphs disagree on the date, resulting to in *Eid Al Fitr* celebrations observed on different days. Even though Ramadan and *Eid Al Fitr* are strictly religious, it seems the cultural aspect and the influence of the caliph is more important.

Obviously, the influence of religion and the religious establishment intertwine and drive culture. After a millennium of coexistence, it is safe to observe that religion and culture have become one, the latter flowing from the former. Even though ironic, Senegalese are very comfortable in mixing religion and culture. For instance, considering monotheism as a major pillar in Islam, many Senegalese are very comfortable observing the daily Islamic prayer, before or after consulting with a cultural mystic (locally known as *serigne/marabou*).<sup>33</sup> Senegalese also perform weddings the cultural and religious way, but simultaneously consummate the same marriage at the court house. Evidently, there exists a very cozy relationship between religion and politics, and a much cozier relationship between religion and culture in Senegal, so cozy that they are inseparable. Religion and culture have finally melted into each other, but still both the political and religious establishment strive hard to maintain a secular society; however, no one

---

<sup>33</sup> These marabous are not the same as the brotherhood leaders, those are referred to as *Grande Marabous*

pretends that there is a separation of culture and religion in Senegal. After all these years, it is practically impossible to divorce the two. After all, considering the role of religion and religious establishment, the shallow entanglement of religion and politics, and the deep entanglement of religion and culture, perhaps these arrangements are the key ingredients in maintaining political stability in Senegal.

### **The Economic Dimension**

The economic establishment and its customary authorities functions within the context that could be better explained as an economic system of corporatism. This establishment includes business and industry. Similar to other establishment, this establishment is also headed by business/industry customary authorities. These customary authorities, within the framework of the *Democarassie* model, also bear out their part in maintaining political stability in Senegal. Economic customary authorities play their role in the distribution of spoils in the form of jobs, access, and resources. As long as these spoils are distributed efficiently, political stability is reinforced. As a matter of fact, the distribution of spoils is so entrenched in Senegalese society that it has come to be expected; a way of doing business, an incentive to vote for/against a candidate or a policy. It is admitted that this breeds corruption and Senegal has its share of corruption, however this arrangement helps maintain stability.

Arguably, the religious establishment overshadows both the socio-cultural and economic establishment. The far reaching hand of the religious establishment reaches out and touches both the socio-cultural and economic establishment. As already pointed out, religion and culture in Senegal cannot be divorced, because socio-cultural exchanges in

Senegal today find its grounding in religion. In a similar vein, the majority of business and industry customary authorities have close and sacred ties to the religious customary authorities. The relation they share is a caliph/talib relationship and in this relationship the caliph is supreme. Therefore, the caliph can dictate downwards. As a result, having connections with the caliph and his deputies can open doors and lead to business opportunities. At the same time if the caliph's order is to break or start a demonstration, these orders will be carried expediently and diligently. As a result the religious establishment and its customary authorities, by far command more influence than other customary authorities, including the political and military customary authorities. The military establishment and its role in upholding political stability are examined next.

### **Military Establishment: Armed Forces**

In the interest of understanding the military establishment and the role of its customary authorities within the *Democarassie* model in upholding political stability, one start the inquiry by examining the Senegalese armed forces. In researching the Senegalese armed forces, one frequently comes across characterizations such as “highly professional”, “well trained”, and “well disciplined”. Such characterizations are hardly new. These characterizations could be traced back to the mid-nineteen the century, but more so during World War I and II, citing the valor and gallantry of the now famous *Tirailleurs Senegalaise*. Today the Senegalese armed forces are known for their professionalism and discipline, both at home and around the world in the numerous peacekeeping missions they lead or participate in from Darfur, to Sudan, to Haiti, in naming a few. According to Defence Web, Senegal's armed forces consist of; an Army of

11900 personnel, an Air Force of 770 personnel, a Navy of 950 personnel and Paramilitary of 5000 personnel; a total armed force close to 19,000. The National Gendarmerie, the wing primarily charged with internal policing and domestic security, is also part of the armed forces. Each unit of the armed forces is headed by Chief of Staff, except the Gendarmerie which is headed by a High Commander. At the zenith of the chain-of-command is the President in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief, followed by the Prime Minister, then the Minister of Defence.<sup>34</sup>

Clearly, the armed force is under civilian control, similar the United States system. Under the civilian leadership are the heads of the various branches of the armed forces. With the influence of the president and “displaced allegiance” in mind, one must be concerned with the issue of how these top military leaders are appointed to these top positions. In Senegal, the president in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief names these leaders to these top positions. For instance, on December 31, 2012 the Africa Review reported, “Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade has named 13 army generals in his capacity as the Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of Senegal.”<sup>35</sup> However, the issue of “displaced allegiance” is not seen as a major concern. Research shows that the professionalism of these top military brass guards against the president’s influence, but this does not mean that the president does not exert some influence over the top military leadership. These heads are also viewed in the study as the customary authorities

---

<sup>34</sup> “Senegal Armed Forces,” Defence Web.

<sup>35</sup> Jean Matthew Tamba, “Senegal’s Wade Appoints 13 New Army Generals,” *Africa Review*, (December 31, 2011), accessed June 2, 2014, <http://www.africareview.com/News/Senegals-Wade-names-13-new-army-generals/-/979180/1297978/-/p87pkiz/-/index.html>.

of the military establishment. Just like the other customary authorities in the other establishment, they operate within the parameters of the *Democarassie* model, with high expectations to fulfill their duty in helping uphold political stability. The focus now turns to, how does this establishment and its customary authorities contribute their part in upholding political stability?

One could argue that as an independent nation, Senegal was fortunate to come into existence with well-disciplined, well trained, internationally exposed, professional armed forces. Equally important is the civilian leaders' vision since the early independence days to 1) keep the Senegalese armed forces under civilian control, and 2) incorporate the armed forces as a partner in development, hence part of civil society. The armed forces in Senegal are not seen as a distant force in confinement in some distant barracks and only come to town in the time of crisis, or come to suppress the people during an uprising. Instead, from the beginning the armed forces are seen as protectors of the nation. In addition to that, the armed forces are seen as being on the service of the people; building public projects, offering health service, educating people and so on. As a result, the armed forces are seen as members of the community, not machines of death. The Senegalese people are also very proud of their armed forces because of their splendid performance in peace keeping around the world, a source of goodwill for the entire country. This idea of incorporating the armed forces as a partner in development underwrites the genesis of the *Armée-Nation* concept: a concept promoting civil-military partnership in development. According to Partners for Democratic Change, *Armée-Nation* is a Senegalese Indigenous model for building peace, stability and civil-military

relationships.”<sup>36</sup> The original idea of *Armée-Nation* and its framer’s vision is hereby captured: “Shortly after Senegal’s independence, President Senghor and Chief of Defense Jean Alfred Diallo determined that the military should play a major role in the country’s development as well as serve the Senegalese people under the unequivocal leadership of the civilian authorities.”<sup>37</sup> Since the inception of the *Armée-Nation* concept, it has always been part of the military mission to assume three responsibilities: “safeguard peace, protect the Senegalese people, and assist the population in economic and social development.”<sup>38</sup> This idea took the armed forces out of the barracks into the civilian community as partners in development. Busy with developing the country and under the civilian leadership, this partly informs the apolitical nature of the Senegalese armed forces. In retrospect, the Senegalese armed forces, since independence, engaged more in development than protecting the country, because Senegal has been relatively peaceful and stable, besides the sporadic uprisings from time to time and the Casamance debacle. In Senegal the armed forces strictly observe the pledge of protecting, developing, and staying out of political affairs. Thus, in and by itself adds to stability.

Today, the Senegalese armed forces command admirable trust, respect, and goodwill from Senegalese citizens. The Senegalese armed forces have never been seen by

---

<sup>36</sup> Partners for Democratic Change, “Senegal’s Armée-Nation: Lessons Learned from an Indigenous Model for Building Peace, Stability and Effective Civil-Military Relations in West Africa,” *Partners for Democratic Change*, accessed 6/4/2014, <http://www.partnersglobal.org/where/africa/senegal/Senegal%20Armee%20Nation.pdf>.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.



leaders and citizens alike as a national security threat or a threat to the Senegalese way of life. Unlike armed forces in other West Africa countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania, in naming a few, the Senegalese armed forces stay at arm's-length and so far seem to avoid at all cost in meddling with the political status quo. As a matter of fact, instead of trying to overthrow the regime, the armed forces are known to have a very harmonious relationship with both the civilian leadership and civil society. Such a harmonious relationship is captured by Biram Diop in his piece *Civil-Military Relations in Senegal*. In this piece, Diop postulates that, "Since independence, civil-military relations in Senegal have been proficient and exemplary. The international community has often cited as a model."<sup>39</sup> Diop went on to reiterate on few points of general consensus within Senegal observers concerning the Senegalese armed forces. Diop observes that the primary reasons behind the successful civilian-military relationship in Senegal are; 1) the generally peaceful political environment; 2) the wisdom and vision of leaders to very early on develop the *Armée-Nation* concept; 3) nurturing an environment with policies that help in the institutionalization of civil-military relationships; 4) treating the armed forces as a partner in development; 5) the professionalism and high standards the armed forces adhere to; 6) the partnership between the Senegalese armed forces and other more experienced and sophisticated armed forces such as the United States and

---

<sup>39</sup> Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal," accessed June 4, 2014, [http://www.ccd21.org/military\\_handbook/volume\\_two/12\\_senegal.pdf](http://www.ccd21.org/military_handbook/volume_two/12_senegal.pdf), 236.

France armed force; and 7) the Senegalese armed force peacekeeping experience and international exposure.<sup>40</sup>

The discussion thus far, paints a picture of an internationally exposed, well-trained, highly professional, civilian controlled armed force, charged with not only with maintaining peace and security, but national development, and service to the people.

Maintaining peace and security is a given for any armed force, however a charge for national development and serving the civilian population during times of peace is not out of the ordinary, but not typical. In other words, when one thinks of the armed forces, national development and serving the people during peace time is not on the top of the agenda. This is arguable, in the case of the armed forces in Senegal, the armed force's role in development and citizens' service results in credibility, respect, appreciation, and goodwill of citizens towards the armed forces. As a result, customary authorities/leaders of the military establishment play their important role of maintaining political stability in Senegal. Arguably, since the armed forces and their leaders enjoy significant credibility and goodwill with the Senegal people, this allows them to perform the duty of maintaining political stability effectively and more importantly in a peaceful democratic manner.

Arguably, the armed forces and its customary authorities will continue to be apolitical and avoid meddling with the political system, because this is what the citizens have come to expect. This has become the status quo and the norm. Therefore, the

---

<sup>40</sup> Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal", 236.

armed forces and its leadership will lose significant credibility and goodwill with the people, if they ever decide to deeply meddle with the political and/or the civilian leadership. Such will be a great price to pay considering the fact that the armed forces, including the top brass customary authority, have been generally satisfied with the status quo. In the relationship the president and the civilian authority take care of the military establishment authorities by allowing autonomy, job security, rewards, recognition, and flexibility, and in return the military establishment customary authorities ensure that the president and the civilian administration perpetuate. Leonardo Arriola succinctly captured this exchange by observing that, "The deployment of patronage has been used to explain the exceptional durability of some African regimes. The evidence from such paradigmatic cases as Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Senegal suggest that the leaders can achieve a degree of stability for their regimes by using the resources to facilitate intra-elite accommodation."<sup>41</sup> Arguably, unless a civilian leader and civilian administration poses major and tangible threats, the armed forces will continue to do their part in upholding political stability and keeping out of politics. In that environment, a coup will not ever take place.

---

<sup>41</sup> Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* Volume 2 Number 10 (2009): 1339-1362, accessed May 24, 2014, [http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3618/Arriola\\_2009.pdf](http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3618/Arriola_2009.pdf), 1340.

## CHAPTER 6

### FINDINGS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings from the study reveal the following workings and processes of the *Democarassie* model: The first finding of the study is that other than the issue of accommodation for nations' unique realities the two models (liberal democratic model and the *Democarassie* model) are practically the same. Since the *Democarassie* model is grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, as expected, the elements of both models are quite similar; both models extend guarantees and protections, as highlighted in the study. The only major difference between the two models is the consideration of unique realities. The liberal democratic model is deemed universal with no considerations to individual nations' unique realities, and the model allows for "direct popular sovereignty". However, the *Democarassie* model is a nation-centric model that takes into consideration and accommodates the nation's unique realities. Because of the unique reality of establishments and customary authority in Senegal, the *Democarassie* model is seen to offer "indirect popular sovereignty": A situation where people hold sovereignty however, that sovereignty is heavily influenced by customary authority, thus the notion of "indirect popular sovereignty".

The second finding of the study is that the *Democarassie* model possesses "system stabilizing" values. As highlighted in the study, these values make the model

kinder and gentler, responsive and accommodating to Senegal unique realities. As a result of these accommodating tendencies, it is found out that in the form of the *Democarassie* model of democracy, the democratic framework has adapted to Senegal's existing realities, therefore adopted as the Senegalese system of government. Because of this arrangement, one can posit that democracy is married to realities (political, socio-cultural, religious, and economic) that Senegalese are already familiar with. The result is, Senegalese becoming more open and comfortable with democracy. This informs the lack of major resistance, the "buying into" and the adopting of democracy in Senegal. Because of the local flavor, democracy is no longer seen as a foreign or a Western construct being "shoved down in their throats." As a result, one posits that Senegalese are now very comfortable, and to an extent understand the working of democracy, therefore fully participate. This explains the high values of political participation, high degree of freedom and liberties guarantees, high level of tolerance, and the high level of inclusion.

The third finding of the study is the "tools of the trade," the "glue," the *Democarassie* model applies in making the model work well, and keep all components operating in tandem. As already mentioned, the strength of the *Democarassie* model is accommodating the nation's realities, and an important reality in Senegal is the reality of cleavages within society. It is no surprise that diverging cleavages makes a society unstable. The *Democarassie* model is well aware of that, and therefore accounts for and accommodates this reality. As a result, the model utilizes religion, culture, language, nationalism, age and gender roles in the application of the "convergent glue." Evidently,

the same ingredients of the “convergent glue,” are also the perfect ingredients for divergent cleavage and agents of instability. However, the *Democarassie* model makes it possible to convert these ingredients from creating divergent cleavages and political instability to convergent cleavages and political stability. The most important finding of the study is discovering how the *Democarassie* model makes this possible. In other words, the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal.

The ultimate findings of the study on the implications of the *Democarassie* model on political stability in Senegal are captured as follows.

In addition to sharing the elements of the liberal democratic model, and offering meaningful “system stabilizing” values, the *Democarassie* model taps into institutions, referred to in this study as establishments and establishment leaders, referred to in this study as customary authority. The case was made that it is in the interest of the customary authorities to work with, rather than against each other, in keeping the regime in place and fending off instability. It was found out that all customary authorities serve their constituents, who in turn pledge allegiance to customary authority, who also pledge allegiance to the regime and the head of the regime-the president. The political, religious, socio- cultural, economic, and military establishments all have special constituencies they serve and serving these constituencies will well help them remain vested, thus maintain stability. The arrangement is seen to maintain stability, through the *Democarassie* model.

In conclusion, it is found prudent to recap the main points of the study. Within the background that democracy upholds prosperity and political stability, chapter one teases out the fact that this is not the case in West Africa, given the magnitude of coups and

general economic stagnation or even deterioration. However, in the region, Senegal and Cape Verde stand out, as far as political stability as manifested in the frequency of coups and the maturity of democracy is concerned. The study focused on Senegal and found out that not the liberal democratic model, but the *Democarassie* model was responsible for democracy and political stability in Senegal. This led to the literature review on the two concerns of the study (the democratization process, democracy, and policy stability). In this review it is discovered that the liberal democratic model is not one-size-fit all. As a result, the literature review analysis concluded with a suggestion for a model of democracy that is grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, but that also accommodates a nation's realities. This leads to a discovery to the gap in the literature, suggesting that the liberal democratic model is not capable of fully explaining political stability in Senegal.

Chapter three adds to the study by presenting the *Democarassie* model as the theoretical framework that explains political stability in Senegal better than the liberal democratic framework. Following a detailed conceptualizations of the main concerns (political stability, democratization/democracy and the *Democarassie* model), chapter three highlighted the necessity and made the justification for utilizing an explanatory qualitative case study. The main justification being, in order to get to the crux of the *Democarassie* model and its implication on political stability, a case study analysis proves to be a useful method of analysis. In the case study, the first conundrum reveals itself in the comparative prelude, where despite similarities between Senegal and West Africa, a different outcome ensued. The case study went at length in showing how

Senegal arrived at that different outcome; the outcome of remaining democratic and politically stable while the general sub-region suffers from endemic issues of democracy and instability. Chapter five illustrates the inner workings of the *Démocarassie* model that makes Senegal democratic and politically stable. This leads to the overall conclusion of the study.

The overall conclusion of the study is that Senegal is relatively democratic and politically stable region, not because of the liberal democratic model as a Western construct, but because of the *Démocarassie* model: a derivative/offshoot of the liberal democratic model that considers and accommodates the realities in Senegal.

Why not promote the idea of discovering models of the liberal democratic model that accommodates nations' unique realities? This is a suggestion for future study: if Senegal is able to discover a model of democracy grounded in the liberal democratic tradition that considers and therefore accommodates Senegal's unique realities, therefore fitting Senegal better, why not other countries, especially countries in the West African sub-region that are plagued with both lack of democratic consolidation and political instability.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ake, Claude. "A Definition of Political Stability." *Comparative Politics* 7, no. 4 (January 1975): 278. Accessed June 14, 2012. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421552>.

American Foreign Policy Council. "World Almanac of Islamism." American Foreign Policy Council. Last modified July 11, 2013. Accessed June 7, 2014 <http://almanac.afpc.org/senegal>.

Arriola, Leonardo. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no.10 (October 2009): 339-1362. Accessed June 16, 2014. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414009332126>.

ANSD. "Senegal in Brief." *Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (ANSD)*. Accessed June 23, 2014, <http://www.ansd.sn>.

Blanco, Luisa and Robin Grier. "Long Live Democracy: The Determinant of Political Instability in Latin America." *Journal of Development Studies* 45, No. 1 (January 2009): 76-95. Accessed May 5, 2012. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220380802264788>.

BBC. "Sufism." BBC Religions. Last modified September 8, 2009. Accessed June 7, 2014. [http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sufism\\_1.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sufism_1.shtml).

Blunt, Elizabeth. "Senegal's Powerful Brotherhoods." *BBC News*, September 22, 2005. Accessed June 7, 2014. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4268342.stm>.

Carothers, Thomas. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 1999.

Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. Last modified June 20, 2014. Accessed June 23, 2014. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html>.

Chambers, Simone. *Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, "Coups Traps: Why does Africa have so many Coups d'état?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science

Association, Washington D.C., September 1, 2005. Accessed May 20, 2012.  
<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/Coup-traps.pdf>.

Constitutionnet. "Constitutional History of Senegal." Constitutionnet. Last modified July 11, 2013. Accessed July 3, 2014.  
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-senegal>.

Crowder, Michael, and Obaro Ikime. (ed) *The West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence*. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970.

Crowder, Michael. *Senegal: A Study of French Assimilation Policy*. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967.

Dahl, Robert A. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

Dahl, Robert A. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Dahl, Robert A. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Dahl, Robert A. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

Dahl, Robert A. *On Political Equality*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Dahl, Robert A., Ian Shapiro and Jose Antonio Cheibub. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003.

Davies, James. "Political Stability and Instability: Some Manifestations and Causes." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no.1 (1969): 1-17. Accessed June 16, 2012.  
 URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173295>.

Defence Web. "Senegal Armed Forces." Defence Web. Last updated October 13, 2003. Accessed June 2, 2014.  
[http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_contentandview=articleandid=32272:senegalese-armed-forcesandcatid=119:african-militariesandItemid=255](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=32272:senegalese-armed-forcesandcatid=119:african-militariesandItemid=255).

Denny, Charlotte. "Suharto, Marcos and Mobuto Head Corruption Table with \$50bn Scams." *The Guardian*, March 26, 2004. Accessed September 5, 2012.  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/26/indonesia.philippines>.

Diamond, Larry. *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008.

- Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Platter. *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Dickson, David. "Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research Agenda." *United States Institute of Peace*, May 10, 2005. Accessed June 7, 2014. <http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/amcdouga/Hist446/readings/political%20islam%20saharan%20africa.pdf>.
- Diop, Biram. "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal." In *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, edited by Dennis Blair, 236-56. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013. Accessed June 4, 2014. [http://www.ccd21.org/military\\_handbook/volume\\_two/12\\_senegal.pdf](http://www.ccd21.org/military_handbook/volume_two/12_senegal.pdf).
- Diop, Cheikh Anta. *Precolonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the formation of the Modern State*. New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987.
- Dye, Thomas and L. Harmon Zeigler. *The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction of American Politics*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1972.
- Freedom House. "Freedom in the World: Senegal." Freedom House. Accessed June 4, 2014. <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/gambia#.U7a18JRdW3I>.
- Freedom House. "Freedom in the World: The Gambia." Freedom House. Accessed June 4, 2014. <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/senegal#.U7a2-JRdW3I>.
- Gillham, Bill. "Case Study Research Methods." *Continuum International Publishing*, (2010). Accessed May 24, 2014. Proquest Ebrary <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/westga/Doc?id=10404926andppg=16>.
- Global Edge. "Senegal: Government." Michigan State University Global Edge. Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/senegal/government>.
- Gouvernement Du Senegal*. "Institutions." *Gouvernement Du Senegal*. Last modified January 7, 2013. Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://www.gouv.sn>.

Gupta, Anirudha. "Roots of Political Instability in Africa." *Economic and Political Weekly* 2, no. 23 (June 10, 1967): 1041-1046. Accessed December 8, 2013. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4358039>.

Held, David and Christopher Pollitt. *New Forms of Democracy*. London: Sage Publishing Ltd., 1986.

Held, David. *Models of Democracy*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Held, David. *Democracy and the Global Order*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1991.

Hurwitz, Leon. "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, *Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change*, (Apr., 1973): 449-463. Accessed May 10, 2011. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421273>.

Hyman, Jacques Louis. "Leopold Sedar Senghor." Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1971.

IREX. "Senegal Media Sustainability Index (MSI)." IREX. Last modified April 24, 2014. Accessed July 30, 2014. <http://www.irex.org/resource/senegal-media-sustainability-index-msi>.

Jong-A-Pin, Richard. "Essays on Political Instability: measurement, Causes and Consequences." PhD. Diss., Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 543 (September 2010). Accessed June 2, 2014 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130>.

Kieh, George Klay. "The State and Political Instability in Africa." *Journal of Developing Societies*. 2591, 1-25. Accessed December 6, 2013. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0169796X0902500101>.

Leon, Tony. "The State of Liberal Democracy in Africa: Resurgence or Retreat?." *CATO Institute*. (April 26, 2010). Accessed August 20, 2012.

<http://www.cato.org/publications/development-policy-analysis/state-liberal-democracy-africa-resurgence-or-retreat>.

Lijphart, Arend. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Lijphart, Arend. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

Lings, Michael. *What is Sufism?*. Cambridge, UK: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1975.

Luttwak, Edward. *Coup D'état: A Practical Handbook*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969.

Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Markoff, John. *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change*. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 1996.

Marshall, Monty G. and Donna Ramsey Marshal. "Coup d'état Events, 1946-2013 Codebook." *Center for systemic Peace*. Accessed May 21, 2014. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/CSPCoupsCodebook2013.pdf>.

McGowan, Patrick J. "African military Coup d'états 1956-200: Frequency, Trend, and Distribution." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 3 (2003) 339-370. Accessed September 30, 2010. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X0300435X>.

Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1956.

Nossiter, Adam. "A Turbulent-Free Elections in Senegal." *New York Times*, March 25, 2012. Accessed May 11, 2012. [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/president-concedes-race-in-senegal.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/president-concedes-race-in-senegal.html?_r=0).

Ong'ayo, Antony Otieno. "Political Instability in Africa: Where the Problem Lies and Alternative Perspectives." Paper presented at the Symposium 2008: "Afrika: een continent op drift." Stichting Nationaal Erfgoed Hotel De Wereld, Wageningen, September 19, 2008. Accessed June 10, 2013. [http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Political\\_Instabil.pdf](http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Political_Instabil.pdf)

Partners for Democratic Change. "Senegal's Armée-Nation: Lessons Learned from an Indigenous Model for Building Peace, Stability and Effective Civil-Military Relations in West Africa." *Partners for Democratic Change*. Accessed June 4,

2014,  
<http://www.partnersglobal.org/where/africa/senegal/Senegals%20Armee%20Nation.pdf>.

Post, Ken. *The New States of West Africa*. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1964.

Przeworski, Adam. *Sustainable Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Reid, Stuart. "Africa's Turn." *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 5 (September 2013): 2-8. Accessed May 25, 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/africas-turn?page=show>.

Reynal-Querol, Marta. "Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars." *Institut d'analysis Economic* (April 2002). Accessed May 10, 2010.  
[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/politicalsystems\\_stability\\_and\\_civilwars.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/politicalsystems_stability_and_civilwars.pdf).

Robert S. Strauss Center. "Social Conflict in Africa Database." The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Last modified May 12, 2014. Accessed May 27, 2014. <https://www.strausscenter.org/country-search.html?countrycode=433>.

Ruchti, Jéfri J., trans. "Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, 2010, As Amended to June to Constitutional Law No. 2009-22 of 19 June 2009." *HeinOnline World Constitutions Illustrated library 2011*. Accessed July 3, 2014.  
<http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN048952.pdf>.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles. *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Schimmel, Annemarie. "Sufism," *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed June 7, 2014.  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/571823/Sufism>.

Skurnik, W. A. E. *The Foreign Policy of Senegal*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972.

Schmitter, Phillippe C. "Still the Century of Corporatism?." *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 36, No.1 (Jan., 1974): 85-131. Accessed June 25, 2014.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406080>,

Souaré, Issaka K. *Civil Wars and Coup d'état in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions*. Lanham, Maryland: United Press of America, 2006.

Tamba, Jean Matthew. "Senegal's Wade Appoints 13 New Army Generals." *Africa Review*, December 31, 2011. Accessed June 2, 2014.  
<http://www.africareview.com/News/Senegals-Wade-names-13-new-army-generals/-/979180/1297978/-/p87pkiz/-/index.html>.

Tellis, Winston. "Applications of a Case Study Methodology" *The Qualitative Report*, Volume 3, Number 3, September, 1997. Accessed May 16, 2014.  
<http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html>.

Wiarda, Howard J. *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great 'Ism'*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997.

Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Hewbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984.

Zakaria, Fareed. *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003.